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Introduction
This study investigates Aristotle’s notion of pros hen and, moreover, how 
this notion is related to the Aristotelian notions of homonymy, synonyms 
and multivocity.1 It is controversial what exactly these notions mean, 
how they are related, and whether Aristotle’s terminology is consistent 
throughout his works. Although there have been attempts to answer 
each of these questions,2 so far no satisfactory answers have been found. 
This study aims at answering these questions. In order to state my the-
ses concerning these questions most clearly, I first provide some general 
remarks about the field of interest. Secondly, I provide a preliminary 
overview of the four notions and my thesis on the issues connected 
with them. Thirdly, I outline the structure of the chapters of this study. 
According to Aristotle, many central philosophical concepts, such 
as cause, principle, nature, or being are said in many ways – λέγεται 
πολλαχῶς. Its meaning is still subject of debate. One standard but also 
debated answer is that if F is said in many ways, “F” has different senses. 
The question for the many ways appears in almost every work of Aris-
totle. This phrase often occurs at the beginning of new chapters, and it 
is a characteristic feature of Aristotle’s strategy of approaching a new 
topic.3 Any thorough investigation requires clarity – τὸ σαφές about 
the terms that are used within.4 Clarity is one of the most fundamental 
conditions of constructing arguments and reaching agreement on a 
1 I use the term “multivocity” to refer to Aristotle’s phrase to be said in many ways – 
πολλαχῶς λέγεςθαι.
2 There is a barely manageable amount of secondary literature on this topic. Among 
others, most relevant for this study are the following contributions: Owen, G. E. L. (1960). 
Logic and Metaphysics in some earlier works of Aristotle. In Aristotle and Plato in the 
mid-fourth century, ed. Ingemar. Düring, Gwilym Ellis Lane. Owen and Symposium 
Aristote licum, 164–191. Göteborg. Owens, J. (19783). The doctrine of being in the Aristo-
telian ‘Metaphysics’: A study in the Greek background of mediaeval thought; with a pref-
ace by Etienne Gilson, 3rd edn. Toronto. Shields, C. J. (1999). Order in Multiplicity: Hom-
onymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle. Oxford. Irwin, T. H. (1981). Homonymy in Aristotle. 
The Review of Metaphysics 34 (3): 523–544. Ward, J. K. (2008). Aristotle on homonymy – 
Dialectic and science. Cambridge. Brakas, J. (2011). Aristotle’s “Is Said in Many Ways” and 
Its Relationship to His Homonyms. Journal of the history of philosophy 49 (2): 135–159.
3 In Phys. II.3, Aristotle begins examining the notion of cause by considering in how 
many ways “cause” is said. Cf. for more examples chapter 1 of this study. 
4 Cf. Top. I.18, 108a18-22.
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certain topic, e.g. if one constructed an argument containing a term 
that is said in many ways without specifying what is meant, one would 
risk drawing unwarranted conclusions.5 Aristotle often mentions that 
some of his predecessors disregarded the multiplicity of ways in which 
something can be said. A prominent example of this kind of critique 
is found in Phys. I.2–3, where Aristotle criticises the monistic position 
of Parmenides (and/or other Eleatics). Aristotle raises the question in 
which way “being” is used by those people who claim that all things that 
are are one (cf. Phys. I.2, 185a20). Aristotle spells this out in terms of his 
doctrine of the Categories according to which saying that something 
exists is to say that it is one substance, one quality, or an item of one 
of the other categories. He claims that if the things that are belong to 
different categories, then there will be obviously more than one thing. 
And if there are qualities or quantities, there must also be substances, 
since nothing that belongs to one of the non-substantial categories can 
exist independently of substance.6 Thus, according to Aristotle, one of 
the problems of Parmenides’s theory was that he disregarded that being 
is said in many ways. This is only the beginning of Aristotle’s critique 
on Parmenides in Phys. I.2–3 and may suffice for now.7 
Another philosopher that may be accused of underappreciating the 
multiplicity of ways in which something can be said is Plato who claimed 
that a single Form of Goodness is responsible for all things being good. 
All good things are good because they participate in the same Form of 
Goodness. In EN I.6, Aristotle formulates five arguments against the 
Platonic proposal of the existence of such a (universal – καθόλου EN I.6, 
1096a11) Form of the good.8 According to Aristotle, Plato assumes that 
5 A popular example for this is: The end is the purpose; death is the end of life; hence, 
death is the purpose of life. This is a fallacy related to the ambiguity of “end”. Aristotle 
deals with such fallacies in SE 4.
6 Cf. Cat. 5, 2b5-9 and Phys. I.2, 185a31-32.
7 The chapters of Phys. I.2-3 are highly controversial. For further remarks on Aristotle’s 
critique cf. Spangler, O. A. (1979), Aristotle’s Criticism of Parmenides in Physics I, in Apeiron 
13 (2). More recently in Clarke, T. (2018). Physics I.2. In Aristotle’s Physics I: A Systematic 
Exploration, ed. Diana Quarantot-to, 60–81.
8 Cf. for a detailed discussion of these arguments cf. Flashar, H. (20062). Die Platon-
kritik (I 4). In Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik, 2nd edn, ed. Otfried Höffe, 63–82, Berlin. 
Moreover, usually there is a crucial difference between the Form of the Good and the 
universal Good. The common element exists in all good things, while the Form of the 
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all things are good in the same way.9 The character that is common to all 
good things is the Form of Goodness. Since this is the same in all cases 
“good” must be said in one way only. Aristotle rejects this belief and 
claims that the “good” is said in many ways because there are different 
accounts of being good in various cases and there is no account of being 
good that is common to all different cases. In his second argument (EN 
I.6, 1096a23-29), he claims it is said across all categories. For example, 
in the category of quantity, it is moderation in amount, in that of qual-
ity, it is virtue, in that of time, a favourable opportunity.10 He concludes 
that there cannot be a universal good that is common to all. In his next 
argument (EN I.6, 1096a29-34), he argues that there should be a single 
science of the good, but as a matter of fact there are various sciences of 
the good. There are various sciences of the goods that are in one category – 
νῦν δ’ εἰσὶ πολλαὶ [ἐπιστήμαι] καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν (EN 1096a31-
32). From this, it is already clear that Aristotle accuses Plato of having 
overlooked the actual complexity of the things that are called “good”. 
This critique may be transferred to other cases in which Plato incau-
tiously treats subtly complex phenomena as unified by a single form.11 
It may be important to emphasise that the core of Aristotle’s critique 
does not aim at Plato or Parmenides having overlooked that the term 
“good” or “being” can have different senses in different applications but 
that the underlying extra-linguistic phenomena are more complex than 
their theories suggest. In this regard, Aristotle’s analysis of the many 
ways in which something can be said is central to the way he deals with 
Good has a separate existence. (cf. MM I.1, 1182b11ff.). In this context a thorough distinc-
tion is not necessary. 
9 Aristotle believes that Plato assumed there is only one definition of “good”. This can 
be derived from Aristotle’s remark that there is only one and the same definition – εἷς 
καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν for the man and the man-itself (EN I.6, 1096b1, also Met. XIII.4, 
1079a33-b3 = Met. I.9, 991a2-8). Therefore, (for Plato) “good” is said in one way only, 
and nothing hinders there being a single science of the good (cf. EN 1096a29). However, 
among other things, Aristotle claims (EN 1096a30-32) that this contradicts the facts, i.e. 
the fact that there are many sciences of the good which support Aristotle’s proposal that 
there must be many ways in which something can be good. Cf. also Plato’s Meno 71e1-72a5.
10 There are differences in the accounts of being good for honour, wisdom and pleasure. 
Cf. EN I.6 1096a24-33 and EE I.8, 1217b27-18a1.
11 I allude to the case of being, which is touched upon by Aristotle’s first EN I.6, 1096a17-23 
and second argument EN I.6, 1096a23-29.
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insufficiently fine-grained philosophical distinctions. When Aristotle 
focuses on the distinctions of several senses in which something can 
be said, he does so to reveal the corresponding real differences, which 
sometimes have been disregarded by his predecessors. In this light, the 
analysis of the many ways may be considered a critical tool primarily. 
Yet, this assessment would be too narrow. Aristotle uses his analyses also 
to present his own views, which are allegedly more accurately making 
sense of the complexity of the worldly reality.
Of specific interest for the present study is a proposal he makes in 
the Metaphysics IV.2. While in EN I.6, Aristotle denied that there is a 
single science of the good because it is said in many ways, in Met. IV.2 
it seems that this criterion is not valid any more. One may assume that 
Aristotle revised his view in this regard.12 In Met. IV.2, Aristotle claims 
that a scientific investigation is also possible of things that are not uni-
fied by a common genus13 but unified in a different way, namely by their 
dependency on one principle14 or one common nature.15 The acknowl-
edgement of an order different from genus-species relationship enables 
Aristotle to justify a unified scientific investigation of fields, which oth-
erwise could not be examined in a single science, as he stated in EN I.6 
(and the parallel EE I.8). In this context, it is clear that with his analysis 
of the many ways, Aristotle discovered a relationship that other philos-
ophers did not see. Thus, the question for the many ways is evidently 
part of his own constructive philosophising. In Met. IV.2, and in other 
passages, Aristotle claims that these things are said in many ways, i.e. 
multivocal, but not homonymous. The meaning and the influence of 
this claim for Aristotle’s doctrine of homonymy, synonymy and multi-
vocity will be of crucial importance for the present study. In order to 
12 Cf. also EE I.8, 1217b27-18a1. In addition, I discuss the question “What is the innova-
tion of the Metaphysics IV?” in section 8.2.
13 In An. Post. I.28 Aristotle states that a science is one when it is of one genus. He does 
not mention the alternative of Met. IV.2 in that chapter. Because of that, one may assume 
that the proposal of Met. IV.2 is an innovation, cf. section 8.2 of this study. 
14 Cf. for principle – ἀρχή Met. IV.2, 1003b6.
15 Cf. for nature – φύσις Met. IV.2, 1003a34. Also, cf. Met. IV.2, 1003b12-16: For not only 
in the case of those things that are said according to one – καθ’ ἓν, it is possible to examine 
one science, but also in the case of those things said in relation to one – πρός μίαν nature it is 
possible to examine one science. This passage is discussed in detail in section 8.4.2.
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clarify this, I now present an overview of these notions and the claims 
made in this study connected with them.
Firstly, we focus on the notion of Aristotelian synonymy. For Aris-
totle, a single term can refer to a multiplicity of things. In cases of syn-
onymy, a single common term refers to a multiplicity of things because 
all these things are of the same kind. For example, the term “animal” 
refers to every animal there is, because the feature of each animal, in 
virtue of how each belongs to the kind animal is the same in all cases.16 
A human and an ox are synonymously animals in the sense that both 
can be identified as animals, and being an animal is the same for them, 
which is why the definition of the term “animal” and the definition of 
what it is to be an animal is the same in all cases. In Cat. 1, 1a6-12, Aris-
totle defines the relation between the particular man and ox insofar as 
both are animals as synonymy. 
Aristotle recognises another way how terms can refer to a multi-
plicity of things. Some common terms apply to a multiplicity of things 
that do not constitute one kind. Thus, the definitions of such things are 
different. Aristotle addresses these cases in two ways. Sometimes, he 
calls them πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον, i.e. multivocal, sometimes homony-
mous. For instance, the term “bank” can refer to river banks and savings 
banks. However, in this case, what it is about each thing that is called 
“bank” in virtue of how it counts as a bank is different. There is no sin-
gle bank-kind as there was with animals, which is common to all the 
things that are called “bank”, but there is a multiplicity of bank-kinds, 
namely river banks and savings banks. The term “bank” is multivocal 
and homonymous at the same time. 
Because of that, one could assume that homonymy and multivocity 
coincide. Yet, there are many passages where Aristotle denies homon-
ymy but not multivocity.17 Hence, at least in these cases, the notions 
do not coincide, and there must be a third way terms can be used. 
16 Cf. SE 1, 166a6-31. Aristotle states that it as a matter of necessity, that there are single 
terms that signify a multiplicity of things, since he assumes that the number of terms is 
limited, while the number of things is infinite.
17 These are the relevant passages: Met. IV.2, 1003a33-34; Met. ix.1, 1046b4-7; GC I.6, 
322b29-32; Met. VII.4, 1030a29-b3, and also Top. II.3, 110b16-22; homonymy is also 
denied of some multivocals in EE VII.2, 1236a16-22. 
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According to Aristotle’s description, it may be plausible to call them 
non-homonymous multivocals. I assume this third possibility to be a 
consequence of the following deduction: It is plausible to assume that 
the distinction of synonymy and homonymy rests upon the presence 
and absence of a common character F, which is either present or absent 
in all cases where a multiplicity of things are called “F”. From this point 
of view, there is a conceptual space for intermediate cases between hom-
onymy and synonymy, i.e. cases in which a common character is neither 
entirely given nor entirely absent. Aristotle’s standard example for such 
cases is the term “healthy” (τὸ ὑγιεινὸν). The term “healthy” applies to 
a multiplicity of different things, while the definition of what it is to be 
healthy differs in each case. Some things are healthy because they bring 
about health, such as warmth, some things are healthy because they 
are a sign of health, such as good shape or full grown hair or similar.18 
Because of this, just as in the case of banks, healthy things do not form 
a single kind, but a multiplicity of kinds. 
Nevertheless, the cases of “bank” and the case of “healthy” are not 
identical. Unlike the example of banks, there is an underlying concept 
that all ways of being healthy have in common. Aristotle claims that all 
healthy things are related to one thing – πρὸς ἕν.19 He states that they are 
all related to health – ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν.20 In the following, this relation 
to one thing is called the pros hen relation (PHR). The hen – ἕν21 is called 
“focal reference”.22 The multiplicity of healthy things will be addressed 
as “focally related entities”. The most distinctive feature of the PHR is a 
18 Cf. Met. IV.2, 1003a34-b6 and also Met. XI.3, 1060b37-a7.
19 See the references of the previous footnote. Moreover, it is difficult to translate “pros 
hen”. One may assume that it means “pointing towards one”. This is a translation Ferejohn 
(1980: 119) describes as “hopelessly vague” and “intolerably metaphorical”. Ferejohn, M. T. 
(1980). Aristotle on Focal Meaning and the Unity of Science. Phronesis 25 (2): 117–128. Yu 
(2001: 208) agrees on “metaphorical”. Yu, J. (2001). What is the Focal Meaning of Being in 
Aristotle? Apeiron 34 (3). The obscurity of the translation tough rests upon the obscurity of 
the basis i.e. the expression “πρὸς ἕν”. Yu, J. (2001), What is the Focal Meaning of Being in 
Aristotle?, in Apeiron 34 (3): 205–231.
20 Met. IV.2, 1003a35. Cf. for the example of medical – ἰατρικόν Met. IV.2, 1003b1 and also 
Met. XI.3, 1060b37-a7.
21 Aristotle calls this also principle – ἀρχή in Met. 1003b6 and nature – φύσις in 1003a34.
22 This label is an allusion to Owen’s (1960; 1965) terminology. Although often criticised, 
Owen’s contributions are still seminal. 
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relation of logical priority23 of the focal reference to the focally related 
entities, which therefore depend in definition on it.24 A is logically prior 
to B, if A is part of the definition of B, while B is not part of the defini-
tion of A. This feature is most important for the PHR and I argue that 
this is the only way in which the focal reference is prior to the focally 
related entities. Even though there are focal references that are prior in 
other ways as well (such as οὐσία – substance in the case of beings – τὰ 
ὄντα)25, I consider logical priority the only kind of priority that is com-
mon to all instances of the PHR. As an operational definition of the PHR, 
I suggest considering it a relation of definitional dependence of multi-
vocals to one thing, i.e. the focal reference. Whilst all the focally related 
entities are related to the focal reference, each entity has a distinct rela-
tion to it, i.e. the unity between the different entities is not grounded in 
their having the same relation to the focal reference, but by the identity 
of the focal reference. In this sense, focally related entities are connected, 
whereas in homonyms, there is no such connection.26 
Unfortunately, Aristotle does not offer a proper definition of the 
PHR. He primarily works with examples. The best approach to delineate 
the PHR is examining both the various applications of it and the scat-
tered remarks on the nature of this relation. There have been attempts 
to define the PHR.27 Two recent monographs try to complete Aristotle’s 
fragmentary account of the PHR following virtually the same strategy. 
Both use an approach one could call a causal analysis even though 
23 “Logically prior” is equivalent with “prior in definition”. It is the sort of priority Aristotle 
calls λόγῳ or κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Cf. Met. XIII.2, 1077b3-4 and Met. V.11, 1018b32-36. Cf. also 
Owen (1960: 169–170) and Ferejohn (1980: 118–120) who also determine this kind of pri-
ority as most distinctive of the PHR. 
24 In connection with the PHR this thesis is found at various places; cf. EE VII.2, 1236a20; 
Met. VII.1, 1028a35-36; Met. ix.1, 1045b31. 
25 In Met. VII.1, 1028a31-33 substance is said to be prior in time, knowledge and defini-
tion. For a discussion of this passage cf. Cleary (1988: 65ff.). Cleary, J. J. (1988). Aristotle on 
the many senses of priority. Carbondale, Great Britain.
26 Here I presuppose a narrow conception of homonymy, i.e. one that is restricted to 
accidental homonymy which will be explained in the following paragraphs. 
27 In this study I discuss the attempts of Shields (1999) and Ferejohn (1980) in detail in 
section 6.1.1. Shields, C. J. (1999), Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of 
Aristotle, Oxford.
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only Ward (2008) refers to her approach with precisely this label.28 
I will discuss the problems of their strategy, and I will suggest a tentative 
definition that is based on the remarks Aristotle makes in the differ-
ent cases he applies this notion. Given the lack of strict criteria for the 
PHR, I analyse the application area of the PHR in greater detail. I present 
a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between homonymy, 
synonymy and multivocity, which primarily serves to determine the 
application area of the PHR. 
While many of Aristotle’s works testify that multivocity and hom-
onymy do not coincide,29 there is a strong tendency in the literature to 
neglect or trivialise this fact.30 The reason for this is that beside pas-
sages, which show that multivocity and homonymy do not coincide, 
there are also passages where Aristotle switches back and forth between 
multivocity and homonymy apparently without a terminological dif-
ference. Bonitz has already noticed the inconsistency between these 
passages and those where the notions do not coincide.31 Nowadays, a 
quite popular way to deal with such passages is with the following work-
around: One assumes that in those passages Aristotle only denies a 
certain kind of homonymy and not homonymy simpliciter. To justify 
that, scholars refer to EN I.6, 1096b26-2732 where Aristotle states that 
the good does not belong to the accidental – ἀπὸ τύχης homonyms. 
This passage has become the standard reference to argue that Aristotle’s 
28 Shields (1999: 110ff.) claims that the way of being F of a focally related entity must stand 
in one of the four causal relations to the focal reference. In addition to that, he claims (123f.) 
that the focal reference is asymmetrically responsible for the existence of the focally related 
entities. Ward (2008) provides an improved version of Shields’s approach which, as I take 
it, basically has the same difficulties as Shields’s approach, cf. section 6.1.1.
29 These are the relevant passages Met. IV.2, 1003a33-34; Met. ix.1, 1046b4-7; GC I.6, 
322b29-32; Met. VII.4, 1030a29-b3, and also Top. II.3, 110b16-22; homonymy is also 
denied of some multivocals in EE VII.2, 1236a16-22.
30 The two recent monographs concerning homonymy in Aristotle tend to blur the subtle 
difference between these notions. Cf. Shields (1999) and Ward, J. K. (2008), Aristotle on 
homonymy – Dialectic and science, Cambridge. 
31 The list of passages can be found in Bonitz Ind. Arist., 514a48-49 and 615a45-46. 
Bonitz, H. (1870). Index Aristotelicus. Berlin.
32 1096b26-27: ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. Sometimes 
scholars also refer to EE VII.2, 1236b25 even though this passage is not entirely equivalent.
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notion of homonymy is comprehensive33, i.e. encompassing accidental 
homonyms as well as non-accidental homonyms.34 I presented two 
examples for each case already: The case of banks illustrates accidental 
homonymy, whilst the healthy-example classifies as a case of non-acci-
dental homonymy.35 Based on this distinction, they claim that “homon-
ymy” and “multivocity” can be used interchangeably unless in a given 
context “homonymy” is meant in its accidental sense. 
Shields (1999: 10; 22ff.; also 219 n. 284) and others36 suggested that 
it is Aristotle’s dominant practice that homonymy and multivocity can 
be used interchangeably. It may be oversimplifying the case, but this 
assessment of the relationship of homonymy and multivocity puts too 
strong a focus on EN I.6, 1096b26-28 and Top. I.15 and it evaluates later 
passages on this basis. Scholars that adhere to this view are required 
to provide the workaround mentioned for passages in which multi-
vocity and homonymy are not used interchangeably.37 In this study, I 
propound that one should propose quite the opposite, i.e. that with 
some exceptions (especially in Top. I.15) Aristotle clearly distinguishes 
between these notions. Even elsewhere in the Topics, namely in Top. II.3, 
Aristotle clearly distinguishes multivocity from homonymy. 
The most prominent passage which proves this is given in Met. IV.2, 
1003a33-34. In this passage, Aristotle claims that being is said in many 
33 Shields (1999) and Irwin (1981) argue in favour of a unified “comprehensive” (Shields), 
or “moderate” (Irwin), account of homonymy. Cf. the list of the various sorts of homon-
ymy in Shields (1999: 41). Ward (2008) follows the assessments of Shields and Irwin. One 
can also add to the list of adherents of a comprehensive view on homonymy Hamlyn (1977) 
and Lewis, F. A. (2004). Aristotle on the Homonymy of Being. Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research 68 (1): 1–36.
34 However, it is a matter of debate how to draw the line between these two kinds of 
homonymy. 
35 In the literature there are many names for “non-accidental homonymy”. In this study, I 
will call it polysemy and I will refrain from calling it a type of homonymy, since according 
to my view it is a species of multivocity. Sometimes this kind of homonymy is assimilated 
to synonymy, cf. Leszl (1970: 135–55). Leszl, W. (1970). Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle. 
Antenore. In Ward (2008), Shields (1999) and Irwin, T. H. (1988). Aristotle‘s first principles. 
Oxford. – this is a type of homonymy, whereas it is called a type of equivocity by Owens 
(19783: 265–67). Owen (1960: 187) assimilated this notion to synonymy). 
36 Ward (2008) follows Shield’s assessments in this regard. For a more detailed overview 
cf. section 2.2.1 of this study.
37 Cf. the passages mentioned in footnote 17. 
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ways not homonymously, but in relation to one thing – ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν 
(Met. IV.2, 1003a34). If homonymy and multivocity were simply iden-
tical, statements like that would be uninformative. Yet, they are infor-
mative, although it is debatable how exactly they are informative. One 
way previously presented is to assume that the denial of homonymy is a 
denial of accidental homonymy only. I argue that this and similar pas-
sages deny homonymy without qualification because I propose that if 
one reconstructs Aristotle’s terminology in the “right” way, it emerges 
that Aristotle’s notion of homonymy is less comprehensive than often 
proposed.38 I will claim that any assessment of Aristotle’s doctrine of 
homonymy should pay more attention to Aristotle’s subtle distinction 
between multivocity and homonymy as it is reported in various pas-
sages across several works.39 The attempt to regard both concepts as 
identical is misleading, especially when it comes to an investigation of 
the PHR. Because of that, I argue that speaking of “pros hen homony-
my”40, or “core-dependent homonymy”41 or “core-related homonymy”42 
threatens the distinctiveness of Aristotle’s doctrine of homonymy. These 
labels assume a comprehensive account of homonymy that strains their 
textual basis. In order to emphasise this, I label such comprehensive 
accounts on homonymy inflationary. They are inflationary because, 
within such views, the notion of homonymy absorbs the notion of 
multivocity even though it is true to say about the whole Corpus that 
everything that is homonymous is also multivocal. At the same time, it 
is not true to say that everything that is multivocal is also homonymous. 
It is a quite widespread assumption that in earlier works (especially 
in Top. I.15 and the SE) the distinction between homonymy and multi-
vocity is not as sharp as in some later works (especially the GC and the 
Metaphysics).43 As indicated above (concerning Shields and Ward), I 
argue that the currently dominant assessment of the relationship of 
38 Several scholars who suggest this view are mentioned in footnote 19.
39 Cf. footnote 17. 
40 Hamlyn, D. W. (1977), The Presidential Address: Focal Meaning, in Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 78: 1–18.
41 Shields (1999). 
42 Ward (2008).
43 This thesis is proposed by Owen (1960) and it is shared by many other scholars. Cf. e.g. 
Owens (19783), Irwin (1981), Brakas (2011). 
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homonymy and multivocity is based on the terminology of the earlier 
works, and it assesses later passages on that basis. As a consequence, 
there are several passages, which only fit into this model if one inter-
poses workarounds in passages where Aristotle clearly distinguishes 
between homonymy and multivocity. I assume it is correct that there is 
a difference between earlier and later works as there is no terminologi-
cal model that applies to all passages without restrictions. Nevertheless, 
the model that represents the relationship of homonymy and multivoc-
ity more adequately is one in which homonymy and multivocity do 
not coincide.44 I will call this view the deflationary view on homonymy 
since it deflates the notion of homonymy from the perspective of the 
inflationary view. According to this view, homonymy coincides with 
what was termed accidental homonymy.45 The inflation of multivocity 
compensates the deflation of homonymy. I consider this an advantage 
for the following reasons: Although homonymy and multivocity do not 
coincide, they are very closely related. I propose that multivocity is the 
broader notion in comparison to homonymy. It is broader in the sense 
that it is the genus of homonymy. Thus, homonymy is a subcategory of 
multivocity beside others. If that is true, all homonyms are multivocals, 
but not all multivocals are homonyms.46 If homonymy is a subcate-
gory of multivocity, there must be at least one further (non-homony-
mous) subcategory of multivocity. From the passage mentioned above 
(1003a33-34), it is clear that there are at least pros hen multivocals. How-
ever, there is another kind of non-homonymous multivocals, namely 
analogical cases.47 These are non-homonymous because they are also 
connected but in a different way compared with the PHR. They are 
44 Moreover, I will claim that the terminological tension of homonymy and multivocity 
between earlier and later works correlates to the developmental thesis of Owen (1960).
45 The assumption that homonymy in Aristotle primarily amounts to what we called acci-
dental homonymy is available since Alexander: τὰ κυρίως ὁμώνυμα λεγόμενα, ἅ ἐστι τὰ ἀπὸ 
τύχης. Hayduck (1891: 241, page lines 25–26). Hayduck, M. (1891). Alexandri Aphrodisiensis 
in Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria. Berlin. A similar claim has been proposed by 
Hintikka, K. J. J. (1959). Aristotle and the ambiguity of ambiguity. Inquiry 2 (1–4): 137–151. 
Furthermore, also Brakas (2011) argues that homonymy and multivocity do not coincide.
46 “Being” or “healthy” are non-homonymous multivocals.
47 Cf. EN I.6, 1096b26-28. There is yet another kind of non-homonymous multivocals. 
This is rather special because as far as I can see it occurs only once (Top. II.10) in Aristotle’s 
works. It will be called synonymous multivocals. 
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connected by an analogy. I claim that these two cases constitute a class 
of non-homonymous multivocals that I term polysemous multivocals. 
In general, polysemy is the capacity of a single term to have multiple 
meanings that are in some way connected.48
There is a feature that connects this modern distinction to Aristotle. 
It is the challenge to define criteria that enable us to assign the different 
multivocals into their appropriate classes. In Aristotle, there are many 
cases, which are difficult to classify. For instance, there is a certain class 
of examples of homonymy Aristotle quite regularly uses, which will 
be called spurious homonyms.49 These cases govern the homonymy 
between two things of which one is a genuine F. In contrast, the other is 
only a spurious F. This is the case in the following examples: The name 
“man” can refer to the statue of a man and the genuine, i.e. living man.
 Moreover, the name “hand” can refer to the dead hand and the liv-
ing hand. Aristotle has a typical way of addressing these cases. He often 
states that some x is no F, or some x is no longer an F, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως50 – 
except homonymously. Intuitively, cases like these appear to be different 
from the case of banks which are not connected, as stated earlier. There 
is no simple answer to the question about the relation of the genuine 
and the spurious F. Neither is there an answer to the question whether 
this kind of example falls into polysemous or homonymous multivocity. 
Straightforwardly, one could assume that it depends on how the spu-
rious Fs are defined. If they depend in their definition on genuine Fs, 
one might argue that they are polysemous multivocals, if not, they are 
homonymous multivocals. 
48 The label “polysemy” is borrowed from the contemporary distinction between homon-
ymy and polysemy. This notion is first is introduced by Michel Bréal. Bréal, M. (1897), Essai 
de semantique: science des significations, Paris. Murphy (2010: 84) and Brown (2006 vol. 9: 
742–744) offer a good overview of the contemporary distinction. Cf. section 5 of this study. 
Here, only a short but elucidating remark of Murphy (2010: 88): “in the case of polysemy, 
we expect that the different senses are related in some way – you can figure out why the 
word came to have this range of senses.” Murphy, M. L. (2010). Lexical meaning. Cambridge.
49 This label is borrowed from Irwin (1981: 527f.). It will be discussed in section 4. Shields 
(1999: 27ff.) calls them discrete, non-accidental homonyms. 
50 PA 640b36; DA II.1, 412b2; similarly, GA 734b25-27 and 735a8; Meteor. 389b20-390a16; 
Pol. I.2, 1253a20-25.
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Literature yields different answers to this question.51 Up to this point, it 
seemed that logical priority among multivocals was sufficient to estab-
lish a PHR, but apparently, the matter is more complicated. Under the 
assumption that logical priority is sufficient, and that the dead F is 
dependent in definition on the living F, they will be related by the PHR. 
Moreover, we have to accept that in all cases where something shares 
the same name because of mere resemblance, there is a PHR. If that 
were the case, something counter-intuitive would be the consequence: 
Since Aristotle states in Met. IV.2, 1003b12-1652 that the PHR is a princi-
ple of the unity of sciences, we would have to admit that the science of 
the artificial and the original, the dead and the living man is the same. 
If one accepts this, Aristotle would have quite radically broadened 
his requirements concerning the question for which groups of things 
there is a single science and for which groups of things there is none. In 
works before the Metaphysics IV, Aristotle requires the things of which 
there is a single science to be of one genus.53 In the Metaphysics IV.2, he 
expands this restriction to things that are related by the PHR. Hence, 
one needs to admit that there are sciences of spurious homonyms – a 
highly counter-intuitive result. 
There are two ways in which one could avoid this counter-intuitive 
consequence. Either (a) one would have to explain that the definition 
of the statue of a man cannot be something like “semblance of a man”, 
or (b) one would have to explain that even though the genuine F is 
logically prior to the spurious F, there is no PHR unifying them. Thus, 
there must be further requirements for the PHR that are yet undeter-
mined. I focus primarily on the first way (a). I argue that Aristotle had 
a practice of defining things with reference to their function. Since a 
dead man or a statue of a man in no way functions as a man, there is 
no reason to assume the spurious F and the genuine F to have anything 
definitionally in common. 
Regarding option (b), I discuss the difficulties of the possibility to 
determine further criteria, that dispel problematic cases from being 
51 Shields (1999) and Irwin (1981) propose opposing views concerning this question.
52 Cf. also Met. IV.2, 1004a23-25.
53 Cf. An. Post. I.28.
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pros hen related. Since Aristotle did not state further criteria there have 
been attempts to supplement them.54 I will discuss these attempts, and 
I will argue that alternative (a) allows a leaner definition of the PHR 
while requiring more background assumptions meaning that problem-
atic cases can be discarded by clearer theses on how things (such as 
spurious homonyms) are defined.
In the first section of this study, I focus on Aristotle’s phrase “being 
said in many ways”. One cannot overemphasise its importance for Aris-
totle’s philosophy. It occurs in almost all of his works. Nevertheless, as 
for the case of the PHR, there is no strict terminological approach to this 
phrase. As a result of my enquiry, I provide two different approaches to 
this notion. 1. The semantic approach; 2. The different reasons approach; 
I suggest that the semantic approach is most dominant in Aristotle’s 
works. It is a view that assumes that there is a plurality of logoi corre-
sponding to each multivocal, be they related or not. I conclude that 
Aristotle’s use of the phrase πολλαχῶς λέγεςθαι, or related phrases, is 
relatively flexible and that it is undoubtedly more flexible than Aristo-
tle’s use of the notion of homonymy. 
The second section concentrates on the differences and the relation-
ships of homonymy, synonymy and multivocity and how the literature 
deals with them. I present three models that try to represent Aristotle’s 
terminology involving the notions homonymy, synonymy and multi-
vocity (the inflationary view, the tertium quid view, and the deflationary 
view). I claim against the currently dominant view that the deflationary 
view is superior to other views. According to this view, many of the 
statements in which Aristotle contrasts homonymy and multivocity 
are immediately informative. In addition, the notion of homonymy 
can be subordinated to the notion of multivocity. Furthermore, follow-
ing this view, spurious homonyms immediately disqualify from being 
focally related. 
In the third section, I discuss the definitions of homonymy and syn-
onymy in Cat. 1. I translate the text, and I present a detailed analysis of 
the problematic elements of these definitions. The interpretation of these 
definitions influences the overall assessment of the relationship of hom-
54 As mentioned earlier, I will primarily focus on Shields (1999) causal analysis. 
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onymy, synonymy and multivocity. In addition, this section contains 
a discussion of the “traditional” distinction between accidental and 
non-accidental homonymy, and its implications and problems.55 I claim 
that the notion of homonymy that is introduced in the Categories does 
not require an association between the homonyms.56 This has often been 
observed especially by scholars that adhere to an inflationary view on 
homonymy.57 They usually argue that although Aristotle does not men-
tion that there could be associations between homonyms, the defini-
tion of Cat. 1 by no means excludes that homonyms can be connected.58 
As this is a weak argument that is based on Aristotle’s silence, and since 
nothing follows from it with necessity, there has been the attempt to 
justify this possibility in a different way. For instance, Irwin (1981: 525) 
argues that it is more plausible to assume that the introduction of hom-
onymy at the beginning of the Categories introduces “connected hom-
onyms” because “connected homonyms are important in the argument 
[of the Categories].” Because of that, he contemplates about the possi-
bility that the example Aristotle uses in the definition of homonymy is 
an example of “connected” homonymy whilst acknowledging the text 
being ambiguous.59 In contrast to this proposal, I argue that the exam-
ple in the definition of homonymy in Categories 1 illustrates accidental 
homonymy.60 
In section four, I discuss the controversial topic of spurious hom-
onyms, i.e. the class of typical examples of homonymy, which are con-
cerned with living and dead things, and with originals and copies, 
respectively. In both cases, these things have the same names while it 
is evident that these things do not share their name by mere accident. 
55 This distinction will be called the ANAD: accidental-non-accidental-distinction.
56 Irwin (1981: 525 ff.) claims that the definition of homonymy in the beginning of the 
Categories primarily is concerned with “connected homonyms”.
57 Cf. Irwin (1981) and Fine, G. (2004). On ideas: Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s theory of 
forms. Oxford.
58 Cf. Ward (2008: 17).
59 In that context the example uses the term “animal”. Aristotle states that it refers to the 
animal and to the drawing. But the text is ambiguous. He may mean either (1) that the 
term “animal” refers to the animal and the drawing of an animal or (2) that the term “ani-
mal” refers to an animal and a drawing (of anything). 
60 Cf. also Owens (19783: 117) interpretation of this passage. He claims that Aristotle in 
that context introduces accidental homonymy. 
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It is far from clear whether they are defined with definitional overlap. 
Since Aristotle does not present a clear-cut answer to this, scholarly 
opinions vary. The present study argues that the reasons to assume 
definitional overlap are scarce and not convincing. This supports the 
adequacy of the deflationary view since it supports the assumption 
that Aristotle’s standard notion of homonymy is accidental homon-
ymy even though “accidental” might not be the appropriate label 
for this case since there is some kind of non-accidental connection 
between these names. There are two linked aspects of this connection: 
1) The connection rests on linguistic conventions (i.e. what was called 
“custom and courtesy”), and these may differ in different languages; 
2) the spurious Fs are connected to the genuine Fs merely by resem-
blance. Neither of these aspects suffices to establish a PHR between the 
genuine and the spurious Fs. In a subsection, the relevance and impact 
of the case of spurious homonyms on the relation of homonymy, synon-
ymy and multivocity is discussed with a particular focus on arguments 
that support the adequacy of the deflationary view.
The fifth section introduces the notion of polysemy. With this sec-
tion, I regard the application area of the PHR as sufficiently determined. 
The sixth section discusses polysemous multivocals, i.e. multivocals 
that are associated either by PHR or by analogy. This section begins with 
a discussion and a critique of a selection of contributions that provide 
attempts to characterise the PHR. It continues to analyse the most infor-
mative passage about the PHR, given in EE VII.2. Among other things, 
the outstanding result of this analysis is that it is possible to distinguish 
between two kinds of examples for the PHR. One kind employs paron-
ymy between the focal reference and the focally related entities while 
the other kind does not. In the latter cases, the focal reference and the 
related entities bear the same name. The first kind I will call healthy- 
examples, the latter friendship-examples. This distinction is present 
also outside of EE VII.2, but it has not been discussed yet. It influences 
the reconstruction of the PHR. Both Ferejohn’s (1980) and Shields’s 
(1999) attempts to define the PHR are designed to only to apply to cases 
that I call friendship-examples. Their accounts do not cover the more 
common healthy-examples unless they add specific qualifications, in 
particular, that also in those cases the focal reference itself is one of the 
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Fs. I argue that this assumption is not essential to the PHR according 
to the diversity of examples he provides.
On the contrary, in the conventional example, i.e. the healthy-exam-
ple, the focal reference, health, bears a paronymous name.61 It is health 
that occurs in the accounts of the focally related entities. Thus, one 
cannot deny that the focal reference in those cases bears a paronymous 
name. Even though the difference is not huge, one cannot ignore the 
case that it influences the form of any intended definition. I will show 
that this distinction influences the minimal number of focally related 
entities. In friendship-cases, a single focally related entity is sufficient 
while in healthy-examples at least two such items are required. The rea-
son for this is that a PHR requires multivocity. 
In section 6.2, I discuss the question of whether there is a pros-hen- 
specific definitory-dependence-relation, i.e. one that exclusively 
belongs to the PHR. Aristotle does not draw fine-grained distinctions 
between different kinds of logical priority. One may doubt whether he 
draws distinctions at all, although it is evident that there should be at 
least some difference. Intuitively, I would agree if he claimed that there 
was a difference between the logical priority of a genus and the logical 
priority of a substance to a non-substance. However, there is no textual 
evidence for a terminological distinction. I try to characterise Aristotle’s 
attitude to logical priority in the following way: I call him a mereo lo - 
gical essentialist about definitions.62 This label tries to elucidate that he 
considers anything that is part of a definitory logos is logically prior 
to the definiendum regardless of whether this thing is a substance or 
whether it is a genus.63 
Within this section, I reject the assumption that other kinds of pri-
ority are part of the PHR. Although some scholars suggest that there are 
other kinds involved, I do not come to the same conclusion.64 I assume 
61 Section 6.1.3 is devoted to the relation of the PHR and paronymy.
62 Whereas of course, he is not such sort of essentialist about sensible objects. 
63 This label is supposed to show that if a part of the definitory logos is different the 
definiendum is a different thing, cf. Top. VI.4, 141a35-b1. 
64 This has been argued by Hamlyn (1977), Shields (1999) and Ferejohn (1980). Fonfara 
(2003) either attempts to determine the PHR separated of its application to being. Fonfara, 
D. (2003). Die Ousia-Lehren des Aristoteles, Untersuchungen zur Kategorienschrift und zur 
Metaphysik. Berlin, Boston.
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that the main reason to integrate other kinds of priority is based on two 
connected things: 1) There is no strict definition. Hence everyone strives 
to determine the missing criteria. 2) In the most critical application of 
the PHR, i.e. its application to being, there is some sort of ontological 
priority unmistakable. However, there are no reasons to assume that the 
ontological priority of substance to non-substantial entities is an effect 
of the circumstance that all beings65 are focally related to substance. I 
consider this feature independent of the PHR since not in all cases in 
which there is a PHR, do the focally related entities depend existentially 
on the focal reference. Thus, ontological priority or existential depen-
dence is not an essential feature of the PHR.66
Since logical priority alone is not sufficient for the PHR and there is 
no evidence to assume another sort of priority to be involved, I discuss 
the possibilities to determine the PHR with additional requirements. 
The result of this discussion suggests that Aristotle’s descriptions of the 
requirements of the PHR are too general to formulate a definition allow-
ing us to distinguish genuine from dubious cases of the PHR. Genuine 
cases are at least all those that are used as examples for a PHR by Aris-
totle. Dubious are those that only seemingly exhibit a PHR, as in the case 
of spurious homonyms. There is no reason to assume a PHR between a 
dead and a living hand or the artificial and the real man.67 Yet, it is diffi-
cult to justify this given the lack of a strict definition of the PHR.
Despite this, I claim that there is no PHR in these cases because 
absurd consequences would ensue. As stated earlier, the PHR is a prin-
ciple of the unity of sciences. If there were a PHR between the spurious 
F and the genuine F, they would have to be part of the same science. 
Even without strict criteria for the PHR, this consequence is at least 
65 Actually, it is not very precise to assert that “all beings” are related to substance. As I 
argue in the very last part of this study (8.7) Aristotle’s pros-hen science of being is not a 
science of the linguistic term “being”. Hence, strictly speaking, it is only correct to assert 
that “all beings” are related to substance without restricting the scope of “all” to those cases 
that are focally related since only those are part of that science. The challenge is to show 
which cases qualify and which disqualify “from focal connection”.
66 In the case of being everything else other than substance only is being because it 
inheres into substance, e.g. such as the walking – τὸ βαδίζον inheres into substance, respec-
tively “belongs to substance”. Cf. Met. VII.1, 1028a25f.
67 This kind of homonyms will be discussed under the heading spurious homonyms.
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counterintuitive. Because of it being counterintuitive the assumption 
of a PHR in those cases is also counterintuitive. The number of sciences 
would increase tremendously. If this conjecture is true, a vast number 
of Aristotle’s standard examples of homonymy employs the deflated 
notion of homonymy I am arguing for. A side effect of this discussion 
is that it revisits the crucial question of whether spurious homonyms 
contain definitional overlaps, or not. The denial of a PHR in these cases 
does not necessarily imply a denial of definitional overlap in these cases. 
Thus, even with definitional overlap, as suggested by Irwin (1981: 528), 
it might not be necessary to assume that there is also a PHR.
The seventh section addresses the connection of the PHR and the 
case of things in serial succession or things ordered in series – τὰ ἐφεξῆς, 
e.g. figures or souls. I conclude that the connection between the PHR 
and ordered series is far more remote than often assumed.68 I argue that 
it is misleading to consider the PHR an abbreviated series of things or 
to regard ordered series as a variant of the PHR. My argument demon-
strates a difference between the relationship of things ordered in series 
and things that are related by the PHR despite Aristotle’s claim that 
also beings are ordered.69 I argue that whilst being may be ordered in 
some sense, there is a difference in the kind of order that is attributed 
to these different cases. I point out that the priority relations in these 
cases are genuinely different and hence ordered series and the PHR are 
more dissimilar than usually assumed. This result explains the oddness 
that Aristotle never applied the PHR to analyse things that are ordered 
in series, although one might expect him to do so since also things that 
are ordered in series lack generic unity. 
The eighth section examines the PHR in the context of Met. IV. It con - 
tains a discussion concerning the question about the most innovative 
features of the book. The conclusion is that Aristotle’s modification of 
68 It has been suggested by Robin (1963: 168 n. 172) that ordered series are a special case 
of the PHR. Cf. also Krämer, H. J. (1967). Zur geschichtlichen Stellung der aristotelischen 
Metaphysik. Kant-Studien 58 (1–4): 313–354. Krämer follows him in this regard. This ten-
dency is also found in Owen (1960: 173) although he does not go into detail.
69 The only allegedly “clear” connections between the PHR and serial order are found 
in Met. XII.1, 1069a19-21; EN I.6, 1096a17-23 and Met. IV.2, 1005a8-11. I argue against the 
assumption that these remarks imply that the categories of being form a series in the same 
sense in which figures or souls form a series.
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his notion of science plays a crucial role, i.e. his admission of the PHR 
as a principle of unity of science. This modification is only possible as 
Aristotle also ascribes a new feature to the PHR: It becomes a principle 
of unity for sciences. This section also highlights a discussion of the 
alleged tension between “earlier” and “later” works of Aristotle with 
respect to the question about the absence of the PHR as a tool to explain 
the unity of sciences, especially in the Ethics (EN and EE). Furthermore, 
this part proposes that not all ways in which being is said are rele-
vant for Aristotle’s general metaphysics but only some. These insights 
help understand the various lists about the ways in which being is said, 
which are spread throughout the corpus. 
In section 8 of this study, I assess the PHR in the context of Met. IV. 
The first part of section 8 is devoted to some of Shields’s arguments aim-
ing to show that Aristotle fails to prove that being is said in many ways. 
The next part discusses the question of the “real” innovation of Met. IV. 
It is a widespread belief that Aristotle had the notion of the PHR long 
before Met. IV, but that he never saw the opportunity to apply it also to 
“being”. In addition, there is another innovative aspect of Met. IV, which 
has not received the attention it deserves.70 As indicated before, Aristotle 
introduces a distinction between two ways in which sciences can be 
unified, i.e. the distinction between kath hen and pros hen unification 
of sciences. This distinction also has an impact on the determination of 
the PHR (section 8.3). It adds a new feature, which needs to be appended 
to the list of features of the PHR, which I provide in section 6.1.2. It helps 
to discard deceptive cases such as the cases of spurious homonyms. I 
suggest that it is not so much the application of the PHR to being, which 
is the most pivotal innovation in Met. IV but that Aristotle claims that 
the PHR is a principle of unity for sciences. 
Often, it has been reported that there is a tension between the (ear-
lier) Ethics and the (later) Metaphysics.71 In the Ethics, Aristotle (implic-
itly) denies the possibility of a science of being since being is said in 
many ways, and if something is said in many ways, there must be many 
70 Some attention is paid to this issue by Yu (2001) and Wilson, M. (2000), Aristotle‘s 
Theory of the Unity of Science, Toronto.
71 An important proponent of this view is Owen (1960). Cf. also Yu (2001) and Bostock, 
D. (1994). Metaphysics. Books [zeta] and [eta]. Oxford.
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sciences.72 Thus, I propose that it is very possible that Aristotle already 
saw that the PHR also applied to being, just as he saw the possibility 
that the ways in which the good is said are related. However, he missed 
the insight that the PHR can function as a principle of unity of sciences. 
On this background, I discuss several theses concerning the relation-
ship of the Ethics and the Metaphysics. These theses are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, but they emphasise different aspects of the relation-
ships between these works. I propose and argue for the so-called expan-
sion-of-science thesis as the most enlightening thesis in this context.73 
In section 8.4 to 8.6, I discuss the details of the kath hen/pros hen 
distinction that are connected to the expansion of science thesis. The 
very last section (8.7) of this study raises the question, which ways of 
being are part of the science of being qua being.74 Since Aristotle pro-
vides many lists of the alleged ways of being but does not contain much 
information about the relation between these lists, I claim that not all 
ways in which the term “being” is said are relevant for the pros hen sci-
ence of being but primarily only what is called categorical or per se being 
according to Met. V.7. In addition to that, it is clear that Aristotle also 
considers part of this science being in actuality and potentiality. Yet, it 
is not entirely clear on which basis it is part of this science. Aristotle 
does not clarify this case. Since being in actuality and potentiality are 
in some sense modes of being of so-called categorical being, one may 
reason that they enter this science on this basis. If this were the case, 
potential and actual being would in some sense also be related to sub-
stance, even if this relation were somewhat “more remote”. 
72 Relevant are EE I.8, 1217b27-18a1 and the parallel EN I.6, 1096a24-33. Moreover, in 
An. Post. II.7, 92b14 and in Top. IV.1, 121a16-19 and 121b7-9 there are remarks that make us 
wonder whether Aristotle had a unified science of being at the back of his mind, yet, these 
remarks do not exclude this necessarily. Remotely related is also SE 11, 172a9-15.
73 Though Yu (2001) does not literally propose a name for this claim it is due to his work 
that I am proposing this claim.
74 A more comprehensive approach to the question what is part of Aristotle’s science that 
sometimes is called “general metaphysics” is given by Wilson (2000).

1 Varieties of Multivocity in Aristotle 
Without any intended doctrinal import, the present study follows 
Shields (1999) and Irwin (1981) and uses the term “multivocity” to 
pick up Aristotle’s phrase πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι and cognate versions of 
it. The reason to substitute one obscure term with another obscure is 
pragmatic. A shorthand is useful in this case. As will be shown below, 
Aristotle uses to the same effect many different phrasings to assert that 
something is said in many ways, or at least, in more than one way. There 
is, e.g. πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι, πλειοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, the interrogative 
ποσαχῶς λέγεσθαι as well as διχῶς or τριχῶς λέγεσθαι or λέγεσθαι καθ’ 
ἕτερον τρόπον and their cognates. 
To acquaint oneself with the topic, one should first examine the 
phrase itself. There is a variety of possible translations.75 The phrase 
πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι traditionally translates as “to be said in many ways”. 
The corresponding participle πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον is often translated as 
“something that is said in many ways”.76 The something is usually per-
ceived as a linguistic entity rather than an entity of some other kind.77 
75 Brakas (2011) offers a good overview about the available variety of translations of 
λέγεσθαι. His favoured interpretation of “F is said in many ways” is “F is uttered signifying 
many things”. One can agree with this interpretation since it is aptly compatible to the 
approach to multivocity which is called the semantic approach below. It is called that way 
because of the close relationship between πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι and πλείω σημαίνειν or πολλὰ 
σημαίνειν which will be argued for within this section. Moreover, cf. Smith (1997: 88, 93). 
Smith, R. (1997), Aristotle, Topics I, VIII, and Selections, Oxford.
76 Notoriously, GC I.6, 322b29-32 describes these things as ὄνοματα as quoted below in 
section 2.3.1. However, there are more candidates for the “something” in this phrase which 
have been listed Owens (19783: 108). He suggests that the phrase “may refer to terms, or to 
concepts and definitions (λόγοι), or to the things defined, and even to all three in the same 
passage.” He refers to Top. V.2, 129b30-130a4. However, it is unclear how he came to assume 
that the passage states that the things defined are said in many ways. Hence, one has to 
disagree with that. Nevertheless, phrases as well as single terms are usually mentioned as 
those things which can be said in many ways. In the SE Aristotle considers homonymy as 
a belonging to terms while concerning phrases he speaks of amphiboly; cf. SE 4, 166a6ff., 
and SE 7, 169a22ff. For a similar list of “candidates” cf. Ferejohn (1980: 127 n. 4).
77 Cf. Smith (1997: 89; 93). Among those scholars who argue that homonymy and multi-
vocity do not coincide (as e.g. Matthews, G. B. (1995). Aristotle on existence. Bulletin of 
the Institute of Classical Studies 40 (1): 233–238; Brakas (2011); Hintikka (1959)) it is quite 
common to consider multivocity as a concept that is tied more closely to language than to 
extra-linguistic entities.
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However, there is the following difficulty: If Aristotle states something 
such as “the F is said in many ways” it is necessary to remind ourselves 
that locutions such as “the F” in Aristotle are often ambiguous between 
the item f and the word F. Unfortunately, Aristotle frequently switches 
back and forth between these two without removing its ambiguity. One 
cannot impose a rigorous rule that is generally applicable to identify 
which of the cases is intended.78 Because of that, the presumptions by 
the different scholars of the kind of thing that is said in many ways are 
so diverse. Smith (1997: 87–89; 92–93) claims that multivocity itself is 
multivocal because of the ambiguity of λέγεται. 
On the one hand, Smith suggests that it is possible to translate 
“λέγεται” with the passive voice “is called”. In that sense, there are “differ-
ent things to which the same word applies may sometimes be called the 
same thing in different ways.”79 In this way, justice and courage are called 
good in one way and what is conducive to health is called good in another 
way (cf. Top. I.15, 106a4-5). In this sense, what is called something in a 
different way is the thing to which the word applies, not the word itself. 
On the other hand, it can also mean “to be said of ”. If A is said of 
B, then the subject of λέγεται is the word. It is important to note that 
these two variants are interrelated. If two things x and y are called A 
in different ways, then x and y are called A in many ways (πολλαχῶς 
λέγεται). But also, if A is said of (λέγεται) x and y, but in many ways, 
then the term A is said in many ways (πολλαχῶς λέγεται) of other things. 
However, although it is possible to distinguish these cases the tradi-
tional way to translate πολλαχῶς λέγεται, i.e. as “is said in many ways” 
is adequate in most contexts that are relevant for this study. Hence, I 
continue assuming that the things that are said in many ways are inter-
preted as linguistic terms. 
The term “πολλαχῶς” of the phrase “πολλαχῶς λέγεται” usually is 
translated to “in many ways”. If a term is said in many ways one may 
78 Cf. Barnes (1971: 77). Barnes, J. (1971). Homonymy in Aristotle and Speusippus. The Classi - 
cal Quarterly 21 (01): 65–80. He discusses this topic under the headline “the Hambruch thesis”. 
79 This quote is taken from Smith (1997: 88). Ward (2008: 56–57) takes over this assess-
ment from him. Cf. also Top. I.15, 106a1-2.
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assume that this term is ambiguous80, i.e. that there is a multiplicity of 
meanings or senses corresponding to this term.81 I use “term” to refer 
to ὄνομα – name and ῥῆμα – verb, i.e. those linguistic entities that suc-
cessfully fulfil the linguistic function of σημαίνειν – signifying. Thus, the 
phrase πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον describes an ambiguous term, i.e. a term 
with many meanings/senses/significations.82 As stated above, in this 
study, I refer to such terms as multivocals. 
Nevertheless, one should neither propose that multivocity is re - 
ducible to ambiguity, nor that multivocity is a sufficient condition for 
ambiguity. I show that ambiguity is a sufficient condition for multi-
vocity, but also that it is not the only sufficient condition for multivocity 
and that in those cases, it is not even a necessary condition. The reason 
80 Here a term is called “ambiguous” if it has many meanings regardless of whether they 
are related or not. Quite usually “ambiguity” is related to word uses, i.e. the datable utter-
ances of words, rather than to words. If one considers it this way, then a homonymous term 
does not necessarily imply ambiguity, because e.g. the context of the utterance in which the 
word is used may eliminate the ambiguity. I agree with Owen (1965: 74f.) (and also Irwin 
(1981: 530)) who notice that the closest concept of Aristotle to the just mentioned way of 
using the term “ambiguity” is what Aristotle calls amphiboly (cf. SE 166a6-7). Owen, G.E L. 
 (1965). Aristotle on the snares of ontology. In New essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. Renford. 
Bambrough and G.E.M. Anscombe, 69–96. New York.
81 This study does not distinguish between meanings or senses. I agree with Matthews 
(1972: 150) and Irwin (1981: 534) in assuming that an (independent) sense or meaning of a 
term is that which is found in a dictionary and that a speaker should be able to learn one 
meaning (or sense) without learning the other. Matthews, G. B. (1972). Senses and Kinds. 
Journal of Philosophy 69 (6): 149–157. 
The assumption that multivocity (and/or homonymy) amounts to words having different 
senses has been suggested by Kung, J. (1986). Aristotle on „Being Is Said in Many Ways”. 
History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (1): 3–18. by Hintikka (1959: 15), Owen (1965: 74), Barnes 
(1971: 66) and others. Irwin (1981: 534) doubts this, because he doubts the identification of 
meaning with σημαίνειν. His elaborate views on this matter is found in Irwin, T. H. (1982), 
Aristotle‘s Concept of Signification, in Language and Logos, ed. Schofield, M. and Nussbaum, 
M. C. pp. 241–266.
82 For the sake of shortness and simplicity this section does not discuss the relation of mean-
ing and signification. For a thorough discussion of this issue see Irwin, T. H. (1982). Aristotle‘s 
Concept of Signification‘. In Language and Logos, ed. M. Schofield and M. C. Nussbaum, 241-66. 
Irwin concludes that Aristotle’s use of σημαίνειν is not systematic and that meaning does not 
entirely coincide with Aristotle’s signification. Further see Kirwan (1993: 94) who suggest that 
σημαίνειν could either be understood as “to mean”, or “to denote” in different texts. Kirwan, 
C. (1993). Metaphysics: Books Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon. Oxford. Moreover, sometimes it 
is claimed that Aristotle does not distinguish between sense and reference, cf. Hamlyn (1977: 
6). Hamlyn claims that Aristotle’s theory of meaning is a realist one: “He thinks, that is, of 
the meaning of a term as what is picked out by it” Hamlyn (1977: 12). 
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for this is that “multivocity” itself is said in many ways in some sense. I 
outline two different accounts of multivocity which differ in their cri-
teria how something qualifies as multivocal. The first connects multi-
vocity to ambiguity, the second does not imply ambiguity:
I. The semantic account of multivocity
II. The different reasons account of multivocity 
This distinction is based on various remarks about multivocity scat-
tered throughout the corpus.83 These fragmented remarks are used to 
attempt a reconstruction of an alleged underlying theory. While this 
distinction cannot be reduced to a single account the following sec-
tion demonstrates that the semantic account is more widely applied by 
Aristotle. Nevertheless, the distinction adds value since the importance 
of multivocity in Aristotle’s philosophy cannot be emphasised enough. 
Aristotle uses it as a methodological tool with which he criticises other 
philosophers, especially Plato, Parmenides, and some other Eleatics. 
He objects that they overlooked that terms can be said in many ways. 
Without the distinctions, Aristotle introduces, they draw conclusions 
that, for Aristotle, amount to obscurity or even to absurdity.84
I) The semantic account of multivocity: This approach assumes 
that a term is multivocal if the term F signifies various things – πλείω 
σημαίνει. I deem it the most widely distributed approach to multi-
vocity in the corpus. The following instances, in which Aristotle uses 
the phrase πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι or one of its cognates help justify this 
approach. The question (indicated by the interrogative ποσαχῶς) of the 
ποσαχῶς – how many ways occurs regularly at the beginning of new 
topics. It can easily be shown by examples that this is a characteristic 
feature of Aristotle’s strategy to ask in how many ways some F is said. 
In EE I.8, 1217b1 Aristotle wants to enquire the best: now let us examine 
83 For the different reasons account consider the examples of “being” Met. IV.2, 1003b6-10; 
“potency” Met. V.12, 1019b35-1020a6; contraries Met. V.10, 1018a31-35. For passages that support 
the semantic account cf. Met. VIII.2, 1042b25-28; Top. V.2, 129b30-32. Met. VII.1, 1028a10-14, 
DA I.5, 410a13-15, Met. VI.2, 1026a33-b4; Met. XIV.2 1089a7-8).
84 Such as the Parmenidean claim that there is not change which originates from Parme-
nides’s failure to distinguish between different senses of “being”. Cf. Phys. I, 2–3.
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what the best is, and in how many ways it is said – σκεπτέον τοίνυν τί τὸ 
ἄριστον, καὶ λέγεται ποσαχῶς. Similarly, in De cael. I.9, 278b9-11: let us 
explain first what we say the heaven is and in how many ways, in order to 
make clear what is enquired by us – Εἴπωμεν δὲ πρῶτον τί λέγομεν εἶναι 
τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ποσαχῶς, ἵνα μᾶλλον ἡμῖν δῆλον γένηται τὸ ζητούμενον. 
Also in Phys. III.5, 204a2-3: first we have to determine in how many ways 
the infinite is said – πρῶτον οὖν διοριστέον ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἄπειρον. 
Even in the early Categories (12) he enumerates in how many ways prior- 
πρότερον is said.
Anyone reading Aristotle will notice that the issue of the many ways 
in which words are said is almost omnipresent throughout his works. 
Nevertheless, one has to clarify what is meant by that. Any attempting 
this needs to make some speculations as there is no proper passage in 
the corpus where Aristotle explicitly explains this notion.85 Fortunately, 
there are several enlightening remarks about this in the corpus that 
alleviate developing a reconstruction of this notion. 
In Top. I.13–17, Aristotle introduces four instruments – ὄργανα 
which are used to construct arguments.86 The second of these instru-
ments proposes that one has to be able to determine in how many ways 
each is said – ποσαχῶς ἕκαστον λέγεται (Top. 105a23-24). In Top. I.18, 
108a18-22 Aristotle tells us that the examination of the many ways is use-
ful – χρήσιμον (primarily) for two reasons. Firstly, it is useful in relation 
to clarity – πρός τὸ σαφές, and secondly to ensure that the reasonings – 
τοὺς συλλογισμούς proceed according to the thing itself – κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ 
πρᾶγμα, and not with regard to the name – μὴ πρὸς τὸ ὄνομα. Since it is 
not explicitly said which kind of clarity Aristotle talks about one may 
consider it terminological clarity. The following passages support this 
kind of understanding:
The opposite of clarity – σαφές is obscurity – ἀσαφές. In Top. VI.2 
there are various Topoi, which are related to avoiding obscurity – 
85 Ward (2008: 64 n. 42) even calls the phrase a “broad, non-technical expression”. 
86 Cf. especially Top. I.13, 105a21-25. 
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ἀσαφές and, mutatis mutandis, preserving clarity.87 Moreover, clarity is 
often connected with language. In the context of Top. VI.1–2, 139b12-
140a22 Aristotle urges to be mostly clear in expression/interpretation – 
σαφεστάτῃ τῇ ἑρμηνείᾳ, especially concerning definitions. Another tes-
timony of the connection of clarity – σαφές with language is given in 
Poet. 22, 1458a18 and Rhet. III.2, 1404b1, for Aristotle describes it as a 
virtue of speech – λέξις. The way terminological clarity comes about is 
to start with a differentiation of the various significations of that which 
is said in many ways.88 The examination of the many ways in many cases 
is best described as disambiguation. Revisiting the De cael. example of 
“heaven” from above Aristotle suggests that “heaven” signifies three dif-
ferent things, namely (De cael. 278b10-21):
1. The substance of the extreme circumference 
2. The body continuous with the extreme circumference,  
which contains other heavenly bodies
3. All bodies that are within the extreme circumference
Accordingly, the starting points of many enquiries are linguistic, while 
the overall enquiry certainly is not merely linguistic. However, in order 
to establish a solid basis from which the enquiry can proceed one needs 
certainty about which things are signified by which terms. Aristotle 
explicitly states (Top. I.18, 108a18-22 see above) that one reason to 
enquire into the many ways is to ensure that the reasonings proceed 
87 There is another Topos that is closely connected to the last one which is about metaphors. 
All that is said metaphorically is obscure – πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγόμενον 
(139b34-35). A further Topos (140a3-5) states that unclear is all that is unaccustomed – πᾶν 
γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ μὴ εἰωθός. He refers to Plato who sometimes uses artificial and not well- 
established words as he calls e.g. “the eye ‘brow-shaded’ or the poison-spider ‘bite-morti-
fying’ or ‘marrow’ as ‘bone-begotten’” (Top. VI.2, 140a3-5). Another quite interesting 
remark is made subsequently in 140a6-8. The distinction of ambiguous terms between 
metaphors and homonymous terms is not exhaustive. Apparently, there are terms that fall 
into neither of these two classes.
88 Aristotle sometimes writes ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς (Met. VI.4, 1028a5; Met. VII.1, 
1028a10-11 and X.1, 1052a16). The book that is meant is (presumably) Met. V. This book 
often is called Aristotle’s philosophical lexicon in which many important terms are disambi - 
guated. It has been suggested that the expression περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς or some relative for-
mulation has been considered as the title of that book (cf. Menn (2008: 40 appendix vii)). 
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according to the things themselves. Thus, the enquiry into the many 
ways is an auxiliary enquiry, which has to be done in advance. The 
Met. I.9, 992b18-20 also testifies this. Aristotle states, using the example 
of being, that examining the many ways is a prerequisite of starting a 
new enquiry. This auxiliary enquiry is a necessary part of the “actual” 
enquiry, since one apparently cannot proceed without it, and moreover 
such an enquiry will lead to a more satisfying result.89
In this light, the question for the many ways appears to be a question 
that asks for the semantics of a certain term: in order to achieve termino-
logical clarity it may suffice to formulate a disjunctive account90 of the 
term, for example 
“F” either signifies A, B or C...
This corresponds to Aristotle’s procedure in the “heaven”-example. 
According to this view, a πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον is a term that, generally 
speaking, signifies a plurality of different significates or meanings (in the 
broad sense of “meaning”). However, there is not only one answer to the 
question what this plurality exactly is. How one conceives the significate 
or meaning which is signified by a name or term, primarily depends 
on how one conceives Aristotle’s remarks about signification. In the 
De int. names and nominal terms, spoken or written, are called symbols – 
σύμβολα (16a3-4). The term “σύμβολον” is a derivate of συμβάλλειν – 
to throw together, bring together, unite, but also of συμβάλλεσθαι – to 
contribute, to have something to say. The meaning of the derivative, 
σύμβολον, can refer to the two halves into which a whole separates and 
which fit together exactly, like, for instance, a tally does. The two com-
plementary halves of a tally can be called σύμβολα. Thus, a symbol is 
something that can be used to identify some other corresponding part. 
In this sense, one can consider it as a token of something, a token serv-
89 Top. I.18, 108a19-20: someone knows better what he is stating, after having shown in how 
many ways it is said – μᾶλλον γὰρ ἄν τις εἰδείη τί τίθησιν, ἐμφανισθέντος ποσαχῶς λέγεται.
90 Here “account” is used instead of “definition” in order to avoid misunderstandings 
with Aristotle’s (stricter) notion of definition. For Aristotle, there are only definitions of 
(accidental) compounds possible in a derivative sense – ἑπομένως (1030a22), e.g. there is no 
definition of the Ilias, cf. Met. VII.4, 1030a6ff. The disjunctive account cannot be consid-
ered a proper definition for the same reasons as the Ilias, because it’s a compound lacking 
the proper sort of unity. Aristotle criticises disjunctive definitions in Top. VI.7, 146a21-24.
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ing as proof of identity. (Also Whitaker (1995: 9ff.)91 makes use of the 
option to translate “σύμβολον” with “token”). 
Whilst it may seem rather unimpressive for us to talk about symbols 
(in the sense of linguistic signs) within a linguistic theory, one has to 
regard the application of the term “σύμβολον” in Aristotle’s theory of 
signification as quite innovative. In the De int. Aristotle states that lingu - 
istic expressions can function as symbols, and that, not by nature92, but 
by being conventional – κατὰ συνθήκην signs – σημεῖα (16a26-29).93 The 
function that symbols fulfil is to signify – σημαίνει.94 According to the 
notion of symbols outlined earlier, signification then is to bring two 
parts together. However, one would have to call both parts symbols, 
according to the etymological remarks about symbols linguistic theo-
ries usually refer to both parts as “symbol”, but only one. When a symbol 
enables us to identify something that is attached to one of “two halves”, 
it is only the linguistic token that is a symbol for something else. What 
this something else is, depends on the respective semantic theory. For 
Aristotle, there is no simple answer to the question what it is that terms 
signify. There is at least a twofold, if not a threefold answer to this. This 
topic is controversially discussed in the literature.95 The plurality, as 
mentioned earlier, can be thought of as 
91 Whitaker, C.W.A. (1996). Aristotle‘s De interpretatione: Contradiction and dialectic.  
Oxford, New York.
92 This is a hint to the dispute between the position called semantic naturalism which 
proposes that there is an intrinsic relation between words and the things they signify and 
(semantic) conventionalism which proposes that the relation between signs and things is 
conventional. This has been discussed in Plato’s Cratylus. 
93 See further below for some remarks about signs in comparison to symbols.
94 Also a verb – ῥῆμα signifies something like a name when it is used without connection. 
There are various possible translations for σημαίνειν none of which is undisputed. This study 
prefers “to signify”, “to denote” and “to stand for”. 
95 I refer to Irwin (1982). Weidemann, H. (2015), Hermeneutik, Berlin. Charles, D. (2000). 
Aristotle on meaning and essence. Oxford. Modrak, D.K.W. (2001). Aristotle‘s theory of 
language and meaning. Cambridge, U.K., New York. Whitaker, C.W.A. (1996), Aristotle’s 
De interpretatione: Contradiction and dialectic, Oxford, New York.
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1. thoughts – παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς (De Int. 16a3ff. and 24b1)
2. things – πράγματα (SE 1, 165a6-9 and De int. 16a6-8)96
3. logoi (especially Met. VII.4, 1030a6-17; An. Post. II.7, 92b31-32) 
One of these three kinds of pluralities corresponds to every πολλαχῶς 
λεγόμενον. What a πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον is or how one can formulate it, 
thus, depends on these three options, because they determine how to 
conceive of the status of the possible significates that supposedly belong 
to the πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον. The three options emanate from remarks 
made in different Aristotelian works such as the De Int. (1) the SE (2) 
and the Metaphysics and the An. Post. (3). This list does not imply there 
are incompatibilities following from these options. It illustrates that a 
simple answer to the question what it is that terms signify, and hence, 
what the questions of the many ways asks for, when it is a question for 
the semantics of a term, is not possible. 
In De int. 1, 16a6-8 it is said that terms primarily – πρώτων signify 
thoughts – παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς. Aristotle adds that that of which these 
<thoughts> are likenesses of, the actual things, are also the same – καὶ ὧν 
ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα πράγματα ἤδη ταὐτά. These statements mention the 
three fundamental elements of Aristotle’s theory of signification: there 
is the term, the thought and the thing in the world.
It is a matter of debate what is denoted by primarily – πρώτων. The 
description of Ammonius (1897: 17ff.)97 is quite popular, but not undis-
96 Cf. Ferejohn (1980: 118 n. 4). He provides a list of different sorts of things that can be 
signified: “The sorts of things that can serve as significata include (1) primary substances 
(concrete individuals), (2) non-substantial particulars (individual qualities, quantities, times, 
places, etc). and (3) the genera and species which contain things of these sorts. (1 make 
no claims here as to whether these genera and species are intensional entities, or simply 
classes of entities of sorts (1) and (2).) Also included are even more bizarre „entities” such 
as (4) differentiae (e.g. two-footed) and (5) „compounds” [συνδυαζόμενα] such as white 
man.” This list shows well how broad “things” can be. One could object that “things” is so 
broad that it encompasses thoughts and logoi, however, Aristotle intended to use “things” 
in contrast to thoughts, i.e. meaning things in the world, or in other words “extra-mental” 
things while thoughts are usually considered mental things.
97 Ammonius, H. (1897), In Aristotelis de interpretatione commentarius, A. Busse (ed.) CAG 
IV, Berlin. Ammonius’ approach is followed by Weidemann (2015: 159ff.) and Whitaker 
(1997: 18ff.). In Whitaker (1997: 18ff.) there is a discussion of the alternative views which 
assert that πρώτων qualifies either sign, i.e. “words are primarily signs of thoughts”, cf. 
Kretzmann, N. (1974), Aristotle on spoken sound significant by convention, in Ancient Logic 
32 1 Varieties of Multivocity in Aristotle 
puted. For the sake of simplicity, I will follow his suggestions for 
the most part. He claims that words are signs primarily of thoughts. 
Although not stated explicitly he assumes that signs signify things secon-
darily.98 Moreover, the thoughts become intermediaries between words 
and things. Thus, words are direct signs of thoughts, while they are 
only indirect signs of things. Accordingly, I assume that words signify 
extra-mental things through our thoughts or beliefs about them. Since 
almost anything can be denominated by a name, “things”, in this con-
text, has to be understood in a broad sense.99 In order to clarify the 
relationship between thoughts and things we have to specify what is 
meant by the term likenesses – ὁμοιώματα. 
Immediately after mentioning “likenesses”, Aristotle refers to the DA 
(cf. De Int. 16a8-9). Apparently, there must be a passage in the DA that 
mentions thoughts as likenesses of things, however, it is not clear to 
which passages he is referring to.100 I attempt to solve this issue not by 
referring to a single passage, but instead by referring to a theory which 
is given in the DA. I assume that a reference to Aristotle´s theory of the 
φαντᾰσία – imagination can bridge the relation between thoughts and 
things in the world. The φαντᾰσία is a faculty that enables those who 
have it to have a purely internal image or concept of something that is 
not evoked by simultaneous sensory stimulation. Perception is neces-
sary for φαντᾰσία (DA III.3, 428a11-16). On the one hand, the φαντᾰσία 
is able to reproduce sensory perceptions of things in the world, and as a 
consequence forming a percept. In this regard, thoughts are likenesses of 
and its Modern Interpretations, Corcoran, J, pp. 3–21. Furthermore, πρώτων may qual-
ify words, i.e. it is primarily words that are signs of thoughts, and secondarily some other 
items are signs of them. Cf. for this Belardi, W. (1981), Riconsiderando la seconda frase 
del De Interpretatione, in Studi e saggi linguistici 21, pp. 79–83. For a criticism of this view 
see Weidemann, H. (1991), Grundzüge der aristotelischen Sprachtheorie, in Geschichte der 
Sprachtheorie, Schmitter, P. ed. Vol. 2 Sprachtheorien der abendländischen Antike, Tübingen, 
pp. 175–185.
98 There is a passage in which Aristotle is even more explicit that names are symbols for 
things – πράγματα. He states that since we are not able to talk with each other by circulating 
 the things themselves we use their names as symbols for them and often one assumes, that 
what follows from the names follows in the things as well, cf. SE 1, 165a6-9. 
99 Below I will claim that non-existent things should be excluded from the scope of “things”. 
100 Whitaker (1997: 14ff.) provides an overview about the suggestions that have been made 
so far. 
1 Varieties of Multivocity in Aristotle  33
perceivable, extra-mental things. Still, there exist also names for things 
no one has ever perceived, such as the goat-stag – τραγέλαφος. It is a 
“thing” that does not exist. Because of that, I do not assign it to the class 
I called extra-mental things. A goat-stag surely is something one can 
think about, however, as Aristotle insists, one cannot know what it is 
(An. Post. II.7, 92b6-7) since it lacks an essence. Nevertheless, Aristotle 
explicitly claims that the name “goat-stag” signifies something and that 
it is possible to provide a logos, in the sense of a formula, of its name.101 
Thus, the scope of thoughts must be broader than the scope of things. 
An explanation for this is also given by Aristotle’s theory of φαντᾰσία. 
The φαντᾰσία is also able to recombine the contents of previous per-
ceptions with another. Those combinations are causing fictional imag-
inations that can result in fantastic constellations such as a goat-stag, 
or a centaur, or a dream. For such things, there is no corresponding 
extra-mental thing.102 
In this light, it seems plausible that Aristotle claimed that the sig-
nificates of names are primarily thoughts and only secondarily things. 
A name can signify a thought without signifying an extra mental entity, 
whereas the opposite is apparently not possible. A name cannot sig-
nify a thing without also signifying a thought. The reason for this is 
given by the definition of names as conventional signs (De int. 16a26-29). 
They signify by convention and any convention is dependent on think-
ing agents.
101 Cf. also De int. 16a16-18 and for the nominal definition An. Post. 92b29f.
102 Ultimately these combinations can be traced back to an extra-mental sources, such 
as a man and a horse in the combination of the centaur. In this context it is often dis-
cussed whether the lack of an extra-mental thing can be classified as a lack of a refer-
ence. Though Aristotle’s distinction between thoughts and things resembles the distinction 
between meaning/sense and reference it has often been argued that these distinctions do 
not coincide. I will not address this issue in the following. Cf. Irwin (1982: 246f.). Moreover, 
Shields (1999: 79ff.) and Carson, S. (2003). Aristotle on Meaning and Reference. History of 
Philosophy Quarterly 20 (4): 319–337.
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The last option from above is the assumption that names signify 
logoi.103 Names can be signs – σημεῖα of logoi (cf. Met. IV.7, 1012a22-24; 
VIII.6, 1045a26). Here logos is understood in a broad sense meaning 
formula, account or definition. The following two passages from Met. VII.4 
illustrate this:
Not every logos – formula is a definition – ὁρισμός:
Met. VII.4, 1030a6-9: ὥστε τὸ τί ἦν εἶναί 
ἐστιν ὅσων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁρισμός. ὁρι-
σμὸς δ’ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἂν ὄνομα λόγῳ ταὐτὸ 
σημαίνῃ (πάντες γὰρ ἂν εἶεν οἱ λόγοι 
ὅροι· ἔσται γὰρ ὄνομα ὁτῳοῦν λόγῳ, 
ὥστε καὶ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ὁρισμὸς ἔσται)
There is an essence in all those cases in which 
the logos is a definition. A definition is not given 
each time a name signifies the same thing as 
the logos (for then all logoi were definitions: 
there will be a name for any logos whatsoever, 
then the Ilias would be a definition). 
For every name there is a phrase which spells out what the name signi fies:
Met. VII.4, 1030a14-17: ἀλλὰ λόγος μὲν 
ἔσται ἑκάστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τί σημαί-
νει, ἐὰν ᾖ ὄνομα, ὅτι τόδε τῷδε ὑπάρχει, 
ἢ ἀντὶ λόγου ἁπλοῦ ἀκριβέστερος.
There will be a logos that signifies what it is of 
each of the other things, if there is a name <for 
them>, <this logos states> that this belongs to 
that, or instead of a simple formula <stating 
that this belongs to that> a more precise.
The latter thought is also presented in the An. Post. II.7, 92b31-32. 
According to these remarks, the many ways in which a name is said 
can be regarded as the different logoi, for which there is only one name.104 
In order to disambiguate a name, one could denominate the different 
logoi that are related to the same name with other names.105 
Further, one could ask what it is that the logos signifies. If the logos is 
a definition it is clear that it is an essence that is signified by the logos (cf. 
Top. I.5, 101b38 and Met. VII.4, 1030a6-9). However, as stated, it is clear 
103 Cf. De Int. 4. In general, λόγοι are spoken sounds or written marks which signify some-
thing by convention and whose parts also signify something. For the sake of simplicity, in 
this context I generally speak about defining λόγοι. Not every λόγος is a defining one, but 
only those in which the λόγος is of something primary, and of this kind are those in which 
it is not the case that some one thing is said of some other thing. τοιαῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅσα λέγεται 
μὴ τῷ ἄλλο κατ’ ἄλλου λέγεσθαι (Met. 1030a11).
104 Aristotle also knows the opposite situation. There can be two names corresponding 
to one formula. The standard example for this case is λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον – cloak and coat. 
Cf. Met. IV.4, 1006b25-27; Phys. I.2, 185b20; III.3, 202b13; Top. I.7, 103a10.
105 Cf. Met. IV.4, 1006a34-b2: It makes no difference, if someone would assert that <‘man’> 
signifies more <than one>, but only limited <things>, for one could set for each λόγος a dif-
ferent name – διαφέρει δ‘ οὐθὲν οὐδ‘ εἰ πλείω τις φαίη σημαίνειν μόνον δὲ ὡρισμένα, τεθείη 
γὰρ ἂν ἐφ‘ ἑκάστῳ λόγῳ ἕτερον ὄνομα. 
1 Varieties of Multivocity in Aristotle  35
that not every logos is a definition and hence not in every case where 
a formula can be given for a name there is an essence that is signified 
by it. One of Aristotle’s standard examples for things lacking essence 
is, again, the goat-stag.106 The account of “goat-stag” states presumably 
what it would be if it existed. Thus, nothing prevents assuming that 
Aristotle allows for a mental image of it. However, in such cases, one can 
only know what the logos or the name signifies, if one utters ‘goat-stag’ – 
ἀλλὰ τί μὲν σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ἢ τὸ ὄνομα, ὅταν εἴπω τραγέλαφος (An. 
Post. II.7, 92b6-7). Aristotle discusses definitions in the context of this 
passage. Broadly speaking, a definition – ὁρισμός is a logos that states 
what something is, i.e. a statement of the essence. This kind of logos is 
contrasted with those, which only tell us what a name signifies.107 These 
logoi are strictly speaking no definitions. Often, they are called nominal 
definitions for they do not tell us what something really is, but only what 
the name signifies. Not everything that can be denominated has a defin-
able nature. One can even signify the things that are not – σημαίνειν γὰρ 
ἔστι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα (92b27-30). In this sense, the logos ‘rational animal’ 
is what the name ‘man’ signifies and ‘fantastic wild goat-like animal’ is 
what the name ‘goat-stag’ signifies.
One could object to the possibility that names signify logoi, and that 
this may not be a real alternative because they signify in the same way 
as names do. One could object that this alternative is based on an insig-
nificant linguistic detour. Names and logoi only differ in their linguistic 
form. However, I claim that exactly this is what makes logoi so interest-
ing when it comes to disambiguation of names. The formal difference of 
the logoi allows a comparison between them and thus makes a distinc-
tion of different senses possible. If something is said in many ways it is 
decisive that we are able to distinguish a different logos for every way in 
which the name is supposedly said. If there is more than one logos, the 
name is said in many ways.108 I call this view the plurality of logoi-view. 
106 Cf. also De int. 16a16-18. There are other examples for such cases. Often Aristotle 
uses the Ilias or the accidental unity of the white man which he baptises “cloak” Met. VII.4, 
1029b26-29 as illustrations of things lacking essences (in the strict sense).
107 An. Post. II.7, 92b26-28. 
108 A plurality of logoi-view on multivocity is also formulated by Ferejohn (1980: 119). 
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II) The different reasons account of multivocity: There is an alterna-
tive approach to multivocity that supposedly does not involve ambi-
guity. In this approach, the multiplicity of ways in which something 
is said is related to the multiplicity of reasons that explain why some-
thing belongs to a certain class F. For example, a sceptre may be royal 
because it belongs to a queen and honour may be royal, because a queen 
awarded it.109 At the same time, the semantics of “royal” are considered 
to be untouched by this approach. Thus, multivocity and synonymy are 
compatible with this approach. 
I assume Barnes’s (1995: 73)110 approach to multivocity fits into this 
pattern. He explains his interpretation of multivocity using the exam-
ple of cause: 
“Rather, he seems to hold that there are four types or kinds of cause, so 
that he is committed to the view that the word “cause” or “aitia” (as it is 
used in sentences pertinent to the theory) has a single meaning and is 
not ambiguous. But although the word “cause” has only one (pertinent) 
sense, what it is for x to be cause of y may be different from what it is 
for z to be cause of w – x is cause of y, perhaps, insofar as x is the object 
which produced or made y, whereas z is the cause of w insofar as z is the 
matter or stuff of which w is composed. In general, Fs are so called in 
several ways if what it is for x to be F is different from what it is for y to 
be F.” (bold prints are mine)
This approach is appealing as an option to discuss, but it is not clear 
how Barnes’s approach avoids ambiguity, at least not without a modifi-
cation. Barnes proposes that it is not a problem to assert the following 
claims together:
1. x and z are both causes, 
2. “causes” is said in many ways and
3. “cause” is unambiguous
109 This example is used by Brentano (1981: 65): “We call royal not only the royal sover-
eign who bears the royal power, but we also speak of a royal sceptre and a royal dress, of 
royal honour, of a royal order, of royal blood, etc.” Brentano, F. (1862). Von Der Mannig-
fachen Bedeutung Des Seienden Nach Aristoteles. Freiburg im Breisgau.
110 Barnes, J. (1995). 3 Metaphysics. In The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jona-
than Barnes, 66–108. Cambridge.
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I assume these three claims create tension, because of Barnes’s explana-
tion of being said in many ways. Let this be his general claim: In general 
Fs are said in many ways, “if what it is for x to be F is different from what 
it is for y to be F”. How could one still assume that “F” is not ambigu-
ous, if the same term “F” in two cases signifies two different accounts 
of being F? It is not obvious how this approach avoids the ambiguity of 
the term “cause”, without modifying the general claim. I assume that 
Barnes applies “causes” in “x and z are causes” in a generic sense111, that 
equally applies to the two different kinds of causes x and z. I agree that 
with this generic sense (regardless of the question whether Aristotle 
accepted such a sense) the claim “x and z are causes” is unambiguous. 
But the reason why the generic sense of “cause” applies to the different 
kinds of causes is that there is something all kinds of causes have in com-
mon, let us call this “causeG”. Next to the causeG-sense of “cause” there 
are several other senses of “cause” that refer to the individual kinds of 
causes 1–4.112 Let me call them “causesK1-4”.113 
Because of that, I assume that Barnes’s approach does not avoid 
ambiguity. The name “cause” is not merely a name for causeG but also 
for all causesK1-4 which in this context lack a specific name. If one 
denies that “cause” is a specific name for causesK1-4 then one has to 
consider the application of the term “cause” to a causeK as a metaphor 
from genus to species.114 However, there are no reasons to assume that 
Aristotle believes that the name “cause” is used metaphorically when it 
is applied to a specific causeK. Consider the following analogy. If “cause” 
were unambiguous and only the name of causeG then an application to 
causeK would be analogous to an application of the name “animal” to 
111 Not in the sense of a genus of things, but simply in the sense of more universal.
112 I.e. the efficient, formal, material and final cause.
113 There is a paper of Matthews (1972) that is concerned with the confusion of senses and 
kinds or senses and ways. It raises interesting questions about the way in which senses are 
confused with kinds. An elucidating example is the following. Matthews claims that if one 
thinks that 1. “’To exist’ has ten senses”; and 2. “There are ten kinds of existence” are jointly 
acceptable one is to fall into the sense-kind confusion. In our example I avoid this confu-
sion by suggesting that there is a generic sense of “cause” besides specific senses of “cause”. 
Thus, there are five senses of “cause” but only four kinds of causes. Matthews mentions this 
strategy (1972: 151) but does not go into detail about it. 
114 Cf. Poet. 21, 1457b6-9. For more remarks about metaphors cf. section 6.4. 
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the species man. Let us further assume that there is no such name as 
“man” and that we would call the rational animal, formerly known as 
“man”, simply “animal”. Then the name “animal” has become ambigu-
ous between the genus animal and the species rational animal. In this 
sense I consider “cause” ambiguous between causeG and causeK, and 
further between the different kinds of causesK14. If one unqualifiedly 
asks “what it is for x or z to be a cause” in the way the general claim does, 
then the target of the question is not entirely clear since there are two 
possible targets: the answer could refer to causeK or to causeG. For this 
reason “cause” is still ambiguous, according to Barnes’s general claim. 
Since Barnes assumes a difference in being F for two x and y, his formu-
lation in the general claim, i.e. “what it is for x to be F” and “what it is 
for y to be F” aim at the accounts of the specific kinds FKx (in my exam-
ples causesK1 and man) and FKy which both may fall under a generic 
sense of Fness (FG) which is applied in the assertion “x and z are both 
causes”. In that assertion, one could only substitute “causes” with the 
definition of of causeG and not with a definition of any specific causeK 
unless x and z are causes of the same kind. Because of that, I conclude 
that Barnes’s assertion that “the word ‘cause’ has only one (pertinent) 
sense” needs to be revised. 
While I agree that if “cause” were only a name for causeG it would be 
used synonymously the term “cause” has only one “pertinent” sense if 
one disregards its other senses. To summarise, on the one hand, there 
is its generic sense of “cause” which applies to all kinds of causes syn-
onymously. On the other hand, there are also specific senses because 
of the lack of different names for the different kinds of causes. Hence, 
the term “cause” cannot be considered as having only one sense. Thus, 
I assume, Barnes’s approach does not avoid ambiguity entirely, but only 
at the generic level. Modifying the general claim in the following way 
may preserve Barnes’s intentions:
F is said in many ways if two things x and y can be F for different 
reasons.115
115 This approach is admittedly quite rough since it not clear what exactly “different rea-
sons” means in this context.
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In this way, multivocity does not imply ambiguity. Consider the term 
“boring”. One can assume that something is boring for various reasons. 
However, these reasons need not enter the semantics of the term “boring”. 
One possible reason or motivation to interpret multivocity in this 
way is inspired by passages such as the following: 
Met. IV.2, 1003b6-10: τὰ μὲν γὰρ 
ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ’ 
ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας, τὰ δ’ ὅτι ὁδὸς 
εἰς οὐσίαν ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις 
ἢ ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννη-
τικὰ οὐσίας ἢ τῶν πρός τὴν 
οὐσίαν λεγομένων, ἢ τούτων 
τινὸς ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας.
Some things are called beings because they are sub-
stances, others because they are affections of sub-
stances, others because they are the way towards a 
substance or <they are> destructions or privations or 
qualities or productive or generative of a substances, 
or they are of those things which are said to be in rela-
tion to a substance or because it is the negation of 
something of these things or of a subs tance <itself>.
In this passage Aristotle lists various reasons why different things qual-
ify as being. There are two other passages which proceed in the same 
pattern. They address potencies (Met. V.12, 1019b35-1020a6) and con-
traries (Met. V.10, 1018a31-35). In the current passage, nothing seems to 
necessitate that “being” is ambiguous. There might be just one universal 
sense of “being” that is said synonymously of all beings. By considering 
passages of this kind the different reasons account of multivocity seems 
to be a viable interpretation of multivocity. Although I considered the 
way in which Barnes stated his approach, imprecise it was possible to 
preserve it with some modification. Nevertheless, this approach is only 
applicable to a minority of passages since one cannot assert without 
restrictions that terms such as “being”, “unity” or “potency” in Aristotle 
are not ambiguous, acknowledging passages such as the ones mentio-
ned do not state their ambiguity explicitly either.
One may consider the following passage as a critique of the different 
reasons approach. For instance, in Top. I.15, 106a18 Aristotle advises that 
it is not enough to merely state that something is said in many ways, but 
that one must also try to render the different accounts. This directive 
revisits the thought expressed by Barnes’s unmodified general claim116 
which has been determined as establishing ambiguity.
116 In general Fs are said in many ways, “if what it is for x to be F is different from what it 
is for y to be F”.
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Top. I.15, 106a1-8: τὸ δὲ ποσαχῶς, 
πραγματευτέον μὴ μόνον ὅσα λέγε-
ται καθ’ ἕτερον τρόπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν πειρατέον ἀπο-
διδόναι, οἷον μὴ μόνον ὅτι ἀγαθὸν 
καθ’ ἕτερον μὲν τρόπον λέγεται 
δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, εὐεκτικὸν 
δὲ καὶ ὑγιεινὸν καθ’ ἕτερον, ἀλλ’ ὅτι 
καὶ τὰ μὲν τῷ αὐτὰ ποιά τινα εἶναι, 
τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιητικά τινος καὶ οὐ τῷ 
αὐτὰ ποιά τινα εἶναι. ὡσαύτως δὲ 
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
As regards the number of ways [in which a term is 
used], we must not only treat of those terms which 
are used in different ways, but we must also try to 
render their definitions; e.g. we must not merely 
say that justice and courage are called good in a 
different way, and that what conduces to vigour and 
what conduces to health are called so in another, 
but also that the former is so called because of a 
certain intrinsic quality they themselves have, the 
latter because they are productive of a particular 
result and not because of any intrinsic quality in 
themselves. Similarly, also in other cases.
This passage supports the semantic approach to multivocity since Aristo-
tle explicitly demands different logoi for each way in which something 
is said to be F. Further support for the semantic approach to multi-
vocity can be given by the fact that Aristotle sometimes uses clarifica-
tory clauses in which he states that what is said in many ways signifies 
many things – πλείω σημαίνειν or πολλὰ σημαίνειν. This has also been 
noticed by Bonitz, who even states that πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι is synony-
mous with πλείω σημαίνειν.117 Some evidence for this claim is given in 
the following passage:
Top. V.2, 129b30-32: Ἔπειτ’ ἀνασκευά-
ζοντα μὲν εἴ τι τῶν ὀνομάτων τῶν ἐν 
τῷ ἰδίῳ ἀποδεδομένων πλεοναχῶς 
λέγεται, ἢ καὶ ὅλος ὁ λόγος πλείω 
σημαίνει·
in the next topos for destructive arguments see 
if any of the names which are part of what has 
been given <in the account> is said in many 
ways, or whether the whole account signifies 
many things
In this context, πλείω σημαίνειν seems to be the function of πολλαχῶς 
λεγόμενα; it is what they do. Moreover, in SE 10, 170b12ff., Aristotle 
argues against the distinction arguments against words – πρὸς τοὔνομα 
λόγους and arguments against thought – πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν. He denies 
that there is real distinction corresponding to these labels. In that con-
text, some of Aristotle’s standard examples for πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα, 
namely being and unity, are said to signify many things (SE 10, 170b21-22: 
being and unity signify many things – τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ σημαίνει). 
From this passage we can directly infer that Aristotle talks about the 
terms “τὸ ὂν” and “τὸ ἓν” as names which signify not one but many 
117 Bonitz Ind. Arist. 615a43-44: Top. V.2, 129b31-130a28. 
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things. There are several other passages which support the connection 
of πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα and πολλὰ σημαίνειν: cf. Met. VII.1, 1028a10-14, 
DA I.5, 410a13-15, Met. VI.2, 1026a33-b4; Met. XIV.2 1089a7-8). In the 
following passage, the semantic approach of multivocity is applied, and 
it is especially evident that multivocity is connected to ambiguity.
Met. VIII.2, 1042b25-28: ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι 
καὶ τὸ ἔστι τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται· οὐδὸς γὰρ 
ἔστιν ὅτι οὕτως κεῖται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι τὸ 
οὕτως αὐτὸ κεῖσθαι σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ κρύ-
σταλλῳ εἶναι τὸ οὕτω πεπυκνῶσθαι. 
Just it is clear that the “is” is said in these many 
ways: For this is a threshold, because it lies 
thus and so, and “being” (τὸ εἶναι) signifies 
its laying thus and so, and “being ice” <sig-
nifies> being solidified thus and so. 
One usually refers to this passage in order to illustrate that “being” has 
many different senses. Aristotle clearly states that “τὸ εἶναι” signifies 
different things in different applications. “τὸ εἶναι” can signify laying 
thus and so – τὸ οὕτως αὐτὸ κεῖσθαι and “τὸ κρύσταλλῳ εἶναι” signifies – 
σημαίνει to be solidified thus and so – τὸ οὕτω πεπυκνῶσθαι. The same 
pertains for other cases. Hence there is a vast multiplicity of senses of 
“τὸ εἶναι”.118 According to this passage, it would not be appropriate to 
consider “τὸ εἶναι” as an unambiguous term. It is clearly stated that “τὸ 
εἶναι” signifies more than one thing – i.e. πλείω.
To conclude, there are two accounts of multivocity. Thus, “multi-
vocity” is itself said in many ways. The different reasons account is 
only applicable in a minority of cases while the semantic account of 
multivocity is more widely applicable. From this, one may formulate 
the following rule: In Aristotle, ambiguity is sufficient for multivocity, 
but multivocity is not sufficient for ambiguity, at least not in every case. 
However, although the different reasons account does not necessitate 
ambiguity, it also does not exclude it. It is neutral regarding the question 
118 Cf. also DA II.4, 415b13: to be for living beings is to be alive, but cause and principle of 
them is the soul – τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν, αἰτία δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ τούτου ἡ ψυχή. In this 
passage “to be” for a living thing means “to be alive”. Moreover, cf. Phys. I.3, 186b3-4 where 
Aristotle mentions that “being” signifies many things – πολλὰ τὸ ὂν σημαίνει. This quote is 
taken out of its context. Aristotle argues against the Parmenidean claim that being signifies 
one thing – τὸ ὂν σημαίνειν ἕν. Nevertheless, in that chapter it is quite clear that Aristotle 
indeed adheres to the view that “being” signifies many things. Cf. also his claim that in Phys. 
I.2, 185b32-34 that the things that are are a plurality – πολλὰ δὲ τὰ ὄντα, either in account – 
'λόγῳ or in division – διαιρέσει. Moreover, cf. Phys. I.3, 186a30-31: things such as whiteness 
and the thing that is white differ in being – τῷ εἶναι ἕτερον.
of ambiguity. Hence, even if something is multivocal according to the 
different reasons account of multivocity, there may be different senses 
of the term that is said in many ways which then satisfies the semantic 
account of multivocity. Unless stated otherwise, the following sections 
pursue the semantic account of multivocity.
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2  On Multivocity, Homonymy and 
Synonymy and Their Relation in 
Aristotle 
2.1 Possible Views on Their Relation
Having investigated multivocity in the previous chapter, I will clarify 
the notions of homonymy and synonymy and their relations to multi-
vocity. To analyse and assess the relationship of these notions, one has 
to consider the various occurrences and applications in the corpus. A 
comparison of the different occurrences reveals what they have in com-
mon. Often, scholars propose that Aristotle’s use of these notions, espe-
cially that of homonymy, allegedly changed from earlier to later works. 
The most prominent adherent of this thesis is Owen.119 Whether there is 
a development of Aristotle’s thoughts or not, the following distinction 
shows that Aristotle does not always follow a strictly regimented the-
ory in his use of the terms “homonymy”, “synonymy”, and “being said 
in many ways”. From this, however, one cannot infer that his doctrine 
changes correspondingly.
I distinguish technical from non-technical occurrences of homonymy 
and synonymy in the corpus. It is still a matter of debate what Aristo-
tle’s technical accounts of these concepts are exactly, but it is widely 
agreed that the definitions of the Categories set the pattern for these 
notions.120 Non-technical are those occurrences of the term “homon-
ymous” (a) in which one would expect the text to provide “synony-
mous” instead (cf. GC I.10, 328b21; Met. I.6, 987b7-10; Met. I.9, 990b6; 
Met. VII.9, 1034a22-23, b1121; moreover, Met. XIII.4, 1079a2; Met. XIII.10, 
1086b27) or (b) those in which it merely has its literal meaning, i.e., 
“having the same name” (a combination of ὅμοιος and ὄνομα) (cf. Phys. 
119 For further remarks on his thesis, cf. section 6.1.1.
120 See also Top. VI.10, 148a23-27. The definitions of homonymy and synonymy will be 
discussed in section 3 of this study.
121 Concerning the latter passage, one often speaks of “synonymy-principle of genera-
tion”, i.e. a (corporeal) house comes into existence through a house (in thought), although 
in most editions we find “ἐξ ὁμωνύμου”).
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VII.3, 245b16; PA I.3, 643b7, and PA II.2, 647b18). The latter non-tech-
nical use does not tell us whether there is or is not anything the two 
things share beyond the name.122
The term “synonymy” literally denotes almost the same, something 
like “commonly named” (a combination of σύν and ὄνομα). By only 
considering the meaning of the compounds and/or their components in 
isolation, i.e. without a technical approach, one can barely distinguish 
homonymy from synonymy. Similar to the case of (a) in Top. VIII.13, 
162b38 the text provides “synonymous” while “homonymous” should be 
given, however, the case of synonymy bears another vagueness.
As stated earlier, the standard Aristotelian notion of synonymy is 
what is presented in the Categories. This notion of synonymy is a rela-
tion between (numerically different) things which both have a com-
mon name, and the logos that corresponds to the name is the same.123 
In contrast to this, there is the “modern” synonymy, which is a relation 
between different names referring to the same thing. Speusippus intro-
duced this as Polyonymy.124 Aristotle knew this notion, albeit not under 
this name. One can find his standard example for polyonymy in Top. 
I.7, 103a9-10: What is one in number but has many names like dress or 
cloth – οἷον λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, however, according to the definition of 
synonymy as mentioned earlier this is not a technical case of synon-
ymy for Aristotle.125 If one examines Aristotle’s remarks in Rhet. III.2, 
1404b37-1405a2, one could be puzzled by his choice of terms. He states 
Synonymies <are useful> for the poet, I call ordinary and synonymous 
e.g., “advancing” and “proceeding”, for both are ordinary <words> and 
synonyms to each other – τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ συνωνυμίαι, λέγω δὲ κύριά τε καὶ 
συνώνυμα οἷον τὸ πορεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα καὶ 
κύρια καὶ συνώνυμα ἀλλήλοις. It is evident that in the example given, 
there are two different names involved, and the notion described in 
122 Whether the two things with the same name are related by homonymy or synonymy, 
or in any other way cannot be determined if we only know that two things have the same 
name.
123 For thorough discussion of this notion see section 3 of this study.
124 Simpl. in Arist. Cat. CAG VIII, p. 29,5 ff.; 36,25 ff.; 38,11 ff.
125 Ammonius (1991: 23) also wondered in his commentary on the Categories of why 
Aristotle does not discuss the contraries of homonymy and synonymy, i.e., polyonymy and 
heteronymy, since these were apparently well-known concepts in the Academy.
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this passage is what Speusippos called polyonymy or what also is called 
“modern” synonymy. This case repeats in SE 5, 167a24. 
I assess the non-technical uses of homonymy and synonymy as occa-
sional reversions to looser usage. I do not think that these occasional 
deviations compromise an investigation of his technical accounts of 
these notions. For the present purposes, it is important to note that my 
approach is aiming at the most appropriate depiction of the relation 
between the three concepts multivocity, homonymy and synonymy. It 
is not trying to incorporate, harmonise or explain all non-technical 
occurrences of these concepts. Nevertheless, the exact nature of these 
technical uses remains to be clarified and is subject of this enquiry.
The relation of homonymy and multivocity has often been discussed 
by several scholars without paying enough attention to the concept of 
synonymy.126 Yet, it is impossible to assess their relation accurately with-
out also assessing the way synonymy is related to these two. The aim 
of the discussion in the following sections is firstly to present three dif-
ferent views of the relation of homonymy, multivocity, and synonymy, 
and then, secondly, to narrow down and justify which model of the 
relations of these concepts describes Aristotle’s doctrine in the best way. 
The broader purpose of this conceptualisation is the determination 
of the application area of the PHR.127 I propose there are three ways the 
relation of multivocity, homonymy, and synonymy can be dealt with 
and sometimes is dealt with in the literature. The three views originate 
from different interpretations of Aristotle’s works. The last view (the 
126 As e.g., in Irwin (1981), Brakas (2011), Hintikka (1959), and also in Owens (19783). In 
contrast to these studies, one has to mention Leszl (1970: 123-126), who divides the contri-
butions to the PHR into those who take a synonymy view of it and those, who take a hom-
onymy view of it. Moreover, there are two other possible views he discusses, which how-
ever, are not of importance in the present context. Leszl categorises the PHR as a certain 
type of synonymy (cf. especially Leszl (1970: 135-155)).
127 Even though the PHR is not a certain kind of multivocity or homonymy, the following-
diagrams might suggest something that looks like a generic subordination. This is not 
intended. The PHR, just as the analogy, are possible explanations for connections between 
multivocals, as I will argue. Some exciting remarks about possible views of the PHR are 
provided by Leszl (1970: 123-126). He gives a list of four possible interpretations of “focal 
meaning.” His different options also presuppose different views of the relation of homon-
ymy, synonymy, and multivocity, which is discussed in the present section. For some criti-
cal remarks on his distinctions cf. Shields (1999: 104 n.125).
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DefH-view) reflects my own exegetical efforts.128 Usually, a detailed dis-
cussion of these three options is not available.129 The controversy about 
these alternatives is to a certain degree about terminological regimen-
tation and not doctrinal. The reasons that support the preferred view 
of the present study also have a doctrinal impact as it is apt to imple-
ment a case of multivocity (namely synonymous multivocals)130 that is 
not covered by the other two models.131
I. The inflationary account of homonymy – InfH 
 Theses: 
1) “homonymy” and “multivocity” can be used interchangeably  
 (With “some” exceptions)
2) The standard use of “homonymy” in Aristotle covers more  
 than accidental homonymy.
3) Homonymy and synonymy are mutually exclusive
 a) Hence multivocals do not appear in the diagram as a third class
4) Homonymy is inflated to cover the following kinds:
 a) Accidental homonyms
 b) Non-accidental homonyms: Pros hen and analogical cases
things with the same name
Homonyms/Multivocals
• Accidental
• Non-accidental
 – pros hen
 – analogical
Synonyms
128 Of course, my exegetical work is influenced by the works of several other scholars.
129 An exception is Irwin (1981) who discusses the first and the third, i.e., what he calls 
the “moderate” and the “extreme” view.
130 This class is explained in section 2.3.2.
131 This is actually a matter of debate. What I call synonymous multivocals sometimes is 
not considered synonymous but homonymous.
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II. The “tertium quid” account of homonymy and synonymy.
 Theses: 
1) With some exceptions “homonymy” and “multivocity” can  
 be used interchangeably
2) Homonymy and synonymy are overlapping. There are cases  
 which can neither be determined as completely synonymous  
 nor as completely homonymous
3) Homonymy and synonymy are not mutually exclusive 
4) One can account for the tertium quids in different ways, either  
 as incomplete synonyms or as incomplete homonyms
5) It is not possible to accommodate synonymous multivocals  
 in this approach
things with the same name
Homonyms/
Multivocals
incomplete homonyms/ 
multivocals, incomplete  
synonyms:
• Pros hen
• Analogical 
Synonyms
III. The deflationary account of homonymy – DefH
 Theses: 
1) “Homonymy” means “accidental homonymy”
2) Homonymy and synonymy are not mutually exclusive 
3) Homonymy is a kind of multivocity
4) There are different kinds of multivocals 
 a) Homonymous multivocals
 b) Polysemous Multivocals
  i) Pros hen Multivocals
  ii) Analogous Multivocals
 c) Synonymous Multivocals (multivocal synonyms re-spectively) 
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things with the same name
Multivocals
• Homonyms
• Polysemous cases
 – Pros hen
 – Analogical
Synonymous  
Multivocals
Synonyms
A note on the diagrams: The entirety of the area that is divided up has no 
name in Aristotle. One can call it “things with the same name” as indi-
cated by the vertical bracket on the right-hand side. The three diagrams 
are supposed to show that it is possible to divide those things in different 
ways. Amongst other things, the most conspicuous advantage of the lat-
ter view is that it contains a further subclass (synonymous multivocals), 
whereas one cannot account for them with the other two approaches of 
the relationship of homonymy, multivocity, and synonymy. 
Overall, it is possible to correlate the most prominent scholarly 
contributions to these three approaches. The assignment is possible 
in broad outline only since many contributions do not primarily focus 
on a reconstruction of the relationship of homonymy, synonymy, and 
multivocity. Nevertheless, most contributions apply at least an implicit 
general framework that determines the relationships of these notions. 
Two of the most recent monographs in this field topic, i.e. Shields 
(1999)132 and Ward (2008), but also Irwin’s (1981) and Hamlyn’s (1977) 
contributions, respectively, apply a framework that is represented by 
InfH. Owen’s position can be assigned to the tertium quid view which 
involves something in between homonymy and synonymy. Sometimes 
he states that “focal meaning” is to be seen as an extension of synonymy 
rather than of homonymy. At any rate, in his opinion, the distinction 
between homonymy and synonymy is not exhaustive and allows for a
132 Lewis (2004) follows Shields’s terminology.
2.1 Possible Views on Their Relation 49
tertium quid (Owen (1960: 168, 188; for tertium quid 180, 181)).133 In 
addition, although Owen does not refer to it, there is indeed a passage 
where Aristotle assimilates pros hen with synonymy, at least indirectly, 
by stating that pros hen is in a way kath hen as well (Met. IV.2, 1003b14-
17).134 Moreover, Alexander135 mentions that a tertium quid view, is plau-
sible even though Alexander also shows a tendency to the DefH-view. 
Hintikka (1959) follows him in this regard. 
The difficulty allocating Owen’s position rests on the fact that he 
adheres to a developmental thesis. This thesis claims that the relation 
of the three notions is changing throughout Aristotle’s works in line 
with his philosophical development. Also, Brakas (2011) and Owens 
(19783) distinguish early and mature views, and like Owen (1960), they 
propose a developmental thesis and assign the views accordingly. Irwin 
(1981) accepts the developmental thesis but nevertheless considers the 
InfH view as the most appropriate approach to assess Aristotle’s notion 
of homonymy in general (as does Owens (19783: 118)). Owen (1960: 183) 
argues that there was a “period” (he refers to the developmental stage 
of the Organon) in which Aristotle worked with an exhaustive dichot-
omy of synonymy and homonymy. However, then, he claims, Aristotle 
changed his mind 136: Owen assumes that Aristotle came to recognise a 
third possibility (tertium quid) in a later period (he refers to the Meta-
physics IV).137 He argues138 that the reason why focal meaning is absent in 
parts of the Metaphysics (Met. I.9, 991a2-8 and Met. XIII.4, 1079a33-b3) 
is that he deliberately ignored it as part of his polemic against Academic 
133 Senfrin-Weis (2009: 263 n.4) asserts the tertium quid view is “certainly wrong”. 
Further she thinks that any view that affiliates pros hen with synonymy is wrong as well. 
Senfrin-Weis, H. (2009). Pros hen and the foundations of Aristotelian Metaphysics. In 
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 24 (2008), ed. Gary 
M. Gurtler, John J. Cleary, J. J. Cleary and Gurtler, 261–285. Leiden.
134 This passage plays an important role in the distinction between kath hen and pros hen 
sciences cf. section 8.5. 
135 In Arist. Metaph. p. 241, line 5–9 ff.
136 I will discuss what is meant with “change of mind” in section 8.2. 
137 Shields (1999: 42) argues that a tertium quid is not necessary to explain the change. 
He, as Irwin, instead argue that Aristotle’s notion of homonymy simply is broader than it 
is sometimes assumed. 
138 Cf. Owen (1960: 181–182).
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views.139 According to my own research, I share the developmental the-
sis Owen suggests. But unlike Irwin (1981), I assume that the DefH-view 
is the most appropriate approach to assess Aristotle’s notion of hom-
onymy in general. 
The following sections attempt to justify the DefH-view. The conclu-
sion is that the reasons to consider the DefH-view as the most appro-
priate interpretation prevail. This approach creates the most coherent 
terminology with fewest deviations and exceptions. As these sections 
convey, there are many passages in many different works of Aristotle 
that suggest a difference between multivocity and homonymy. These 
sections aim to demonstrate that the assumption of co-extension of 
multivocity and homonymy as a general doctrinal view of Aristotle 
does not represent Aristotle’s doctrine on these matters in an appro- 
priate way. I will argue for a narrower notion of homonymy, i.e. one that 
is seemingly orientated on Aristotle’s “mature” works (in this context I 
refer to the Metaphysics and the GC), however, I will argue that there are 
many reasons which reveal that this allegedly “mature” notion of hom-
onymy indeed coincides with the notion of homonymy that is defined 
in the Categories. In section 1.4, I will also address the problems of the 
DefH-view and suggest a solution. 
2.2 The Relation of Multivocity, Homonymy, 
and Synonymy – Arguments for DefH
As stated earlier, the relation of homonymy and multivocity has often 
been discussed.140 Yet, it is still a matter of ongoing debate. I think the 
main problem of adherents of the InfH-view, such as Shields (1999), 
Ward (2008), or Irwin (1981), is that they rely without necessity on 
the idea that homonymy and synonymy must be mutually exclusive.141 
When it comes to cases such as “being” or “healthy” which are said in 
many ways but not homonymously they must inflate the notion of hom-
onymy to avoid synonymy in such cases and to maintain the exhaus-
139 For the full remark cf. section 4.1.2 footnote 251.
140 As stated earlier, especially important for this study are the views of Irwin (1981), 
Shields (1999), Owen (1960), Owens (19783), Hintikka (1959) and Brakas (2011). 
141 So does Shields (1999: 23
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tive distinction of homonymy and synonymy. As these conclusions are 
unsatisfactory, I argue for an alternative, the DefH-view. 
The following example shall serve as a starting point to enter the 
discussion:
Assume there are precisely two properties, which can be denomi-
nated by the term “sharp”, i.e. the sharpness of a tone and the sharpness 
of a knife. The application of “sharp” to the knife signifies the sharpness 
of a knife. The application of “sharp” to the tone signifies the sharpness 
of a tone. The difference can be made obvious by comparison of their 
accounts:
1. “sharp”– knife → def. “what it is to be sharp for a knife”  
e.g. “to cut well” 
2. “sharp”– tone → def. “what it is to be sharp for a tone,”  
e.g. “to be of high frequency” or something similar.142 
According to the semantic account of multivocity, the term “sharp” in 
this example is multivocal. The sharpness example is one that occurs 
in the context of tests for homonymy in Top. I.15, 107b13-18. “Sharp” is 
used homonymously, since the two ways of being sharp are not related. 
According to this test, one has to verify whether a comparison is pos-
sible (cf. also Phys. VII.4, 248b6-12). One can call this the commensu-
rability-test. One has to ask whether a comparison is valid in two cases 
where something has a common name.143 If the answer is negative, it is 
a case of homonymy. This is the case in the example given. One cannot 
compare the sharpness of a knife with the sharpness of a tone. Aristotle 
infers from this that being sharp is said of them homonymously. Evi-
dently, this test shows that the multivocal “sharp” is said homonymously. 
This claim is only informative if there is a difference between multivoc-
142 Cf. Top. I.15, 107a36-b5.
143 One has to presuppose that Aristotle thinks of terms that allow comparison and not 
of terms that disallow it as e.g. the term “animal”. Even if “animal” was said synonymously 
a comparison would not be possible, but from this it does not follow that it is used hom-
onymously. Hence, only in some cases in which comparison is not possible one can infer 
homonymy.
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ity and homonymy. Whether there is a difference between these notions 
and what it consists of is a matter of debate.
Since Aristotle clearly states in several passages that something that 
is said in many ways is not necessarily said homonymously, it is clear 
that these notions do not coincide. Nevertheless, in the literature, this 
aspect is sometimes neglected, ignored or considered trivial, since in 
other passages these two notions apparently coincide. Because of the 
very close relation of homonymy and multivocity, the assumption pre-
vails that they are “indeed co-extensive” (cf. Shields (1999: 10; 22ff; also 
219 n. 284)): what is said in many ways is said homonymously and what 
is said homonymously is said in many ways.144 
There are several reasons to regard the assumption of co-extension 
of homonymy and multivocity as an inappropriate assessment of the 
relation of the two in Aristotle. Owens (19783) restricts the assumption 
of co-extension to certain works, i.e. the Top. and the SE, which in fact 
only pertains to certain parts of these works.145 Brakas (2011: 148) pres-
ents a similar approach. He suggests that Aristotle changed his usage 
of homonymy throughout his works, assuming that in his earlier works, 
such as the works of the Organon, multivocity and homonymy were 
the same thing. In his later works, “his views shift” until he reaches the 
point where homonymy implies multivocity but not vice versa. Other 
scholars such as Hintikka (1959) refuse to identify them in any context 
whatsoever. The four scholars mentioned propose three positions with 
two extremes and one moderate view. One can identify one extreme 
as the assumption of co-extension (Shields), whereas the other is the 
144 This position is also Owen’s in Owen (1960: 182 n. 5): “If a word is pollachôs legome-
non then it is a case of homonymy, requiring different definitions in different uses”. Owen 
refers to Top. 106a1-8. Also Shields (1999: 23 n. 22) refers to Owen and the same passage 
Owen quotes. However, I do not see how that passages in any way can be used to justify 
Shields’s assessment that it is Aristotle’s dominant practice (cf. also Shields (1999: 42)) to 
use “the terms interchangeably – where the interchange, as in Topics i. 15, esp. 106a 1–8, 
heads in both directions indifferently.” In addition, Shields (1999: 219 n. 284) claims “his 
[Aristotle’s] commitment to the multivocity of being is sufficient for its homonymy.” The 
present study claims instead: if something is homonymous it is also a multivocal and not 
the other way around.
145 It is not correct that Aristotle identifies homonymy and multivocity in the Topics, 
since also the Topics there is a passage (Top. II.3, 110b16-22) in which Aristotle clearly dis-
tinguishes the two.
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exclusion of co-extension (Hintikka). Both extreme positions assume 
that Aristotle’s terminology of multivocity and homonymy is consistent 
throughout his works, at least for the most part. Still, one can argue 
with respect to the relevant passages that the DefH-view represents 
Aristotle’s terminology more appropriately than the InfH-view. I mean 
by “more appropriately” that the DefH-view with its clear distinction 
of homonymy and multivocity does not only represent Aristotle’s most 
mature view on the relation of homonymy and multivocity, but that its 
narrow notion of homonymy is also adequate to interpret Aristotle’s 
Categories. By proposing this, I do not want to deny development in 
Aristotle’s thought about these notions, but there is no reason to assume 
a radical change from earlier to later works with regard to the question 
of whether there is a narrower or a broader notion of homonymy. What 
Aristotle develops in his Metaphysics and GC is a clear articulation of 
the difference between homonymous and non-homonymous multivo-
cals. In comparison with other scholars who work on homonymy and 
multivocity in Aristotle, my deflation of homonymy is compensated 
for by inflating of the notion of multivocity, which will be identified as 
the notion that is broader and more flexible in contrast to the notion 
of homonymy.
The subsections hereunder argue for, but also discuss and restrict, 
the following claims by referring to the relevant passages in order to 
provide a reassessment of the relations of homonymy, synonymy, and 
multivocity supporting the DefH-view. The main focus lies in showing 
that there is a difference. 
1. Homonymy and multivocity are not co-extensive
2. Homonymy in Aristotle is homonymy ἀπὸ τύχης (cf. EN I.6, 
1096b27)
3. Homonymy is a kind of multivocity
The result is that everything that is said homonymously is said in many 
ways, whereas the converse is not true. From this, it is clear that homon-
ymy is a kind of multivocity. However, it is only a kind of multivocity if 
one defines the standard use of homonymy as what is called accidental 
homonymy. Moreover, the relation between synonymy and multivoc-
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ity will be further determined. These notions are not mutually exclu-
sive. There is a hybrid class of synonymous multivocals or multivocal 
synonyms, which needs to be distinguished from other multivocals or 
synonyms. 
2.2.1 Multivocity and Homonymy are not  
Co-Extensive
There are several crucial passages contrasting homonymy with mul-
tivocity.146 Most prominent and instructive is the following passage, 
which is also most important in the application of the PHR to “being” 
which I mentioned in the introduction already.147
Met. IV.2, 1003a33-34: τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεταιμὲν 
πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρός ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ 
φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως
Being is said in many ways, but <it is said 
so> according to one, i.e. one nature, and not 
homonymously
Aristotle does not only tell us here that “the things that are” is said in 
many ways, he is more specific. He actually tells us three things: (1) that 
“being” is said in many ways, and (2) that every being is called “being” 
with reference to some one thing, (i.e. a single nature), and (3) moreover, 
he qualifies his statement by saying “being” is not said homonymously 
which almost sounds like a conclusion. One can consider the first καὶ 
in this passage explicative. The formulations need to be precise at the 
beginning of book IV where Aristotle begins with his justification of 
the possibility of the science of being qua being. The first καὶ clearly 
specifies the ἓν, which otherwise would be completely unspecified. By 
146 All following passages already have been or will be quoted in the following: Met. IV.2, 
1003a33-34; Met. ix.1, 1046b4-7; GC I.6, 322b29-32; Met. VII.4, 1030a29-b3, and also Top. 
II.3, 110b16-22; homonymy is also denied of some multivocals in EE VII.2, 1236a16-22.
147 The thesis that being is not said homonymously is found again in Met. VII.4, 1030a29-b3. 
Though “πολλαχῶς” is not explicitly mentioned it is clear from the “μήτε ὡσαύτως” (a35) 
and the “οὔτε καθ‘ ἓν” (b3) that “being” also is not said synonymously. Moreover, Aristotle 
repeats what he said in Met. IV.2 that being is said like the healthy and the medical said 
with relation to one, i.e. πρὸς ἕν.
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the addition καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως it is clear multivocity and homonymy 
cannot be co-extensive but related in a different way.148 
The denial of co-extension does not guarantee that multivocity con-
tains homonymy as a subcategory. Nevertheless, in the section after the 
next (2.2.3), two further passages will establish and justify this claim. 
Before entering the discussion of these passages, the standard interpre-
tation of the present and related passages will be reassessed.
2.2.2 Homonymy is Homoònymy ảπò τύχης
It has been proposed that Aristotle uses the term “homonymy” ordi-
narily when there is no connection between things with the same name, 
other than by name.149 This assumption has been around since Alex-
ander:150 τὰ κυρίως ὁμώνυμα λεγόμενα, ἅ ἐστι τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης: Aristotle’s 
ordinary – κυρίως use of “homonymy” refers to accidental homonyms – 
τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης (cf. for this label EN I.6, 1096b27, similarly in EE VII.2, 
1236b25). I propose there are two main reasons for this claim. One rea-
son is given by the definition of homonymy in the Categories (cf. chapter 
3 of this study for a thorough analysis). Yet, the reference to this defi-
nition alone is not fully convincing because the text in the definition 
of homonymy in the Categories contains an ambiguity which does not 
exclude a more comprehensive notion of homonymy. I discuss these 
problematic aspects of the definiton in section 3.4. In addition to the 
first reason there are passages where Aristotle denies homonymy of 
some multivocals.151 In those passages, it is clear that Aristotle applies 
a narrow notion of homonymy. These two reasons support the DefH-
148 If one disregards this difference one might come to assertions like the following: Bren-
tano (1862: 6) asserts that “Das Seiende ist ein ὁμώνυμον”. This quote is especially careless 
because Brentano in his work simply does not quote the last three words of the passage – 
καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως – maybe he abstained from doing so because otherwise his statement 
would sound conflictual.
149 Cf. Hintikka (1959: 139).
150 Alexander, In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria ed. M. Hayduck (1891: 241, page 
lines 25–26).
151 As mentioned earlier: Met. IV.2, 1003a33-34; Met. ix.1, 1046b4-7; GC I.6, 322b29-32; 
Met. VII.4, 1030a29-b3, and also Top. II.3, 110b16-22; homonymy is also denied of some 
multivocals in EE VII.2, 1236a16-22.
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view. However, it remains an exegetical assumption that is only partly 
warranted since there are other passages where Aristotle’s notion of 
homonymy appears not as restricted. This is particularly evident in pas-
sages using homonymy and multivocity interchangeably.152 Many schol-
ars, such as Shields (1999), Ward (2008), Irwin (1981) refer to such pas-
sages to justify that Aristotle’s notion of homonymy is comprehensive. 
I think an assessment of Aristotle doctrine of homonymy on this 
basis inflates it and threatens its distinctiveness. The applicability 
of such a comprehensive notion is restricted to select passages and 
requires scholars who apply it to provide a special rationale for those 
passages where Aristotle denies homonymy but not multivocity. 
The rationale provided is the following: There is an assumption that 
I call the standard auxiliary assumption (SAA). It underlies many inter-
pretations of passages in which Aristotle denies homonymy but not 
multivocity. The SAA proposes that the denial of homonymy in such 
passages only covers a specific kind of homonymy, namely accidental 
homonymy, i.e. those cases where the homonyms are not associated by 
definitional overlap.153 At the same time, it proposes that homonymy “in 
general” is not denied.154 Homonymy is not denied as multivocity is not 
denied and multivocity warrants non-synonymy, at least according to 
the InfH-view. This is crucial since the InfH-view contains the assump-
tion that the distinction between homonymy and synonymy is mutually 
exclusive. Thus, they can infer homonymy from non-synonymy and 
vice versa. As a consequence, if non-synonymy155 is true of something, 
and according to the InfH-view it is true of all things that are multivo-
cal, homonymy also must be true of it as well. If Aristotle then denies 
homonymy of some multivocals adherents of the InfH-view suggest 
that Aristotle only denies accidenal homonymy and not homonymy in 
152 Cf. Bonitz Ind. Arist., 514a45-47.
153 For a detailed account of the accidental-non-accidental distinction and its problems 
see the section 3.4.1.1 below. I doubt that the lack of definitional overlap is sufficient to con-
sider a given homonymy accidental.
154 I agree with Brakas (2011: 157) who claims that he fails to see how one could justifi-
ably infer from the denial of homonymy (simpliciter) that only accidental homonymy is 
denied. He explicitly refers to Ward’s (2008: 107) assessment of Met. IV.2 1003a33-34. 
155 This is an assumption is do not share, since I acknowledge a case of synonymous 
multi vocals which will be discussed in section 2.3.2. 
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general and maintain in this way the exhaustive distinction between 
homonymy and synonymy. Because of this, one could even object that 
the InfH-view requires two notions of homonymy that are in variance 
with another: a comprehensive and a narrow. 
The example of “being” illustrates this further. It cannot be homon-
ymous and non-homonymous at the same time and in the same sense. 
Adherents of the InfH-view need the SAA to solve this paradox. Shields 
(1999), Irwin (1981), Ward (2008), Owens (19783) and others apply the 
SAA. I assume these scholars consider it desirable that the distinction 
between homonymous and synonymous cases be mutually exclusive. 
This might be a key of the reason for their preference of the InfH-view. 
However, homonymy and synonymy being mutually exclusive can only 
be maintained if the SAA is added to those passages where homonymy 
and multivocity do not coincide. 
The SAA assumption, however, proves redundant – I will even argue, 
it is problematic. Through its redundancy, the view on the relation of 
homonymy, synonymy, and multivocity needs to be revised to the 
DefH-view, which denies the SAA, i.e. one denies that Aristotle merely 
denies accidental homonymy in the relevant contexts. I propose that 
Aristotle denies homonymy without limitation and that this denial 
implies the application of a deflated notion of homonymy.156 Because 
of that, the SAA is not only redundant, but its application would even 
be problematic and unconvincing.
Ensuing this denial, one has to realise that when scholars speak of 
homonymy as, e.g. in the philosophically interesting cases such as being, 
unity, potency or substance, they should instead talk about a particular 
kind of multivocity, i.e. one that is non-homonymous. Instead of core- 
dependent homonymy (Shields (1999) or pros hen homonymy (Hamlyn 
(1977)) one should not consider those cases homonymous at all. One of 
the main reasons arguing for the narrow notion of homonymy is that the 
claim that all multivocals are homonyms comes with restrictions while 
the opposite, i.e. the claim that all homonyms are multivocals is a truth 
free from any restrictions and is not violated anywhere in the corpus. 
156 It is deflated only from the point of view of scholars who adhere to the InfH-view.
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I acknowledge that Aristotle does not always distinguish carefully 
between homonymy and multivocity and that his use of these terms 
allows certain flexibility, nevertheless, these uses are restricted to a few 
contexts. The task of the exegete, in this case, is not showing that there is 
a correct and a false view on the relation of homonymy and multivocity, 
but that there is a more central opposed to a more marginal case and 
that this insight should be used as a starting point to develop theses to 
interpret every single instance of these notions. 
A reassessment of the relationship between homonymy, synonymy, 
and multivocity is necessary not only for these reasons but also for 
another: As announced earlier, in Top. II.10 there is a hybrid of multi-
vocity (cf. section 2.3.2) and synonymy which is neither covered by InfH 
nor the tertium quid account.
2.2.3 Multivocity Encompasses Homonymy
The denial of co-extension does not determine the relation of multi-
vocity and homonymy positively. This omission will be made up now: 
It has been suggested, e.g. by Matthews (1995: 235), that multivocity is 
a notion broader than homonymy. However, one can be more explicit 
than this. Multivocity is not only broader but also the superordinate 
notion of homonymy and thus, as indicated earlier, homonymy is a kind 
of multivocity. As Aristotle does not deal with this question in detail, 
this thesis attempts a synoptic reconstruction.
The assumption that multivocity is the broader notion presupposes 
the denial of co-extension. Some scholars accept this view (cf. Matthews 
(1995), while some deny it (Shields (1999) and for the most part Owens 
(1979)). Matthews (1995: 235) provides the following assessment: “We 
need not suppose, that is, that Aristotle supposes any term said in many 
ways is therefore used homonymously. We are free to suppose that “said 
in many ways” is a looser classification – one that includes, but is not 
restricted to, cases of genuine homonymy.” What Matthews calls genuine 
homonymy is often called accidental homonymy or simply homonymy. 
Hintikka (1959: 138), as well as Brakas (2011: 158–159), also share this 
opinion, while they fail to provide a thorough assessment of the rela-
tion between these concepts. 
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The first step in showing that homonymy is a kind of multivocity con-
sists in showing that multivocity is the broader notion, which is not 
evident from the passage of Met. IV.2, 1003a33-34 from above, but from 
the following passage of Met. ix.1: 
Met. ix.1, 1046a4-7: ὅτι μὲν οὖν λέγεται πολ-
λαχῶς ἡ δύναμις καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι, διώρισται 
ἡμῖν ἐν ἄλλοις· τούτων δ’ ὅσαι μὲν ὁμωνύ-
μως λέγονται δυνάμεις ἀφείσθωσαν
It has been pointed out by us elsewhere, that 
potency and to be able to are said in many 
ways: Of these, we may neglect all the poten-
cies that are so-called homonymously. 
Aristotle is explicit in this passage. He is talking about the term “potency” 
which is multivocal. By saying this, he wants to neglect those potencies 
that are potencies only homonymously from those – τούτων, i.e. other 
multivocals. It is clear that homonyms are said in many ways as well 
whereas not everything that is said in many ways is homonymous.157 
Hence some multivocals are non-homonymous.158 If it is true that 
multivocity encompasses homonymy, it needs to be true that there are 
no homonyms that are not multivocal. The assertion that something 
can be homonymous without being multivocal is absent from Aristotle’s 
works. This indirectly supports the claim that multivocity is a notion 
superordinate to homonymy: Everything that is homonymous is mul-
tivocal, but not every multivocal is homonymous.
2.3 Non-homonymous Multivocals
If homonymous multivocals constitute one class of multivocals, there 
has to be at least one other class of multivocals that is different from 
those. According to the DefH-view, there are two complements to hom-
onymous multivocals, i.e. polysemous multivocals and synonymous 
multivocals.
157 Aristotle uses the example of δύναμις in geometry. That case in not connected to the 
cases that are discussed in Met. ix. Cf. for this example also Met. V.12, 1019b33-34 and fur-
ther his remark that those cases are not pros hen related 1019b34-35.
158 Shields (1999: 22ff.) devotes a whole section to non-homonymous multivocals. However, 
he considers their occurrence as a threat to the assumption that the distinction of synon-
ymy and homonymy is exhaustive and basically argues against such a class, since its alleged 
instances (like being, potency or contact) are only “seemingly” non-homonymous, though 
they really are homonymous. This attitude is also rest on the standard auxiliary assumption. 
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2.3.1 Polysemous Multivocals
Today one defines polysemy as a grouping of related meanings under 
a single (word) form.159 For instance, “chip”: a potato chip, a chip of 
wood, and a computer chip. Here the things that are called chip are 
related, unlike savings banks and river banks. According to the seman-
tic approach to multivocity, this label is suitable for those cases of mul-
tivocity that are not synonymous and not homonymous. 
Aristotle explicitly contrasts pros hen cases with homonymous cases 
of multivocity in two passages. The first one continues from the passage 
of Met. IV.2, 1003a34-b4 as presented above, which stated that being is 
said in many ways, but not homonymously. This passage determines 
pros hen cases as contrary to homonymous cases. The exact nature of 
the PHR is investigated in section 6.1.2. Here, the emphasis is on the 
subdivisions of multivocity. 
The other passage is found in the GC I.6: 
GC I.6, 322b29-32: Σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ καὶ 
τῶν ἄλλων ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον λέγεται πολ-
λαχῶς, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὁμωνύμως τὰ δὲ θάτερα 
ἀπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων καὶ τῶν προτέρων, οὕτως 
ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἁφῆς.
Similar to those other names which are 
said in many ways, of which the ones are 
said homonymously and the others because 
of other and prior things, so it is also with 
“contact”.
In the context of this passage, Aristotle discusses contact – ἁφή. We 
learn something about the relation of multivocity and its variants only 
in the short but often quoted parenthesis of this passage (highlighted 
by the italics).160 This passage declares two things: (1) that the homony-
mous use of terms is a subclass of the multivocal use of terms, and (2) 
that next to homonymous multivocals there are those that are multi-
vocals because of different and prior things – ἀπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων καὶ τῶν 
προτέρων. The phrasing indicates that Aristotle refers to the same alter-
159 For a detailed account of polysemy cf. section 5.
160 Actually, this passage is often quoted because Aristotle here explicitly states that names 
are said in many ways and that it is names that are used homonymously. This remark is 
interesting because it contrasts with the remarks Aristotle makes in the Categories about 
homonymy and synonymy. In the Categories homonyms and synonyms are things. Confer 
the comments about this in the section 3 which is concerned with homonymy and synon-
ymy in the Categories. 
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native to homonymous multivocals as above, i.e. pros hen multivocals. 
This is exemplified by the notion of contact.161 
Beyond pros hen cases of polysemous multivocals, there are cases 
connected by an analogy. This kind of polysemous multivocity is men-
tioned only in EN I.6, 1096b28-29 and it is discussed in section 6.3.
2.3.2 Synonymous Multivocals – A Hybrid Class
Synonymous multivocals are another kind of multivocals which differ 
from homonymous multivocals and polysemous multivocals. This class 
is neither covered by the InfH-view nor by the tertium quid view.162 
In Top. II.3 Aristotle clearly states that something can be multivocal 
without being said according to homonymy – καθ’ ὁμωνυμίαν. Thus, 
one could combine this class with the class of polysemous multivocals 
as they are also not homonymous. This case is, however, also different 
from these as I assume that it implies synonymy, whereas polysemous 
multivocals and homonymous multivocals are not synonymous. 
Top. II.3, 110b16-22: Πάλιν ὅσα μὴ καθ’ 
ὁμωνυμίαν λέγεται πολλαχῶς ἀλλὰ 
κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον, οἷον ἐπιστήμη μία 
πλειόνων ἢ ὡς τοῦ τέλους καὶ τῶν 
πρὸςτὸ τέλος, οἷον ἰατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγί-
ειαν ποιῆσαι καὶ τοῦ διαιτῆσαι, ἢ ὡς 
ἀμφοτέρων τελῶν, καθάπερ τῶν ἐνα-
ντίων ἡ αὐτὴ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη 
(οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τέλος τὸ ἕτερον 
τοῦ ἑτέρου), ἢ ὡς τοῦ καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ 
τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός
Again, <consider> what is said in many ways,not 
according to homonymy, but in some other way, 
as for example one science is of many things, (1) 
either as the science of the end and what leads to 
the end, as e.g. medicine is of producing health 
and <the right> conduct of life, (2) or as the sci-
ence of both ends, as the science of the opposites 
is called the same science (for the one contrary is 
not more an end than the other contrary), (3) or 
in the sense as a science is of the per se and the 
accidental
What exactly is the example in this passage? There are three words 
following οἷον: ἐπιστήμη μία πλειόνων. Is it the whole phrase? Is it μία 
or πλειόνων? Or is it ἐπιστήμη? Shields (1999: 26) assumes that multi-
vocity belongs to the phrase “one science of many things”. This is also 
suggested by Owen (1965: 72 n. 1). Irwin (1981: 529) assumes that one 
161 For more details on this passage cf. Buchheim (2010: 378–384). Buchheim offers an 
elucidating comment on the different accounts of contact in that passage of the GC.
162 The case of the passage of Top. II.3, 110b16-22 which will be considered in the follow-
ing is not unnoticed by Shields (1999) or Irwin (1981). However, each of the two classify 
the case differently. Further remarks are given below.
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of its constituents, namely “πλειόνων”, is said in many ways. He claims 
that “many” “may refer to means and end, or to two ends, or to intrin-
sic and accidental object. But “many” is not non-synonymous; it need 
not be replaced by different definitions in these different uses.” Thus, 
according to Irwin “many” is a synonymous multivocal. Shields (1999: 
26 n. 27) reacts to this by saying that if one component is multivocal, 
the whole phrase becomes multivocal, but he does not infer from this 
that the phrase is a synonymous multivocal. 
 I assume that the whole phrase is said in many ways, but I also think 
that it is not necessary to replace it with different definitions in different 
cases. I think in this passage the example is “to be one science of many 
things”. Thus, I claim that “to be one science of many things” is multi-
vocal. The following three examples given in this passage, which show 
in how many ways one science can be of many things (the numbering 
corresponds to the marks in the translation):
1. One science can be of many things because the object of study 
is of both the end or the means: medicine is both, the science of 
producing health (the end), and (the right) conduct of life.
2. One science can be of many things because the object of study 
consists of two distinct ends: medicine is the science of health 
and disease. 
3. One science can be of many things because it covers per se and 
per accident attributes: One science explains that a triangle, per 
se, has angles equal to two right angles, but it also explains that 
the equilateral – τὸ ἰσόπλευρον, has angles equal to two right 
angles. However, we know that the equilateral has angles equal to 
two right angles because accidentally it is a triangle and therefore 
has angles equal to two right angles. 
The first way medicine is said to be one science of many things is different 
from the second way in which it is said to be one science of many things. 
Thus, medicine is a science of many things in (at least) two ways. Firstly, 
because it studies the end (health) and the means (the right conduct of 
life). Secondly, because it studies health and disease. I assume that “to 
be one science of many things” is synonymous in these two cases but 
that it is said in many ways according to the different reasons account of 
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multivocity. Thus, the new class of multivocals qualifies as multivocal 
for a different reason than either homonymous multivocals or polyse-
mous multivocals. While polysemous and homonymous multivocals 
are ambiguous, the new kind of multivocals is not ambiguous. The list 
of examples (1, 2, 3) is not supposed to provide exhaustive classificatory 
alternatives, but rather it illustrates the flexibility of the possible reasons 
rendering something multivocal. 
One could object that synonymous multivocals, such as “to be one 
science of many things” cannot be classified as a kind of multivocity 
coordinate to homonymous or polysemous multivocals and that one 
should modify the DefH diagram from above accordingly. But, as stated 
above, the DefH-view compensates for the deflation of homonymy with 
an inflation of multivocity. One may consider this a flaw of DefH, yet, it 
is also a virtue since only in this form the flexibility of Aristotle’s notion 
of multivocity is incorporated. 
2.4 Limitations of the DefH-View
As indicated earlier, Aristotle’s use of the terms “homonymy”, “synon-
ymy” and “being said in many ways” contains certain flexibility. I stated 
in the beginning of this chapter that one cannot infer from this that 
the notions behind these terms are flexible in the same way the uses of 
the terms are flexible. In this section I will make some concessions to 
this. I address those passages that indicate potential limitations of the 
DefH-view since they may suggest that there is no doctrinal difference 
between multivocity and homonymy. I argue that such an alleged iden-
tity of these notions is limited to certain contexts. 
Bonitz lists a variety of passages allegedly indicating multivocals and 
homonyms as synonyms.163 Also, he provides a list of passages where 
this is not the case.164 The places where Bonitz does not see a difference 
between these notions are restricted to the Topics (I.15 and VI.2) and 
163 Bonitz Ind. Arist., 514a45-47: Top. I.15, 106a21, b4; VI.2, 139b19, 21, 23; SE 4, 165b33; 17, 
176a5, 15; 22, 178a25-28.
164 Bonitz Ind. Arist., 514a48-49: Top. II.3, 110b16 and 615a45-46: Top. II.3, 110b16; Met. 
IV.2, 1003a33; Met. XI.3, 1060b32; GC I.6, 322b30. I added to this list Met. VII.4, 1030a29-b3; 
Met. ix.1, 1046b4-7; homonymy is also denied of some multivocals in EE VII.2, 1236a16-22.
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the SE (4, 17, 22). According to Owens (19783: 115), who also refers to 
Bonitz’s passages, there is no reason to doubt the identity of homonymy 
and multivocity in the whole Top. I.15, as illustrated by the following 
passage: πότερον δὲ πολλαχῶς ἢ μοναχῶς τῷ εἴδει λέγεται, διὰ τῶνδε 
θεωρητέον – Whether something is said in many or in one form has to 
be considered by the following means (106a9-10). Owens assumes that in 
this context μοναχῶς is equivalent between synonymous and πολλαχῶς 
with homonymous. If this interpretation is adequate, the DefH-view 
might be false in this context, since according to the DefH-view there 
is a difference between asking whether something is said in many ways 
and asking whether something is said homonymously. 
There are two ways one may mitigate this problem. One possibil-
ity is to refer to the close relationship of homonymy and multivocity. I 
stated earlier that the DefH-view considers homonymy a subcategory 
of multivocity. Hence, it is not a problem that homonymous cases are 
sometimes merely called multivocals. Most of the examples in the sev-
eral tests for multivocity given in Top. I.15 actually concern (acciden-
tal) homonyms. Moreover, the overall framework, i.e. the assumption 
that homonymy is embedded into multivocity, is not violated by this 
chapter. As quoted above, Aristotle states in Top. I.15, 106a9-10 that the 
following means can be used to show whether something is said in one 
or many ways. The absence of the term “homonymy” in this context is 
plausible, knowing that these notions do not coincide entirely. Aristot-
le’s introduction naturally applies the more general notion of multivo-
city.165 Moreover, as stated earlier, Aristotle never claims that something 
is homonymous and not said in many ways while he often claims the 
opposite. This practice is not violated in Top. I.15. Admittedly, this does 
not prove that these notions do not coincide. 
Nevertheless, there are other passages, which seem to support the 
InfH-view rather than the DefH-view.166 I will call them closeness-pas-
sages. For instance, Aristotle claims in EN V.1, 1129a26-28 that the dif-
ferent uses of justice and injustice are so closely – σύνεγγυς connected 
165 As mentioned earlier, even in the Topics there is a passage which shows that multi-
vocity is broader than homonymy: Top. II.3, 110b16-22, cf. section 2.3.2.
166 Cf. Shields’ (1999: 39ff.).
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that their homonymy often escapes notice – λανθάνει.167 The example 
of key – κλεὶς is an example of a distant – πόρρω homonym. The term 
“κλεὶς” refers to a collarbone, or clavicle, and an instrument for locking 
a door. While one might assume an etymological connection between 
the two terms, there is presumably no overlap in their definitions, and 
hence these keys are indeed accidental homonyms. 
In contrast to this is the close-case: Aristotle first states that “justice” 
and “injustice” are multivocals and then in the next sentence he merely 
states that their homonymy escapes notice – λανθάνει. There is no men-
tion of an overlap in their definitions or any other elucidating remark 
that tells us what “close” means. Nevertheless, it is often assumed that 
there is definitional overlap, since Aristotle calls them close. Nothing 
warrants the suggestion that distant homonyms correlate with acci-
dental and close with non-accidental homonyms.168 Thus, it is plausible 
that Aristotle calls them “close” or “distant” regardless of the question 
whether they are accidental or non-accidental, but with regard to the 
question whether they are either evident, as in the case of keys, or hard 
to reveal as in the case of justice and injustice.
There is another passage that often is used to support the InfH-view. 
In EE VII.2, 1236a17 Aristotle tells us that “friendship” is not wholly said 
homonymously – πάμπαν ὁμωνύμως. The adherents of the InfH-view 
claim that if something is not entirely homonymous it must be possible 
that it is partly, or in an incomplete sense, homonymous, thus still hom-
onymous.169 These incomplete homonyms are then those that often are 
called “non-accidental” or “connected”170 homonyms. If πάμπαν is read 
167 Related are also EE VII.2, 1236a17; Phys. VII.4, 249a23-25.
168 Irwin (1981: 527) assumes such a correlation while Shields (1999: 39ff.) denies it. 
Actually, nothing in this passage and its context suggests that close homonyms should be 
equated with non-accidental homonyms and that distant homonyms with accidental hom-
onyms. Aristotle does not specify what is meant by “close” and “distant”. I assume that this 
distinction concerns solely the difficulty of the revelation of the homonymy in each case 
and is hence unrelated to the question of the kind of homonymy, i.e. whether it is acci-
dental or non-accidental homonymy. Nevertheless, this passage is used to support a more 
comprehensive account of homonymy. I agree with Shields (1999: 39f.) who calls close and 
distant homonyms seductive and non-seductive while rejecting an identification of this dis-
tinction with non-accidental and accidental homonyms.
169 Cf. Irwin (1981: 525–527). 
170 This is how Irwin calls them.
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as “wholly” this passage may support a more comprehensive notion of 
homonymy, but it also highlights that Aristotle’s strict notion of hom-
onymy is narrow. The DefH-view also may not be violated by this pas-
sage if one assumes that it means the following: By stating that the three 
cases of friendship are not entirely homonymously predicated Aristotle 
emphasises simply that they are not entirely unrelated. In this way, this 
passage straightforwardly denies homonymy. Alternatively, πάμπαν can 
also be read meaning “altogether” in the sense of “collectively”. Then 
πάμπαν emphasises that all the three ways in which “friendship” is said, 
are said collectively not homonymously. Also in this way, this passage 
does not insinuate a more comprehensive notion of homonymy.
Finally, the majority of the contributions concerning homonymy and 
multivocity claim that there is no single strict and universal technical 
use neither of “homonymy” nor of “being said in many ways”. This does 
not mean that one cannot assess their relation at all, but rather that one 
has to define the range of the applicability of the hermeneutic models. 
A solution to the tension between those passages supporting the 
DefH-view and those undermining it can be provided by a developmen-
tal thesis. Passages which are compatible with a more comprehensive 
notion of homonymy belong to allegedly earlier works, while all pas-
sages in which Aristotle explicitly states that homonymy and multivocity 
do not coincide belong to allegedly later works. There may be a reason 
for this difference: As has been claimed by Owen (1960), Aristotle did 
not know the PHR in earlier works such as the Topics and the SE, so one 
could assume that in earlier works homonymy and multivocity seem to 
coincide not because they are necessarily identical, but because Aris-
totle lacked the means to draw the difference between accidental and 
non-accidental cases of homonymy. The terminological specialisation of 
homonymy which is explicit in the GC and Met. was not necessary, or at 
least not possible in earlier works. Because of that, I agree with all these 
scholars that adhere to the developmental thesis.171 In addition to the 
acceptance of the developmental thesis, I consider the DefH-view more 
appropriate than the InfH-view, since I assume that Aristotle’s allegedly 
mature, narrow notion of homonymy is identical to the notion of hom-
171 For instance, Brakas (2011), Owens (19783), Owen (1960) or Irwin (1981).
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onymy he introduces in the Categories.172 Because of that, I consider the 
passages that do not support the DefH-view marginal deviations from 
the original doctrine, which I attempt to depict with the DefH-view. 
Another problem of the DefH-view is its implementation of syn-
onymous multivocals. Synonymous multivocals qualify as multivocals 
according to the different reasons account of multivocity, whereas hom-
onymous and polysemous multivocals qualify as multivocals (primar-
ily) according to the semantic approach. This may create an inhomo-
geneity in the Venn diagrams, however, I do not deem this a serious 
problem for the DefH-view. It may be an advantage since this inhomo-
geneity represents Aristotle’s terminology more adequately in contrast 
to the InfH-view. 
2.5 Conclusions 
There are different ways the relationship between homonymy, synonymy 
and multivocity has been addressed in the literature. I distinguished 
between three alternatives, the InfH-view, the tertium quid-view and 
the DefH-view. The currently dominant tenet ascribes the InfH-view 
to Aristotle. I argued that this assessment blurs the distinction of hom-
onymy and multivocity, which in several contexts is of crucial impor-
tance. Because of this, I reassessed the relationship of homonymy, syn-
onymy and multivocity with the result that there are sufficient reasons 
to consider homonymy a subcategory of multivocity. This dogma is 
not violated in Aristotle’s works. Thus, I proposed that the DefH-view 
more appropriately represents Aristotle’s theory of homonymy, syn-
onymy and multivocity. Furthermore, I gave a preliminary overview 
about those multivocals that are non-homonymous, i.e. polysemous 
multivocals and synonymous multivocals and I discussed the limita-
tions of the DefH-view with the result that those occurrences, which 
seem to support a more comprehensive notion of homonymy, are not 
central to Aristotle’s doctrine.
172 Wedin (2000: 13) and Owens (19783: 117). Wedin, M. V. (2000). Aristotle’s theory of 
substance: The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta. Oxford.

3 Homonymy and Synonymy in  
the Categories
Aristotle’s Categories begins with a definition of three onymies: hom-
onymy, synonymy and paronymy. As mentioned in chapter 2, it is a 
common assumption that within the things with the same name one 
finds the group of homonyms and synonyms and that it is a matter of 
interpretation to either assume that this distinction is exhaustive or 
not. In contrast to those two allegedly complementary notions, there 
is paronymy. Paronyms are called those things that have their name 
derived from another name, as, e.g. the grammarian is derived from 
grammar. Thus, they do not belong to the class of things with the same 
name. Nevertheless, many scholars assume a close connection between 
paronymy and the PHR. The discussion of this connection is presented 
in section 6.1.3.
Many contributions, which reflect the topic of homonymy and syn-
onymy in Aristotle and especially homonymy and synonymy in Aris-
totle’s Categories begin with brief restatements of their definitions. The 
following excerpt is found in the most recent monography on this topic: 
“Put briefly, homonymy refers to things having the same name and dif-
ferent definition; synonymy, to things having both the same name and 
the same definition” (Ward (2008: 9)). In general, brief restatements 
may be informative and helpful to achieve a preconception of the Aris-
totelian notions, but at the same time, their imprecision may lead to a 
wrong picture. The reason for this is that the definitions of homonymy 
and synonymy still are object of controversy. The difficulties begin with 
the translation and interpretation of the text. 
The following section about homonymy and synonymy in the Cate-
gories provides a translation, makes introductory remarks about these 
notions and their interpretations and identifies some problematic 
aspects that are common to both homonymy and synonymy. There are 
additional problematic aspects in the definition of homonymy, which 
are discussed after that in combination with a digression on the dis-
tinction of accidental and non-accidental homonymy. 
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3.1 Translations and Introductory Remarks
Homonymy in the Categories:
Cat. 1, 1a1-6: Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν 
ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔ-
νομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον 
ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμέ-
νον· τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, 
ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας 
ἕτερος· 
Homonyms are called those things [H1] which 
only have the name in common, [H2] and the 
definition of the subject corresponding to the 
name is different as <one calls> ζῷον a man and 
a drawing for these things only have the name 
in common, and the name-corresponding defi-
nition of the subject is different
Synonymy in the Categories:
Cat. 1, 1a6-12: συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν 
τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα 
λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῷον 
ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς·
Synonyms are called those things [S1] which have 
a common name and [S2] and the definition of 
the subject corresponding to the name is the 
same, as, e.g. animal <is said of> man an ox
It has become common understanding to assume that both passages 
are about those things that are synonyms/homonyms.173 One can read 
the term “synonyms”/“homonyms” also as “synonymous/homony-
mous things”. One may justifiably wonder what it is that is suppos-
edly not included in the scope of things. Usually, Aristotle contrasts 
things with names. It often has been assumed that this passage is also 
about names and their different senses, since many passages outside the 
Cate gories that mention homonymy or synonymy are related to names 
(cf. GC I.6, 322b29; Top. V.2, 129b30ff.; SE 4, 166a14-16; for synonymy: 
Top. VIII.13, 162b38, SE 5, 167a24).174 Whilst it has been noted that Aristotle 
173 “Things” needs to be understood in a very broad sense. Lewis (2004: 4) asserts that 
the relata of synonymy/homonymy are universals such as health in a person or health in a 
complexion, which is a universal different from the former. He does not explain this notion 
in detail in his paper, but one can summarise it in the following way: He calls “healthy” a 
predicate that is common to different things, but that there are different definitions associ-
ated with different uses of the same predicate. The underlying entities that are determined 
by these definitions are different universals. 
174 Consider Shields’s (1999: 11 n. 7) summary of the controversy over whether Aristotle 
intends to determine homonymy as a doctrine about senses of words or about properties/
things. See also the distinction between the real-essence and the meaning view below. Many 
contributions either adhere the one or the other alternative. The truth is that there is no 
simple answer to the question since Aristotle’s use of “homonymy” varies throughout his 
works. This does not mean that his doctrine is inconsistent, but it means that one also has 
to vary the assessment of his doctrine according to these different uses. Focussing on the 
Categories only, one may presumably prefer the view that it is not a doctrine about different 
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“almost systematically” violates the definitions of homonymy and syn-
onymy in this respect. 
Moreover, as a third option, it is noticeable that Aristotle very often 
does not call the names themselves homonymous, but instead the way 
in which they are said: As an adverb ὁμωνύμως regularly qualifies var-
ious forms of λέγεσθαι.175 In many occurrences of this form of hom-
onymy homonymous predication has a devaluating character. If x is F 
homonymously, or rather if F is said homonymously, one is often right 
assuming that F is said in an odd, extraordinary way. Often, Aristotle 
adds that ‘x is not F at all, properly speaking’. His standard examples are 
those of dead or artificial imitations of real things. The section about 
spurious homonyms176 pays extra attention to this judgmental applica-
tion of homonymy. In the Categories, this judgmental aspect of hom-
onymy plays no, or if at all, an inferior role.
In the present work, the terminology is regimented in the following 
way: “Homonym” / “synonym” refers to the homonymous thing that is 
the bearer of a homonymous name. Thus, a homonym is not identical 
with a homonymous name. One is an extra-linguistic entity, the other 
is a linguistic entity. The terms “synonymy” / ”homonymy”, which have 
been used already, are terms that either refer to the relationship between 
those things, which are called “synonyms” or “homonyms” or to the 
relationship between the corresponding homonymous terms.
Several contributions provide different interpretations of Aristotle’s 
notion of homonymy and synonymy. Usually, homonymy receives more 
scholarly attention. Gail Fine (2004: 144 ff.) summarises different views 
on homonymy in the following way: 
meanings of words (although even this is controversial). Focusing on other works only it is 
likely to conclude that homonymy is a doctrine about senses of words. This idea is related 
to the fact that Aristotle is ready to use difference in signification as a test for homonymy 
(especially in Top. I.15). Thus, any assessment of his doctrine regarding the controversy, 
which Shields summarises comes with qualifications of this kind.
175 GC I.6, 322b29, Met. IV.2, 1003a33-34; VII.4, 1030b2-3; VII.10, 1035b1; ix.1, 1046a6 and 
many more.
176 Cf. chapter 4 of this study.
the meaning-view and the real-essence view. 
The meaning-view proposes that two things x and y are homonymously 
F just in case the term “F”, which is attributed to them has multiple 
meanings.177 The meaning view conceives the λόγος (1a2) as a nominal 
definition (with reference to κατὰ τοὔνομα). The real-essence view 
bases on the assumption that the λόγος (1a2) is of the essence (with 
reference to τῆς οὐσίας) of that thing which corresponds to the name: 
Two things x and y are homonymously F only if “they have different 
real natures of F”. Fine favours the real-essence view, which was dis-
cussed earlier by Irwin (1981; 1982) and MacDonald (1989)178 because 
she assumes that it makes many of Aristotle’s claims more plausible. The 
example of the good illustrates this. The meaning-view suggests that the 
term “good” has different meanings in “Socrates is good” and in “this 
is a good knife”. The real-essence view instead suggests that there is a 
difference between the nature of a person’s goodness and the nature of a 
good knife without worrying about the semantics of the term “good” in 
the two different cases. According to the real essence view, it is sufficient 
for homonymy that there is a “real” difference in the nature of the two 
sorts of goodnesses. The real-essence view does not entail claims about 
the semantics of the terms involved in the relationship of homonymy. 
My interpretation of the definitions of homonymy and synonymy 
is in line with the assumption of the real-essence view, i.e. that claims 
about the semantics of the term “good” may not be required explicitly. 
Yet, I think there are reasons to believe that whilst the difference in the 
nature of the goodness of a person and the goodness of the knife may 
be sufficient to account for their homonymy, the essential difference 
does not exclude semantic differences between the different applica-
tions of the term “good”. I believe it is counter-intuitive to assume no 
semantic differences are corresponding to different applications of the 
term “good” if there are essential differences in being good. I think that 
177 A variant of the meaning-view has been defended by Woods (1992: 70–74). Woods, 
M. (1992). Eudemian Ethics: Books I, II, and VIII, 2nd edn. Oxford.
178 MacDonald, S. (1989). Aristotle and the Homonymy of the Good. Archiv für Geschichte 
der Philosophie 71 (2). He calls the views “the multiple natures interpretation” and the “mul-
tiple meanings interpretation”. Proponents of the meaning-view are e.g. Ackrill (1963: 71f.) 
and Owen (1960). Ackrill, J. L. (1974). Aristotle’s Categories and De interpretatione. Oxford. 
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the real-essence-view is correct, but I also believe that it provides insuf-
ficient answers on the question for the semantics. I assume that there 
is a reciprocal structure between different real-essences and terms that 
signify them. The real-essence-view claims that if the same term sig-
nifies different real-essences, the two things are homonyms. From this 
point of view, the term “good” is not ambiguous, and Aristotle’s defi-
nition of homonymy does not entail any claims about ambiguity. Thus, 
according to the real-essence-view, homonymy and ambiguity do not 
necessarily coincide. A supporter of the real-essence-view may agree 
that ambiguity implies homonymy, but he may reject that homonymy 
implies ambiguity. According to the claims of the real-essence-view, 
this is entirely legitimate. However, considering other remarks about 
homonymy in the corpus, this view is violated almost systematically.179 
Outside the Categories, Aristotle often claims that it is terms that are 
homonymous, not things. I deem that it is legitimate on this basis to 
assert that while in the Categories, homonymy and ambiguity do not 
coincide according to the real-essence-view, this is not the case out-
side the Categories. Because of that, I think it is justifiable to assume 
that although the real-essence-view does not contain any claims about 
different semantics, if there are essential differences between the good-
ness of Socrates and the goodness of a knife, these differences may have 
some influence on the semantics of the term “good” when it is applied 
to each of the two things. Thus, I believe that the essential differences 
between the different ways in which something can be good correlate 
with semantic differences of the term “good”. If that is so, a comparison 
of the semantics of the terms provides insights about the real differences 
between the ways of being good and the real-essence view implies dif-
ference in meaning even it does not explicitly claim they are necessary.
179 GC I.6, 322b29; Top. V.2, 129b30ff.; SE 4, 166a14-16; for synonymy: Top. VIII.13, 162b38, 
SE 5, 167a24. Cf. also Hintikka (1959: 140).
3.2 The Two Conditions of Homonymy  
and Synonymy
In order to establish the relation of homonymy and synonymy, two 
conditions need to be met. These conditions were mentioned in Ward’s 
brief restatement: “homonymy refers to things [1] having the same 
name and [2] different definition; synonymy, to things having both 
[1] the same name and [2] the same definition” (Ward (2008: 9). The 
correct understanding of the notions of homonymy and synonymy, as 
given in the Categories, depends on a proper interpretation of those two 
conditions, with particular focus on the interpretation of the second 
condition. The interpretation of these conditions also contributes to the 
assessment of the general view on the relation of multivocity, homon-
ymy and synonymy in Aristotle. 
The definition of synonymy is more straightforward in a way since 
the definition of homonymy contains some elements (see the bold Greek 
prints in the text) that require a more detailed analysis while these ele-
ments are absent from the definition of synonymy. Those aspects in the 
definition of synonymy that require a thorough analysis are also present 
in the definition of homonymy allowing to be analysed together. The 
following reformulation of the definition of synonymy (and homonymy, 
respectively; see the square brackets) provides a preliminary starting 
point for the discussion of the definitions of homonymy and synonymy. 
For further analysis, two necessary conditions can be identified.
Synonymy S1 / [H1]
Two things x and y are synonyms [homonyms] iff 
SC1 two things x and y have the name z in common, and
SC2 the definition of the subject corresponding to the name  
 is the same [is different].
This reformulation reflects strictly what is found in the text, but it needs 
to be further explained since as such it is not more enlightening than 
the original text. The second condition is particularly controversial. 
There are several problematic elements in this condition (see next sub-
section). In the two cases, the only difference is that the definition of the 
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subject corresponding to the name is either different – ἕτερος or the same – 
αὐτός. In order to thoroughly understand the second condition, the 
next section (3.3) addresses several questions about the three problem-
atic elements of that condition: 1) ὁ λόγος αὐτός/ἕτερος; 2) τῆς οὐσίας; 
3) κατὰ τοὔνομα. I put the cart before the horse and bring forward the 
conclusion of these considerations.
Synonymy S2 / [H2]
Two things x and y are synonyms [homonyms] iff 
SC1 two things x and y have the name z in common and 
SC2* what it is for x to be z and what it is for y to be z, is the same  
 [is different].
SC2 differs only in the second condition SC2*. The following section 
documents the steps that lead to this modified definition. The first con-
dition SC1 is identical in S1 and S2. The first condition requires that a 
name z, e.g. “horse”, applies to at least two things x and y. Whilst it is 
not explicitly mentioned in the text, one may add that the kind of terms 
that are primarily relevant here are terms that apply to a multiplicity of 
things, i.e. common names which denote sorts of things,180 unlike proper 
names such as “Socrates” which denote individuals.181 There are two 
ways to deal with proper names in this context depending on the way 
in which proper names are interpreted. (1) One may assume that proper 
names are neither homonymous nor synonymous as they signify the 
wrong type of thing, i.e. individuals, and individuals are not definable 
as such (cf. Met. VII.15, 1040a2-7) and if they are not definable one can-
not compare the definitions of different cases; or (2) one may suggest 
even proper names such as “Socrates” or “Kallias” are homonymous or 
synonymous based on the assumption that Aristotle does not really dis-
tinguish between common and proper names. Aristotle’s remarks about 
180 Lewis (2004: 4) suggested that in this context Aristotle talks about “universals”.
181 Cf. Wedin (2000: 14) who assumes that in “both homonymy and synonymy we may 
think of the items named as named by a special kind of sortal term.” As others Wedin does 
not add further remarks on proper names in that context.
proper names are scarce.182 As this issue is not addressed by Aristotle 
any attempt to solve it results in speculation. I assume that Aristotle 
does not really distinguish between proper names and common names 
since in both cases the names can be substituted by logoi which are 
common/universal (cf. Met. VII.15, 1040b1: κοινὸς ἄρα ὁ λόγος). From 
this point of view, a proper name may be considered a common name 
with a very restricted scope.
3.3 The Problematic Elements of the Second 
Condition 
One may assume that the formulation of the second condition of hom-
onymy and synonymy is the result of careful reflections and that every 
part of it fulfils a certain function, as the formulation occurs three times 
at the beginning of the Categories: twice in the definition of homon-
ymy, and once in that of synonymy. To analyse this condition, it is nec-
essary to consider the following three aspects (here in the order it is 
dealt with):
1. Ὁ λόγος αὐτός/ἕτερος → What is the relevant definiendum  
of that λόγος?
2. The role of τῆς οὐσίας 
3. The role of κατὰ τοὔνομα
These three aspects are evident in both the definition of homonymy 
and synonymy. For synonymy, the first piece states that the definition/
account is the same. The interpretation of λόγος depends on several 
points. If one regards it as a definition in a stricter sense, it may be justi-
fied because of its vicinity to τῆς οὐσίας. In several other places, Aristo-
tle uses λόγος τῆς οὐσίας (An. Post. II.13, 97a19; PA 695b18; Met. VII.11, 
1037a24) or ὁρισμός (horismos) (Met. VII.10, 1034b20, VII.12, 1037b12) 
182 Two of the most recent monographs on Aristotle’s theory of signification, i.e. Modrak 
(2001) and Charles (2000), are broadly silent on proper names in Aristotle. Both refer for 
a general overview on proper names to McDowell, J. (1977). On the Sense and Reference of 
a Proper Name. in Mind 86 (342): 159–185.
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in a stricter sense of definition. It was stated earlier (chapter 1) that not 
every logos is a definition.183 Thus, logos is the broader notion in com-
parison to horismos. In the broader sense “logos” means something like 
“formula” or “account”, which can be given for everything that can be 
named (Met. VII.4, 1030a14-17).
In contrast to that, a horismos can be given only for certain kinds of 
things, i.e. substances. Aristotle believes that not everything is defin-
able in the same way. The reason for this is based on certain metaphys-
ical assumptions. In Met. VII.4, Aristotle discusses τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. This 
is a phrase that is often translated with “essence”. The phrase is artifi-
cial, and it presumably abbreviates a longer, but unknown phrase.184 Its 
detailed meaning is debated among several scholars.185 The phrase is 
usually used like a substantive. It has been suggested that this phrase 
originates from the Platonic academy and that it alludes to previous 
attempts of defining something: “what it was to be x”.186 In this sense, 
it can be considered the extra-linguistic definiens of something. Thus, 
the essence is something that determines what something is.187 In Met. 
VII.4 and 5, Aristotle raises the question for which kinds of things there 
is an essence and for which there is not. He claims that things lacking 
an essence are not definable, at least not in the same way things that 
have an essence are definable. Things that lack an essence are e.g. (acci-
dental) compounds – σύνθετα such as the white man and generally all 
things that belong to categories other than the category of substance. 
Their definition is only possible by addition – ἐκ προσθέσεως (Met. VII.5, 
1030b16) of that thing which they belong to. In Met. VII.4, 1030b4-6 and 
VII.5, 1031a13, Aristotle states that horismos and essence primarily and 
unqualifiedly – πρώτως καὶ ἁπλῶς belong to substances. But then Aris-
183 I referred to Met. VII.4, 1030a6-9.
184 Frede and Patzig (1988/2: 19) assume that the extended phrase could be something 
like what it was for a man to be man – τί ἦν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. Frede, M., and 
Günther Patzig. (1988). Aristoteles Metaphysik Ζ. München.
185 In this study a detailed discussion of Aristotelian essence is omitted. Cf. for discussions 
of essence and definition Charles (2000). 
186 Cf. Detel (2009: 269). Detel, W. and Wildberger, J. (2009). Metaphysik, Bücher VII 
und VIII: [Griechisch-Deutsch]. Frankfurt am Main.
187 Sometimes, it can be considered as that which makes something what it is in the sense 
of a formal cause.
totle also admits that there is (some kind of) essence that belongs to 
things of the other categories. They have an essence in a similar – ὁμοίως 
way (Met. VII.4, 1030b6 and Met. VII.4, 1030a18-27) and, moreover, he 
claims that definition – ὁρισμός is said in many ways (Met. VII.5, 1031a9-
10: πολλαχῶς λεκτέον εἶναι τὸν ὁρισμὸν). Thus, also things other than 
substances can have a horismos, however, not in the same way. Because 
of that, sometimes it is assumed that when Aristotle speaks of the defi-
nition of something and one interprets it in the strict sense, then one 
assumes he must be concerned with substances.188
Whether this strict understanding is appropriate or not depends on 
the way how the following question is answered: What is the relevant 
definiendum? This question bears the following difficulty: For logical 
reasons, one could refer to both τῆς οὐσίας and κατὰ τοὔνομα to answer 
the question. How can this issue be resolved? There are three options: 
Either one highlights one of the two and neglects the other (option 
one and two), or one focuses on a solution that combines both features 
(option three). I will argue that the third option is the desired path. The 
main question is how a definition can be κατὰ τοὔνομα and τῆς οὐσίας at 
the same time. Before this can be answered, it must be determined what 
each of these attributes (κατὰ τοὔνομα and τῆς οὐσίας) amounts to pre-
cisely, and which role each fulfils in order to identify the relevant λόγος. 
188 A slightly different contrast is given by the opposition of nominal and causal defini-
tions that is presented An. Post. II.10, 93b29-39. A causal definition contains the cause of 
something. The causal definition of thunder is “sound of fire being extinguished in the 
clouds”. The nominal definition of thunder only states what a name signifies such as “noise 
in the clouds” and is hence less clarifying. The relationship of causal and nominal defini-
tions is highly controversial. Within this context it shall suffice to point at the complexity 
of Aristotle’s remarks on “definition”. For a detailed discussion of the relation of causal and 
nominal definitions I refer to Demoss, D., and Daniel Devereux. (1988). Essence, Existence, 
and Nominal Definition in Aristotle‘s „Posterior Analytics” II 8–10. Phronesis 33 (2): 133–154. 
They assume p. 138–141 that there even is a difference between the account of a name and 
a nominal definition. The difference mainly concerns the existence-presupposition which 
they think is needed in the case of nominal definitions, since it presumably states a part 
of the τί ἐστι and there is only a τί ἐστι of the things that are. They call this assumption the 
no existence no definition thesis (141). According to this assumption there is no nominal 
definition of the goat-stag, since there are no goat-stags. But one can give an account of 
the name of what “goat-stag” signifies, which however is not considered as definition, not 
even as nominal definition, rather it has to be regarded as a mere description.
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3.3.1 The Role of τῆς οὐσίας and the Issue of  
the Ontological Scope
There is a long-standing debate about the authenticity of τῆς οὐσίας.189 
The following considerations do not join this debate. They proceed on 
the premise that τῆς οὐσίας is a genuine part of the text. 
As the genitive τῆς οὐσίας indicates, the λόγος is of an οὐσία. This 
requires clarification. There are several concerns about the function 
of the attribute in this context. The expression ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας has 
been causing difficulties to translators and commentators, which the 
following translations of the whole phrase ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς 
οὐσίας illustrate.190
1. O. F. Owen (1889)191 “[…] the definition (of substance according 
to name) is different”.
2. Ackrill 1974: “[…] the definition of being which corresponds to the 
name is different”.
3. Irwin 1981: “[…] but the account of being corresponding to  
the name is different.”
4. Shields 1999: “[…] the account of being corresponding to  
the name is different”.
5. Wedin 2000: “[…] the definition of being which corresponds to 
the name is different.”
189 There are two reasons that raise concerns about the authenticity of τῆς οὐσίας. The 
first is related to issues about the textual transmission. For further information about this 
debate confer Waitz (1844: 269–271). Waitz, T. (1844). Aristotelis Organon Graece. Leipzig. 
Cf. also Anton, J. P. (1968). The Meaning of ‚O λóγos τs oùσíαs in Aristotle‘s Categories 1a. 
The Monist 52 (2): 252–267. Anton states that in most of the translations (that he considered) 
the τῆς οὐσίας is either not available or bracketed. This has to do with the respective textual 
traditions on which the translations are based. Anton refers to Andronicus and Boethus 
of Sidonos according to whom the τῆς οὐσίας is an unnecessary part of the text. The rele-
vant passages can be found in Dexippus 21, 18–19 and Simplicius In Arist. Cat. 29, 30-30,5. 
For more details confer Anton (1968: 255–258). Cf. also Oehler’s (1986: 201f.) analysis of 
this passage. Oehler, K. (1986). Aristoteles Kategorien. Berlin. The second reason, which is 
related to the first is “Aristotle-internal”: There are two other definitions of homonymy 
and synonymy that do not contain τῆς οὐσίας, cf. Top. I.15, 107a20 and Top. VI.10, 148a24f. 
190 For some further variants see Anton (1968: 255–256).
191 Owen, O. F. (1889). The Organon, or Logical treatises, of Aristotle: With introduction 
of Porphyry. London.
6. Fine 2004: “[…] the account of the essence (logos tes ousias) 
which corresponds to the name is different”
7. Ward 2008: “[…] but a different account of being corresponding to 
the name”.
Since Ackrill the dominant translation of ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας has been 
definition/account of being. There are several difficulties with this trans-
lation. Firstly, the translation “of being” could be clarified. One may 
object that it does not reflect the difference between ὄν and οὐσία. 
Another concern is that “of being” may reduce the relevance of the 
τῆς οὐσίας-part or even renders it redundant. One could translate it as 
“an account/definition of being” even if “τῆς οὐσίας” were not part of 
the text since every account or definition is a definition of the being 
of something. 
I propose that the τῆς οὐσίας-part fulfils a specific function in the 
definition. It contributes to determining the relevant definiendum of 
the respective λόγος. There are several suggestions on the role of the 
τῆς οὐσίας-part that follow this intuition. Anton (1968) put forward the 
thesis that the τῆς οὐσίας-part determines the λόγος as definition in the 
sense of the stricter ὁρισμός, which is considered necessary because also 
λόγος is said in many ways.192 By assuming this, the definition of hom-
onymy covers only the things, which are definable in a strict sense, and 
these are substances only (at least according to Aristotle’s statements in 
Met. VII.4). This assumption connects the role of τῆς οὐσίας with con-
jectures about the ontological scope193 of the definition of homonymy 
and synonymy, i.e. whether the doctrine ranges only over substances 
or also over the non-substantial categories. This presumption is shared 
192 It could mean “formula” in this context or “account”, but as Anton assumes it could 
also mean “definition” in the strict sense which would imply that Aristotle’s doctrine of 
homonymy and synonymy is restricted to the category of substance.
193 There are two questions of scope that are raised in connection with the definition of 
homonymy in the Categories. The first one is a question that concerns the ontological scope 
as explained here. The second concerns the conceptual scope, i.e. whether the notion of 
homonymy defined is comprehensive or narrow. Cf. section 3.4.
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by Anton (1968) and Cohen and Matthews (1991)194 whilst they reach 
opposite conclusions.195 
Anton’s (1968: 252) approach is based on the following assumption: 
“The expression [ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας] has a special doctrinal meaning 
and is, therefore, free from terminological imprecision.” I agree with his 
thesis. However, I disagree with his conclusion, which is that τῆς οὐσίας 
in this context refers to the category of substance, or more precisely, to 
the secondary substance. Anton asserts (p. 264) that the definitions 
of synonymy and homonymy in the Categories are only supposed to 
cover a “delimited” range of things. As he concludes “He [Aristotle] is 
primarily concerned with homonymous classes and species of primary 
things, not the accidental properties of individuals and their names.”196
This interpretation contrasts with that of Cohen and Matthews 
(1991). Cohen and Matthews (1991: 23 note 26) notice that if one con-
siders ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας an account of being, then οὐσία is taken in a 
broad sense. They call it a “generic sense of ‘being’ or ‘essence’”. Cohen 
and Matthews use the term “generic” in the sense of “more general” or 
“more universal” without meaning that there is a genus of being, which 
could become part of the definition of all things.197 Ammonius pro-
poses that Aristotle must have used “οὐσία” in the more general sense 
for a specific reason: If one did not read it that way, the text would sug-
gest that there are only homonyms of substances and not of accidents. 
However, since this is in conflict with the examples Aristotle uses in the 
Topics, e.g. “sharp” or “white”, he rejects this option.
I assume the determination of the ontological scope of the doctrine 
of homonymy and synonymy, i.e. whether it ranges over substances 
only or also over accidents, is not the function of the τῆς οὐσίας-part, 
because it presupposes a distinction that has not been introduced so 
far (i.e. the distinction between substantial and non-substantial cate-
gories). On this basis, my view deviates from Anton’s, who restricts the 
194 Cohen, S. M. and Matthews, G. B. (1991). Ammonius On Aristotle‘s Categories. Ithaca, 
N.Y.
195 The question of ontological scope is briefly treated by Oehler (1986: 202).
196 Cf. for textual considerations Anton (1968: 258). Anton refers to Simplicius’s (In Categ. 
30, 3–5) reports that τῆς οὐσίας does not occur in all the copies he has seen.
197 This is something Aristotle rejects in Met. III.3, 998b14-999a24.
scope of the doctrine with reference to this distinction.198 But my view 
is in line with the proposition of Ammonius, that the function of the 
τῆς οὐσίας-part is not supposed to draw a contrast to accidents. Yet, one 
has to modify the way their approach is completed, i.e. by translating 
τῆς οὐσίας with “of being”, and also one has to modify the explanation 
Ammonius’s commentary offers, which has influenced several subse-
quent interpretations. 
In order to introduce my critique, I need to establish a distinction 
between different ways Aristotle uses the concept of substance. When 
Aristotle speaks about substances, he may intend to single out certain 
kinds of entities. In Aristotle (but not only in Aristotle) these are usually 
macroscopic concrete particular objects such as this man and this horse, 
i.e. the primary substances of the Categories. In this regard, substances 
are just one kind of entity among other kinds of entities. I call this use of 
the concept of substance taxonomical.
In contrast to this, the concept of substance can also be used in a 
broader sense meaning “being”, “entity” or “thing”. Related to these 
broader senses, but more specific, is the sense of “subject” or “under-
lying thing”, which is one of the main ways “substance” is said.199 If it is 
used here in this sense “τῆς οὐσίας” does not refer to the category of 
substance, taxonomically speaking, which is what has been proposed 
by Anton (1968). Moreover, the translation “of the subject” clarifies 
the function of the τῆς οὐσίας-part and its combination with the κατὰ 
τοὔνομα-part. This translation emphasises that the relevant definien-
dum is of a subject, in the sense that it is of that thing that corresponds 
to the name – κατὰ τοὔνομα, which has to be interpreted in the sense 
that it is of the thing, the being which underlies or is picked out by the 
name. This warrants that also accidents (taxonomically speaking) can 
be homonyms or synonyms since they can be denominated and thus 
198 So does Oehler (1986: 202) with other ancient commentators.
199 A note on “subject” as translation for “οὐσία”: This is one of the two main ways “οὐσία” 
is said as it is presented in Met. V.8, 1017b23-26. It is the last subject, that is not said accord-
ing to something else – τό θ’ ὑποκείμενον ἔσχατον, ὃ μηκέτι κατ’ ἄλλου λέγεται. Also in Met. 
VII.3, 1028b34-36 Aristotle lists the subject – ὑποκείμενον as one of the main meanings of 
 “οὐσία”. The exclusion of the subject as a primary notion for substance, which is the result 
of the discussion in Met. VII.3 has no impact on the possibility that Aristotle uses “οὐσία” 
in this sense also in the line ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας of the Categories.
82 3 Homonymy and Synonymy in the Categories 
3.3 The Problematic Elements of the Second Condition  83
be subjects of a name as well. Thus, regarding the question about the 
ontological scope of the doctrine of homonymy in the Categories, my 
approach is in line with Ammonius’s presumptions, albeit it is so for 
different reasons.200
In conclusion, the translation of “τῆς οὐσίας” with “of the subject” 
clarifies the determination of the relevant definiendum. The translation 
“the definition of being that corresponds to the name” may not be incor-
rect but, at least to me, it is obfuscating. As mentioned, one may won-
der why Aristotle should have used “τῆς οὐσίας” if “of being” is what 
was supposed to be meant. He could have used “τοῦ εἶναι” instead. The 
advantage of “of the subject” over “of being” is that the former formula-
tion determines the definiendum more clearly. One could improve “of 
being” by inserting a definite article. Then, one would have “the defini-
tion of the being that corresponds to the name”. This is much closer to 
my proposal, nevertheless, I prefer “of the subject” since it highlights the 
connection to the other feature that determines the relevant definien-
dum, i.e. κατὰ τοὔνομα.
3.3.2 The Role of κατὰ τοὔνομα
“Κατὰ τοὔνομα” in S2/H2 is translated with “corresponding to the name”. 
This qualification is most important for the understanding of both syn-
onymy and homonymy as they are presented in the Categories.201 The 
reason for this is that it also contributes to the determination of the 
relevant definiendum that corresponds to the λόγος. According to the 
position between the article ὁ and the substantive λόγος, κατὰ τοὔνομα 
is an attribute to λόγος. In this respect, there is a parallel to the τῆς 
200 In appreciation of Anton’s approach, one has to admit that the examples used for hom-
onymy and synonymy in the Categories are actually only using substances. Anton assumes 
that this is sufficient to explain the application of τῆς οὐσίας instead of something else as 
e.g. αὐτῶν, which is used in a parallel expression in Top. I.15, 107a2. As argued here, one 
has to doubt that a restriction of the doctrine follows from the application of τῆς οὐσίας, 
on the one hand because of the flexibility of the concept of substance, and on the other 
because the limitation to substantial examples as found in the Categories, does not guar-
antee a limitation of the applicability of the doctrine to non-substantial cases. 
201 It is “most” important simply because there are no concerns regarding its textual 
authenticity.
οὐσίας-part. Both attributes contribute to determining the relevant 
definiendum of the λόγος.202 As outlined already, several interpretations 
of this passage have problems incorporating both aspects into a coher-
ent reconstruction of the whole account. The problem is this: What does 
it mean that the λόγος corresponds to the name – κατὰ τοὔνομα203 and is 
of a subject – τῆς οὐσίας, at the same time? As indicated above, things 
and names are usually contrasted. Hence, it is extraordinary that here 
there might be a definiendum that combines both. One way to approach 
this difficulty is disregarding and thereby overemphasising one of the two 
attributes of the second condition. 
It was mentioned above that in the case of the τῆς οὐσίας-part, it is 
possible that it is bracketed or even neglected with reference to certain 
textual traditions. There are also reconstructions of the second condi-
tion that do not incorporate the κατὰ τοὔνομα-qualification properly 
and moreover, there are approaches that have problems with both of 
these qualifications. Shields (1999: 11) translates and interprets the defi-
nition of synonymy as: “Those things are called synonymous of which 
the name is common, and the account of being corresponding to the 
name is the same”.
From above it is clear that his translation of ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας as 
the account of being is vague. Yet, this is beyond scope here, as there 
are other things to focus on as well. His paraphrase of this translation 
is the following: 
“x and y are synonymously F iff (i) both are F and (ii) the definitions 
corresponding to ‘F’ in ‘x is F’ and ‘y is F’ are the same”
 His account contains two conditions, but the formulations of his 
conditions are not as closely related to the formulations given in the text 
as they should be. First, a small note on his reconstruction of the first 
condition. He suggests that two things need to be F, whereby according 
to the text it requires nothing else than having a name in common. One 
202 The expression “ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος” occurs again only in Top. I.15, 107a20 and 
VI.10, 148b15. Cf. for the notion of synonymy also 148a24-25.
203 In the Categories it is not explained what it means that a λόγος corresponds to the name – 
κατὰ τοὔνομα, but from several other passages it becomes clear that a λόγος can replace 
a name (sometimes, but not always, without any difference), which does not mean that 
the definiendum of the λόγος is a name. Top. I.5, 101b39-a1; V.2, 130a39; VI.4, 142b3; VI, 9, 
147b13-15; Met. VII.4, 1030a7-9, b7-12.
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has to agree that the (extra-linguistic) attribute of being F plays a role in 
the whole definition, but according to its structure, it plays a role only 
in the second condition, not in the first. Thus, one should not make it 
part of the first condition in the reconstruction. The first condition may 
be thought of as a merely linguistic condition. Two things need to have 
the same name, without drawing any further inferences. Moreover, the 
textual basis of the first condition is the same in the definition of hom-
onymy, and there it would turn out to be false to assume that the two 
separate things need to be F.
Further, related to the second condition, one cannot accept that it is 
appropriate to determine the definienda of the definitions that need to be 
the same as the terms “F” in “x is F” and “F” in “y is F”. This clearly over-
emphasises the κατὰ τοὔνομα-part of the second condition. Although 
the distinction of x and y somewhat incorporates the τῆς οὐσίας-part, 
it does not incorporate it as contributing to determining the relevant 
definiendum since it is determined only by the κατὰ τοὔνομα-part.
Moreover, Shields’s reconstructions of the definition of homonymy 
is not completely in line with his reconstruction of the definition of syn-
onymy. From the outset, Shields (1999: 11) offers two reconstructions of 
the definition of homonymy because he immediately makes a distinc-
tion based on his interpretation of ἕτερος as either meaning completely 
different or partly different.204 
• Discrete Homonymy (DH): x and y are homonymously F iff (i) they 
have their name in common, but (ii) their definitions have nothing in 
common and so do not overlap in any way 205
• Comprehensive Homonymy (CH): x and y are homonymously F iff (i) 
they have their name in common, (ii) their definitions do not com-
pletely overlap
204 Cf. section 3.4. Characteristic of Shields’s reformulation is that he does not comment 
on the μόνον in Cat. 1, 1a1. In my opinion the μόνον is a strong indication that the kind of 
homonymy that is introduced in the Categories is what Shields calls discrete homonymy. 
More often it is called accidental homonymy or simply homonymy as has been argued above. 
205 Compare also Cameron (2015: 39) who offers a modified version of Shields´s (1999). 
Cameron, M. A. (2015). Is Ground Said-in-Many-Ways? Studia Philosophica Estonica 7 (2): 
29–55.
The first condition of these definitions has improved over to the pre-
vious critique. Yet, surprisingly, the formulation of the second condi-
tion does not incorporate the κατὰ τοὔνομα-part properly, neither in 
DH nor CH. According to his formulation, one could assume that the 
definitions of x and y need to be different independently of their name, 
while it is clear that this cannot be the case since κατὰ τοὔνομα indicates 
that they need to be different according to their name. The term “their” 
in the second condition refers to x and y without any further qualifi-
cations. Put this way the τῆς οὐσίας-part becomes the only of the two 
attributes that determines the relevant definienda. As a result, in this 
case, it is the τῆς οὐσίας-part that is overemphasised. It is not wrong 
that it plays a role in the determination of the relevant definienda, but 
it is not entirely sufficient to reproduce the second condition because 
the definition also needs to correspond to the name and is not merely 
τῆς οὐσίας. Shields deals with the two problematic aspects differently in 
each of his reconstructions of the second condition, once in the case of 
synonymy, once in the case of homonymy, whereas there are no clues 
that require him to treat these differently as the textual basis is identical 
in the relevant aspects. 
3.3.3 Incorporating κατὰ τοὔνομα and τῆς οὐσίας  
is Necessary 
By using well known and established examples for homonymy, it is pos-
sible to show that any reformulation of the two conditions that focuses 
solely on one of the two attributes either becomes too wide or too nar-
row. As a premise, one has to assume again that the formulation of the 
second condition is the result of prudent considerations and that every 
part of it fulfils a specific function. Starting with the tripartite decompo-
sition of the second condition from above it will be shown that there are 
counter-examples to each of the two re-combinations of ὁ λόγος ἕτερος 
with the attributes τῆς οὐσίας and κατὰ τοὔνομα. 
The first simplified, second condition of homonymy:
 HS1 ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος 
The second, simplified second condition of homonymy:
HS2 ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος ἕτερος 
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Combined with the first condition of homonymy, it can be shown that 
neither of these simplified conditions suffices to cover every case of hom-
onymy (mutatis mutandis this method applies for synonymy as well). 
First verification attempt: 
HC1 + H2S1: x and y have the same name + the definition of the being 
is different- ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος
Is this a sufficient and rigorous definition of homonymy? This is 
probed with the following examples.
Banks are well-known examples of homonymy:
“Bank,” said of a sandy elevation.
“Bank,” said of a financial institute.
HC1 is fulfilled, H2S1 is fulfilled: The definition of the two subjects is dif-
ferent. The two things are homonyms with respect to the name “bank”. 
According to this example, one may conclude that the reformulation 
(H1 + HS21) suffices to explain the definition of homonymy and this is 
actually the case, however, under a certain constraint: H1 + H2S1 suf-
fice to explain the homonymy between individuals of different gen-
era with the same name. Thus, one has to ask: Is it possible that “κατὰ 
τοὔνομα” is superfluous? It is not superfluous, since also a man and a 
horse, being called “animals” would become homonyms, despite them 
being expected to be synonyms with respect to the name animal.
Example 
“Animal,” said of a man
“Animal,” said of an ox
HC1 is fulfilled. H2S1 is fulfilled: The definition of the two subjects is 
different. Thus, the two things must be homonyms with respect to the 
name “animal”, which clearly is an undesired result. How is this pos-
sible? H2S1 suggests to only consider the definition of the being inde-
pendently of the name “animal”. According to this formulation, the sub-
jects are the man or the horse, whose definitions are not the relevant 
ones here. Thus, H2S1 is too wide. Species of the same genus would 
become homonyms with regard to the name of their genus. If only a 
shared name and the definition of the being independent of the name, 
which needs to be the same, was necessary, then one would have to call 
the ox and man homonyms with respect to their common name “ani-
mal”, since the λόγοι of ox and men, considered independently of their 
common name “animal”, are different. Consequently, the attribute “κατὰ 
τοὔνομα” is not superfluous.
Focussing on κατὰ τοὔνομα and the insight that it is necessary, one 
may go beyond that and enquire whether the κατὰ τοὔνομα-part was 
sufficient to establish homonymy. One can reject this assumption using 
appropriate examples. In addition, the κατὰ τοὔνομα-part only contrib-
utes to determining the relevant definienda of the λόγοι that need to be 
compared, while it does not determine them completely.
Second verification attempt: 
H1 + H2S2: x and y have the same name + the name-corresponding 
definition is different – ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος ἕτερος
Is this sufficient to completely explain homonymy? The following exam-
ples show: 
“Bank” said of sandy elevation x
“Bank” said of financial institute y
HC1 is fulfilled, and H2S2 is fulfilled: The name-corresponding defini-
tion is different. Therefore, x and y are homonyms with respect to the 
name “bank”. Up to this point, H2S2 is as suitable as H2S1 was. If H2S2 
avoids the homonymy in the animal-example, it seems to be the more 
promising condition:
“Animal” said of a man
“Animal” said of an ox
HC1 is fulfilled, but H2S2 is not fulfilled: The name-c0rresponding defi-
nition of the two does not differ. Thus, ox and man are not homonyms 
with respect to the name “animal”, which is correct, and consequently, 
H2S2 avoids the previous problem of H2S1. However, does this mean 
that the τῆς οὐσίας-part is unessential? If one thinks so, the decision 
has been made too hastily. H2S2 only states: the name corresponding 
definition is different. This is only seemingly sufficient. It seems suffi-
cient because intuitively, one adds something into the condition H2S2, 
which can be called the necessary indexicality. What is meant by that? 
The verbatim H2S2 is:
the name-corresponding definition is different
However, one can assume this is elliptical for the following clause:
the name-corresponding definition <in each case; for each thing> 
is different
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Thus, one may assume, even if τῆς οὐσίας was omitted one could not 
read H2S2 without at least an implicit necessary indexicality. The role of 
the τῆς οὐσίας-part is to make this indexicality explicit. This, however, 
does not explain the choice of the term “οὐσία” in this context. If it is 
only about indexicality, Aristotle could have used another term such 
as ἑκάστων or αὐτῶν. In Top. I.15, 107a2, Aristotle uses the phrase the 
name-corresponding definition of each thing is different – ἕτερος γὰρ ὁ 
κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος αὐτῶν to explain an example of homonymy. This 
formulation emphasises the necessary indexicality of the second con-
dition while avoiding the much more complex term “οὐσία”, which is 
the cause of the concerns about the ontological scope of the definition 
as explained above. I propose that the role of the “τῆς οὐσίας” in the 
Categories is the same as the role of the “αὐτῶν” in the Topics passage. 
This insight, however, does not explain the choice of the term “οὐσία” 
in Cat. 1, but it can be used to reinforce the criticism of the popular 
translation of “τῆς οὐσίας” with “of being” (see above). In this light, 
translating “τῆς οὐσίας” as “of being” seems to suffer from the same 
problem as H2S2: It lacks the necessary indexicality. If the comment 
about the necessary indexicality is justified, then it applies also to any 
translation that translates “the name-corresponding definition of being 
is different.” The choice of “of being” renders the τῆς οὐσίας-part redun-
dant in terms of its function of indicating the relevant subjects. Thus, 
one could apply the same to 
“the name-corresponding definition of being is different” which has 
been applied to H2S2, i.e.
“the name-corresponding definition of being <in each case; for each 
thing> is different.” 
From this, it emerges that the way the popular translation represents 
the second condition faces the same problem as the H2S2. 
3.3.4 Identifying the Relevant Definiendum
All that is left to do is to identify the relevant definiendum. The pres-
ent proposal is based on the assumption that the relevant definiendum 
is determined by a combination of the two attributes, κατὰ τοὔνομα 
and τῆς οὐσίας. It has been shown in the previous sections that it is 
not possible to obtain the desired result by disregarding or overem-
phasising one of these aspects. The results are either too narrow or 
too wide. This can be regarded as further evidence of the adequacy of 
the assumption that the two attributes together determine the relevant 
definiendum. It was proposed that on the one hand the τῆς οὐσίας-part 
is added because one is not supposed to compare the definition of a 
name206 independently of its subject. On the other hand, it was shown 
that κατὰ τοὔνομα is added because one is not supposed to compare 
the definition of some subject independently of its name, i.e. one is not 
supposed to compare the definition of the ox or the man as it is four-
footed animal and two-footed animal.207
From this approach, one can devise a positive proposal about the 
relevant definienda. According to what has been said, one has to assume 
that “οὐσία” needs to be interpreted in the sense of “subject” and it 
needs to be taken into account because it contributes to determining 
the relevant definiendum. The proposal starts with the following trans-
lation of ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας […]:
The definition of the being that corresponds to the name […]
This translation is deliberately neutral concerning the question of the 
ontological scope of the doctrines of homonymy or synonymy, which 
was raised by Anton and Ammonius. Substances and accidents, taxo-
nomically speaking, may both meet this condition. The reason is that a 
name can denominate both. This translation supposedly lays open the 
relevant definienda which need to be compared. In the sentence after 
the definition of synonymy (Cat. 1a10-12) there is an example given: if 
someone is supposed to provide a definition for each, i.e. what being an 
animal is for each, one will give the same definition – ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ 
τις τὸν ἑκατέρου λόγον τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, τὸν αὐτὸν 
λόγον ἀποδώσει. The relevant definiendum is τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι in each case. 
Thus, it is not the name “animal”, (though the definiendum has a name), 
206 One may wonder whether definitions of names are actually a real alternative, since it 
is not clear whether it is possible to define names at all. Nevertheless, in this context one 
needs to consider this option at least on grammatical grounds. One might think of that, 
what sometimes is called nominal definitions, which can be given also in cases where real 
knowledge of the defined thing is impossible as it is the case of the goat-stag. 
207 This case was not excluded by Shields’s homonymy reformulations.
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but it is something extra-linguistic, namely what is denominated by 
the name, which in this sense is subject of the name, i.e. τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι – 
being an animal. This approach also works for accidents. For example, 
sharpness: There is the extra-linguistic sharpness*, e.g. a sharpness that 
inheres in a knife, and there is sharpness**, e.g. a sharpness that inheres 
in a tone. Sharpness* and sharpness** are homonyms. Both are called 
sharp, and the definition of the being that corresponds to the name is dif-
ferent. The subjects of the names are sharpness* and sharpness** which 
indeed are defined differently.208 Thus, the relevant definienda sharp-
ness* and sharpness** are determined by a combination of name and 
corresponding subject. 
The formal reconstructions of the definitions of homonymy and syn-
onymy H2 and S2 from above, result from the improved translation of 
the second condition: the definition of the subject that corresponds to the 
name is the same [different].
Synonymy S2 / [H2]
Two things x and y are synonyms [homonyms] iff 
SC1 two things x and y have the name z in common and 
SC2* what it is for x to be z and what it is for y to be z, is the same 
[is different].
This reconstruction mentions the relevant definienda directly, i.e. to be 
z in the one, i.e. the x-case and to be z in the other case, i.e. the y-case. 
This reformulation is construed to mirror the example Aristotle pre-
sented (1a10-12) where he refers to τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι as that which is the 
same in two different cases x and y, e.g. man and ox. 
208 One may object the following: What prevents us from thinking that the subjects of 
 “sharp” in the first and “sharp” in the second are simply the knife and the tone themselves? 
Of course, there is a sense of being a subject in which the knife and the tone are the subjects 
of the names, but in this context, one has to distinguish this sense of being a subject from 
the sense as it has been present in the example of the animal Aristotle used to explain the 
relevant definienda in the case of synonymy. The relevant subjects in this context are what 
Lewis (2004: 4) calls “universals”, i.e. non-substantial universals in the case of accidents 
and substantial universals (τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι) in the case of substances.
3.4 The Problematic Elements of the Definition 
of Homonymy – The Conceptual Scope
In addition to those three problematic aspects that are common to both 
homonymy and synonymy (1. ὁ λόγος, 2. τῆς οὐσίας 3. κατὰ τοὔνομα), 
as announced earlier, there are three further elements in the definition 
of homonymy that need to be discussed. See the underlined words in 
the translation form above: 
1. μόνον 
2 ἕτερος
3. τὸ γεγραμμένον
Cat. 1, 1a1-4: Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα 
μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος 
τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε 
ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον· τούτων 
γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔ-
νομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος
Homonyms are called those things [H1] which 
only have the name in common, [H2] and the 
definition of the subject corresponding to the 
name is different as <one calls> ζῷον a man 
and a drawing for these things only have the 
name in common, and the name-corresponding 
definition of the subject is different
Interestingly, these three aspects have a certain connection and 
far-reaching influence on the character of the alleged doctrine of hom-
onymy in Aristotle. Similar to the discussion above, the interpreta-
tion of these three elements also concerns the scope of the doctrine of 
homonymy. However, this time “scope” does not encompass the ques-
tion whether the definition of homonymy covers substances or also 
non-substances, but instead, it concerns something that may be called 
the conceptual scope of homonymy. The question for the conceptual 
scope is closely linked to the interpretation of the three additional prob-
lematic aspects that are part of the definition of homonymy. Depending 
on their interpretation, one either makes use of them as textual evi-
dence for the thesis that Aristotle’s standard use of homonymy amounts 
to accidental homonymy and thus is more restricted in its conceptual 
scope (this option supports the DefH-view). The other interpretation 
allows using these elements in such a way as to use them against that 
thesis. Then one argues that this definition is broader in scope and also 
covers cases of so-called non-accidental homonymy (this option sup-
ports the InfH-view). 
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Indeed, one cannot ground a proposal about Aristotle’s alleged standard 
view of homonymy merely by focusing on these two definitions and 
ignoring what is said in the rest of the corpus. However, the interpreta-
tion of these two definitions plays a crucial role in the reconstruction 
of the Aristotelian terminology particularly for the best possible view 
on the relation of multivocity, homonymy and synonymy. 
3.4.1 Μόνον and ἕτερος
“μόνον” occurs in the first condition of homonymy in Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται 
ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν and two lines later in τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον 
κοινόν. μόνον – only, alone, solitary has to be taken as the opposite of 
together with something, i.e. not together with something else or even 
exclusively or solely.209 If “μόνον” means “not together with something 
else” and one assumes that the only thing that can plausibly be meant 
in this context by “something else” is the λόγος, then one may deduce 
that two things need to have a name in common and not their account on 
the basis of “μόνον”, (even without reference to “ἕτερος”). In this regard, 
μόνον indicates non-identity of the logoi. The postposed “ἕτερος” picks 
this aspect up again. Non-identity is sufficient for difference. Neverthe-
less, there is room for interpretation. Even if “μόνον” means “exclu-
sively”, i.e. that two things exclusively have their name in common and 
not their definition, it does not tell whether the related accounts are 
1 completely different or 
2 partly different. 
It is widely accepted to distinguish these two different possibilities 
regarding ἕτερος – different.210 Unfortunately, the definition only pro-
vides “ἕτερος”, whilst we want to know whether it is to be understood 
as ἕτερος completely or ἕτερος partly. As said, something qualifies as dif-
ferent already if it is not completely identical. Hence, one cannot decide 
which option is preferable only by considering “ἕτερος” or “μόνον”. 
209 Irwin (1981: 524) acknowledges the importance of this adjective.
210 Cf. Shields (1999), Irwin (1981), Ward (2008), Wedin (2000), Brakas (2011).
As a consequence of these options, it is a regular practice to distinguish 
two exhaustive kinds of homonymy, namely those where the definitions 
are not entirely different, i.e. those in which there is definitional overlap, 
and those which are completely different, with no overlap. The labels of 
these kinds are usually given with reference to EN I.6, 1096b27. If there 
is no definitional overlap, one speaks of accidental homonymy; if there is 
overlap one may call it non-accidental homonymy, although sometimes 
this distinction bears other names.211 In the following, this will be called 
the accidental / non-accidental distinction (ANAD). There are reasons 
to regard this distinction not as the best way to depict the terminologi-
cal complexity connected with the topic of homonymy in Aristotle since 
it inflates the notion of homonymy. Nevertheless, this distinction has 
become quite popular. Because of this, I will discuss it in greater detail.
The next subsection interrupts the discussion of the three additional 
problematic elements of the definition of homonymy and takes a look 
at the ANAD and its origin, and considers some difficulties that are 
connected with it.
3.4.1.1 Digression: The accidental-non-accidental distinction
The challenge for adherents of the ANAD is to provide theses on the way 
in which the ANAD is drawn. There are different ways in which the ANAD 
can be drawn. It has been mentioned earlier that the distinction is con-
nected to the ἕτερος-discussion from the Categories. As there either is 
an overlap, or there is none, this is a clear criterion. The labels “acciden-
tal” and “non-accidental” trace back primarily212 to EN I.6, 1096b26-27: 
how is <the good> said? For it does not look like it belongs to the by-acci-
dent-homonyms – ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης 
ὁμωνύμοις. It is not surprising that this passage is often considered sep-
arating one species from another of the same genus because one could 
easily imagine that this passage continued in the following way: For it 
211 Such as discrete and comprehensive homonymy as suggested by Shields (1999) which 
is cited above section The Role of κατὰ τοὔνομα3.3.2.
212 Also, a reference to EE VII.2, 1236b23-26 is common. However, it is questionable 
whether this reference argues for or against the ANAD. Cf. the section 3.4.1.2. 
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does not look like it (the good) belongs to the by-accident-homonyms →  
but they belong to the not-by-accident-homonyms. 213
The ANAD is part of the InfH-view. The difficulties that are connected 
with the way the ANAD is drawn are the reason for the inflation of the 
notion of homonymy in this approach. If there was only definitional 
priority as the sole criterion that qualifies a homonym as non-accidental, 
the situation would be simple, but there is an extensive set of cases of 
homonymy that barely fit into the ANAD if it is construed only relying 
on definitional overlap. In this work, they are called spurious homonyms 
as, e.g. all living things and their dead counterparts or real and artificial 
things. Spurious homonyms are discussed in a separate section below 
(chapter 4). They play an important role in the overall understanding 
of Aristotle’s standard notion of homonymy. For spurious homonyms, 
it is a matter of interpretation whether there is definitional overlap or 
not. There is evidence to deny definitional overlap without denying 
some sort of association.214 Shields (1999: 29ff.) also acknowledges the 
importance of spurious homonyms. He expands his terminology, which 
is based on the ANAD with yet another sort of non-accidental hom-
onymy besides the ones that are covered by the strong approach (i.e. 
analogical and pros hen cases). He calls this account of non-accidental 
homonymy discrete, non-accidental homonymy. He denies definitional 
overlap in those cases, but he does not deny association. 
The problem of the ANAD is that οὐ ἀπὸ τύχης – not by accident 
allows various interpretations. If one solely considers the passage of EN 
I.6, 1096b26-28 one may notice that not by accident – οὐ ἀπὸ τύχης is 
not further explained by Aristotle. One may assume that this means that 
for non-accidental homonyms there is some reason or explanation for 
the fact that two different things share the same name, which is absent 
in accidental homonyms and that this is sufficient to classify them. 
However, “some explanation” does not mean that merely any explana-
tion is sufficient, since also in synonymy there is some kind of explana-
tion for the fact that two different things share the same name. There 
213 This is suggested, e.g. by Owens (19783: 117).
214 The application of the ANAD needs to deal with the problems connected with the SAA, 
which already is a strong argument against the adequacy of the ANAD. Cf. section 2.2.2.
are certain restrictions. But from this passage alone, it is not entirely 
clear, which sort of restrictions apply here. One approach is given by 
definitional overlap and the reference to the Categories emphasising 
that the interpretation of ἕτερος allows, or at least does not explicitly 
exclude, the possibility of definitional overlap. Let us call this strong 
non-accidental homonymy: 
Strong non-accidental homonymy: A strong approach of non-acci-
dental homonymy would probably aim at definitional overlap: hom-
onyms qualify as non-accidental, only if their definitions overlap. 
The other way to distinguish accidental from non-accidental cases is 
the following:
Weak non-accidental homonymy: A broader, more permissive 
approach would presumably allow any kind of explanatory rela-
tion, without demanding definitional overlap: homonyms qualify as 
non-accidental if there is a satisfying explanation for the fact that two 
different things share the same name. 
This can be illustrated by the following example: “With a single click 
of his mouse, John ordered food for his mouse.” The names of the two 
things, the animal and the device, are associated by more than mere 
lexigraphic identity. There is a common etymology for the words. Yet, 
one may imagine that it is possible to define the electronic pointing 
device without referring to the fact that it has its name “mouse” derived 
from a rodent. According to the strong approach, this case would not 
qualify as non-accidental homonymy, but it does so according to the 
weak. The example demonstrates that there are different ways to clas-
sify “mouse”, which depend on assumptions on the appropriate forms 
of their definitions. 
There is a similar example in EN I.5, 1129a26-31. Aristotle calls this a 
homonymy that is remote (πόρρω). The term key – κλεὶς, which either 
refers to the collarbone or to the instrument that opens doors is homon-
ymous. How should one classify this example according to the distinc-
tion above? Irwin (1981: 527f.) assumes that in cases like this, Aristotle 
does not need to assume that it is a “complete accident” that two things 
bear the same name “key”. Nevertheless, the nature of the two keys 
“is so different that the definitions include no common element, and 
we can understand one definition without needing to understand any 
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part of the other.” Since Irwin does not assume definitional overlap but 
instead considers this example not “completely” accidental, we can infer 
that he would adopt the weak approach to non-accidental homonymy.
Also, with accidental homonymy, it is possible to know one without 
but not the other. The only difference between them would then be the 
admission or denial of another explanation. If one allows a distinction 
between weak and strong cases in the non-accidental homonymy, a 
parallel distinction for accidental homonymy will create a conceptual 
overlap between accidental and non-accidental homonymy. The weak 
approach of accidental homonymy would then coincide with the weak 
approach to non-accidental homonymy, i.e. denying definitional over-
lap, but allowing some other kind of explanation. The strong approach 
to accidental homonymy would deny definitional overlap and any other 
kind of relation.215 This distinction shows that the ANAD has problems 
accommodating a certain set of prevalent examples for homonymy. 
The severe cases are those without definitional overlap, but some other 
kind of relation between them, i.e. spurious homonyms. There are cases, 
which can be regarded as both, accidental and non-accidental without 
implying a contradiction. Given that there is an alternative that avoids 
this vagueness, i.e. the DefH-view, it is difficult to identify the strengths 
of any approach that admits a form of the ANAD.
3.4.1.2 Discussion: An appropriate distinction? 
The difficulties of non-accidental and accidental cases only arise if one 
agrees that in EN. I.6, 1096b27-28 the ἀπὸ τύχης enables us to mark-off 
one species from another species of the same genus (i.e. the problems 
only arise if one agrees with the ANAD). The remark about homonyms 
ἀπὸ τύχης is the only occurrence of its kind, and I doubt it is sufficient 
to justify the inflation of Aristotle’s notion of homonymy in the way the 
ANAD requires it. It is possible to argue that ἀπὸ τύχης instead has to be 
understood as a clarificatory remark about the character of homonymy 
215 Cf. the following passages contain an example that explicitly state that two things 
can have the same name without seeing anything common in them: Met. I.9, 991a5-8; Met. 
XIII.4, 1079b1-3 as if someone would call “a man” Kallias and the wood, though one does not 
see any communality of them – εἴ τις καλοῖ ἄνθρωπον τόν τε Καλλίαν καὶ τὸ ξύλον, μηδεμίαν 
κοινωνίαν ἐπιβλέψας αὐτῶν. Cf. for a discussion of these passages Ward (2008: 36ff.).
simpliciter without assuming that Aristotle’s presupposes or proposes a 
comprehensive notion of homonymy in this passage. This assumption 
can be supported by a parallel passage of the EE which is sometimes 
used to support the adequacy of the ANAD. 
EE VII.2, 1236b23-26: λείπεται τοίνυν 
οὕτως, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς μόνη <ἡ> πρώτη 
φιλία, ἔστι δὲ ὡς πᾶσαι, οὔτε ὡς ὁμώνυμοι 
καὶ ὡς ἔτυχον ἔχουσαι πρὸς ἑαυτάς, οὔτε 
καθ’ ἓν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἕν.
The only remaining alternative is that the primary 
friendship is the only one, because it is somehow 
all, neither as homonyms, i.e. as being related to 
each other by chance, neither according to one 
species, but rather in relation to one.
This translation does not insinuate the ANAD. If one considers the καὶ ὡς 
ἔτυχον as an explanatory phrase to οὔτε ὡς ὁμώνυμοι, then it emphasises 
the idea that homonyms primarily are those things that are accidentally 
related. Moreover, it is said that friendship is said synonymously, for the 
καθ’ ἓν εἶδος alludes to synonymy. Finally, the conclusion is that neither 
of the two is the case, but that friendship instead is said pros hen. This 
explanation is entirely consistent with the DefH-view and also with the 
tertium quid view, but without any support for the InfH-view.
Another limitation connected to the ANAD concerns the justification 
of the ANAD by referring to the Categories. It is not possible to exclude 
the possibility that in the Categories 1 a comprehensive notion of hom-
onymy is introduced, but some hints support the thesis that the defini-
tion concerns a narrow notion of homonymy. How can this be justified? 
The three problematic pieces μόνον, ἕτερος and τὸ γεγραμμένον play an 
influential role in this regard.216 One indication that supports the thesis 
that the definition of homonymy in Cat. 1 is concerned with a narrow 
notion of homonymy is given by μόνον – only (it occurs twice). If the 
definition were about non-accidental homonymy, the function of the 
“μόνον” would become mysteriously restricted. Why should Aristotle 
assert that two things only have their name in common, if he also thinks 
that parts of their definitions overlap? Further, how could “μόνον” be 
read less restricted, if it means something akin to “exclusively”? There are 
no comparatives for this adjective. If Aristotle had this option in mind, 
the point would have become much clearer if “μόνον” was not part of 
the text. It is much more likely, since “μόνον” is part of the text, that 
216 Cf. Wedin (2000: 13) who, by and large, shares my assessment.
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the “μόνον” fulfils a proper function and has an unlimited scope. Nev-
ertheless, one has to accept that this argument does not guarantee what 
it is supposed to show. It is still imaginable that “μόνον” has a restricted 
scope. Intertwined with this is the problem of the notion of ἕτερος – 
different in this context. If Aristotle concedes to call different – ἕτερος 
anything that is not completely identical, then “μόνον” has a restricted 
scope. Then, the definition covers also the so-called non-accidental cases 
such as the healthy (although, in the relevant passages exactly these are 
said not to be homonymous). Yet, if Aristotle in this context only calls 
different what is completely unidentical, then this definition only covers 
those accidental cases. Since the “μόνον” can be taken as an indication 
to conceive of difference in this context what is completely unidentical, 
whereas it is not an indication for the alternative, one has to conclude 
that the reasons to assume that the definition of homonymy in the Cate-
gories focusses only on accidental homonymy prevail. 
3.4.2 Τὸ γεγραμμένον
The interpretation of τὸ γεγραμμένον can be used to argue for the ade-
quacy of the ANAD. To illustrate homonymy Aristotle uses the following 
example: οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον. There are two 
ways to interpret this example.217
1. Linguistic incident: “ζῷον” signifies an animal and a drawing (of 
anything → accidental homonymy
2. Paradigm & image: “ζῷον” signifies an animal and a painted animal 
→ non-accidental homonymy
217 Cf. for this distinction also Irwin (1981: 525 n. 3). Recently, it has been argued by Brakas 
(2011: 145–148) that there are not two alternatives but only one. Brakas rejects the first option 
that I mention here as a real option. He even claims that the example given in the definition 
shows that the PHR was “embedded in Aristotle’s thought from the very beginning.” (p. 147). 
I do not see real evidence for such a claim within this passage, although I would not claim 
that it is impossible. I agree with Wedin (2000: 13) that this passage presents a definition of 
a narrow notion of homonymy. (Wedin calls this kind of homonymy “strong”).
As indicated, dependent on these two ways is the assessment of the 
ζῷον-example either as an example of accidental homonymy or non- 
accidental homonymy. Scholars are not in unison on this.218 
To consider this an example of non-accidental homonymy the lines 
need to be interpreted the following way: οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ 
γεγραμμένον – for example “ζῷον” <designates> a man and the painted 
<animal>. This assumes that the participle τὸ γεγραμμένον belongs to 
ζῷον. Then, ζῷον does not amount to two entirely unrelated things, but 
to related things. The painted animal is not a genuine animal, since it 
lacks, e.g. self-locomotion, but it may be called animal, because of its 
physical resemblance to a real animal. Its definition could amount to 
“semblance of an animal” and thus include a reference to the real animal, 
although nowhere Aristotle concedes this dependence in definition.219 
It is possible to assume that Aristotle here talks in the same fashion as 
he talks in DA II.1, 412b19ff. and other places about a stone or painted 
and a real eye of which he explicitly says that they are homonyms.220 
These examples have a unique role within Aristotle’s examples of hom-
onymy. Often, examples of this kind are called spurious homonyms, as 
discussed in the next section. 
Shields (1999: 14–15) prefers the paradigm & image interpretation 
of the example. He states that “Aristotle’s example here evidently lends 
218 There are opposing translations that basically follow either take of the example as 
illustrating a case of accidental homonymy or as a case of non-accidental homonymy, cf. 
Rath (2012: 7) “Zum Beispiel ist sowohl der Mensch als auch der auf einem Bild gezeichnete 
Mensch ein Lebewesen.” Rath, I. W. ed. (2012). Die Kategorien: Griechisch/deutsch. Stuttgart. 
Cf. also Rolfes, E. (1925²: 43) „So wird z. B. der Name Sinnenwesen (ζῷον) sowohl von einem 
(wirklichen) Menschen wie von einem gemalten Menschen oder Tier gebraucht.“ Rolfes, E. 
ed. (1925). Aristoteles Organon, 2nd edn. Leipzig [u.a.]. In contrast to that, cf. Oehler (1986: 
9) „So wird zum Beispiel der Name ‚Lebewesen’ sowohl in bezug auf den Menschen als auch 
in bezug auf das Bild gebraucht.“ In accordance to that Ackrill (1986: 10) “Thus, for example, 
both a man and a picture are animals” which is identical to Barnes (1984: 2). Owens (19783: 
117) and Wedin (2000: 13) assume that the Categories’s example is accidental. 
219 In section 4, I discuss the topic of so-called spurious homonyms. These reflect the 
homonymy between two things of which one is a genuine F whereas the other is only a 
spurious F, as in the case of the picture of the animal which is not genuine animal, but only 
spuriously so. In that section, I argue that there is no reason to believe that there is defini-
tional overlap between these cases. 
220 Actually, the example of real thing and its copy is found in many works: PA 640b29-
641a6, Meteor. 390a10-13, GA 726b22-4, Pol. 1253a20-5, and similar to the Categories phras-
ing: De Motu. 450b20-24.
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support to a kind of homonymy which recognises definitional overlap”. 
However, several pages later Shields proposes a convincing argument 
about the way Aristotle defines things. He speaks of functional determi-
nation.221 Under this principle, the definitional overlap between copies 
and originals is denied. Yet, surprisingly, he does not apply this insight 
to his assessment of the example of the Categories.
To consider the example οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον 
an example for accidental homonymy one needs to interpret it the fol-
lowing way: as “ζῷον” <signifies> a man and a drawing, regardless of 
whether the drawing is of an animal, a man or anything else. Here, 
“τὸ γεγραμμένον” is conceived as a substantivised participle meaning 
“drawing” or “painting”, which are literal meanings of the ambiguous 
term “ζῷον”. Although it is possible that there is a common etymologi-
cal background to both meanings, as the objects of many paintings were 
animals, this possibility does not seem to be of interest in this context, 
and it is certainly not more than an ad hoc explanation to establish an 
association between these things.222 It is pivotal for the “linguist inci-
dent approach” that the linguistic ambiguity of the term “ζῷον” is fully 
recognised as otherwise, Aristotle’s choice of terms would demand the 
backreference of “τὸ γεγραμμένον” to “ζῷον” as mentioned above. On 
the one hand, one may oppose that the fact he uses τὸ γεγραμμένον and 
not a proper substantive for “painting” or “image” such as “εἰκών” or 
“εἴδωλον”, and actually indicates and calls for the backreference of “τὸ 
γεγραμμένον.” But, on the other hand, if this were true, the choice of 
“ζῷον” as example would be perplexing, because of its ambiguity. 
221 This notion will be picked up again in the next section. Shields (1999: 33) defines this 
in the following way: “FD: An individual x will belong to a kind or class F iff: x can per-
form the function of that kind or class.”
222 The example of ζῷον is not clearer than the example of ὄνος – mule in Top. I.15, 107a18-22: 
οἷον ὄνος τό τε ζῷον καὶ τὸ σκεῦος· ἕτερος γὰρ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος αὐτῶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ 
ζῷον ποιόν τι ῥηθήσεται, τὸ δὲ σκεῦος ποιόν τι – as e.g. in the case of the animal and the 
vessel: for the definition of the things that correspond to the name is different, it is said that 
one is an animal of some kind and the other a vessel of some kind. It is not obvious, whether 
there is no dependency between the two different meanings. In the case of the mule and 
the machine one could at least assume a historical connection. 
The interpretation of the ζῷον-example influences the interpretation of 
“ἕτερος”. The image & paradigm account demands that “ἕτερος” is read 
meaning “partially different” the linguistic-incident approach needs to 
read it meaning “completely different”. 
Verdict: According to the room for interpretation it is not entirely 
clear which intentions Aristotle has. Either, he introduces only one of 
the two kinds of homonymy, or he introduces both and is aware of the 
ambiguity between these two types of homonymy. It seems unlikely 
that Aristotle chose the term “ζῷον” as an example and used it in the 
way the image & paradigm account suggests it in the awareness that at 
the same time “ζῷον” is a term which by linguistic incident refers to 
two completely different things. This, the occurrence of “μόνον” and 
the absence of problems connected with the SAA convincingly speak 
in favour of the assumption that this passage is about what has been 
called accidental homonymy. 
The only way one still could adhere to the image & paradigm account 
and still consider ζῷον-example illustrating accidental homonymy, is to 
assume that there is no overlap in definition between image and para-
digm, which is something that has also been proposed by Shields (1999: 
29ff.) albeit he does not apply this theory to the Categories.
3.5 Conclusions
I agreed with the real-essence-view on homonymy as it was formu-
lated by Fine (2004). According to this view, homonymy and ambi-
guity do not coincide. I pointed out that there are reasons to believe 
that although the real-essence-view is appropriate, it actually does not 
exclude that there are semantic differences between the different appli-
cations of the terms. I claimed that the semantic differences are based 
on essential differences. Because of that, I believe that the disagreement 
between the meaning and the real essence view is not as strong as one 
may think.
Moreover, I argued that the main difficulties of the definitions of 
homonymy and synonymy are related to the three elements of their 
second condition. There is the meaning of ὁ λόγος αὐτός/ἕτερος and 
the role of its attributes τῆς οὐσίας and κατὰ τοὔνομα. My proposal is 
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that τῆς οὐσίας and κατὰ τοὔνομα are crucial elements of that condi-
tion since they contribute both to the determination of the relevant 
definiendum of the logos, which is supposed to be the same (αὐτός) in 
the case of synonymy and different (ἕτερος) in the case of homonymy. 
One of my theses on the τῆς οὐσίας-part of the second condition 
is that the τῆς οὐσίας-part is not primarily concerned with an issue 
about the ontological scope of the doctrine of homonymy and syn-
onymy, whilst some scholars assumed this.223 Moreover, I criticise the 
translation of “τῆς οὐσίας” with “of being” since it is not enlightening 
the function of the τῆς οὐσίας-part of the second condition clearly. I 
suggest a better understanding can be obtained if one assumes that the 
term “οὐσία” is used in the sense of subject. This interpretation attempts 
to clarify the function of τῆς οὐσίας-part given that it needs to be con-
sidered together with the κατὰ τοὔνομα-part. I argue that the challenge 
of the second condition is the determination of the relevant definien-
dum. My discussion shows that both elements, i.e. the κατὰ τοὔνομα-
part and the τῆς οὐσίας-part, are indispensable parts of the definition 
as the elimination of one of the two has absurd consequences. 
Finally, I discussed those problematic elements that only belong to the 
definition of homonymy, i.e. “μόνον”, “ἕτερος” and “τὸ γεγραμμένον”. 
Connected with the interpretation of these elements are assumptions 
about the conceptual scope of the definition of homonymy in the Cate-
gories, i.e. whether it defines what usually is called accidental homon-
ymy or whether the definition allows a more comprehensive interpre-
tation. My conclusion is that one cannot rule out the interpretation that 
renders the notion of homonymy comprehensive, however, I argue (in 
the digression) that the reasons to believe that Aristotle intended to 
define a narrower notion of homonymy prevail. 
In the following chapter, I discuss and assess spurious homonyms. I 
discuss the impact of this class of examples on the assessment of Aristo-
tle’s doctrine of homonymy. The chapter after next then discusses those 
cases of multivocity that are said non-homonymously, i.e. those that I 
baptised polysemous multivocals. 
223 Anton (1968) and Cohen’s and Matthews’s Ammonius (1991).

4 Spurious Homonyms – Living and 
Dead – Copies and Originals
Spurious homonyms are best illustrated by these two examples: the 
pair of the painted/sculpted and their prototype F and the pair of the 
living and dead F. 
Often, the latter is explained with reference to the former since Aris-
totle apparently assumes that in the former case, the homonymy is more 
visible and easier to reveal (cf. DA II.1, 412b17-22, Meteor. IV.12, 389b20-
390b2). The label “spurious homonyms” has been introduced by Irwin 
(1981: 527ff.):224
“Aristotle also recognizes “spurious homonyms,” homonymous Fs that are 
not genuine Fs, but spurious Fs, called Fs simply because they resemble 
genuine Fs. Boxes and breasts are both called chests because they resemble 
each other, but neither sort of chest is defined simply as a resemblance of 
the other; some are defined as a type of box; others as a part of an animal, 
and they are all genuine chests. In spurious Fs the resemblance to real Fs 
is all that there is to their being F.”
First, a small technical note: The addressees of the label “spurious hom-
onyms” are not entirely clear. Either a spurious homonym is only the 
spurious F (insofar as it is a relatum in a homonymy) or one calls the 
pair of picture and paradigm taken together spurious homonyms and 
qualifies the relation of homonymy as spurious, in spite of one of the 
homonyms, the paradigm, indeed being a genuine F.225 In addition, 
although he does not speak of genuine homonyms, only of genuine Fs, 
one can imagine that it is in his sense to admit a complementary class 
of genuine homonyms. Let us call spurious homonyms the spurious Fs 
and not both of the relata of the homonymy as e.g. the painted man 
who is a spurious man. Accordingly, genuine homonyms are called those 
224 It also was picked up by Shields (1999: 31ff.).
225 The difference following from these options is that one may either think that “spuri-
ous” devaluates the homonymy or that it devaluates the homonym. 
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homonymous Fs, which are altogether genuine Fs as e.g. keys are (like 
all other accidental homonyms).226 
There are further questions to answer. Questions of particular inter-
est are: What is the difference between a genuine and a spurious F? And 
connected to this: Is a reference to the genuine F necessary to define 
the spurious F, or not?227 
The main difference between the genuine and the spurious F, as 
described by Irwin, is that the spurious F merely resembles the genuine 
F. But often at the same time,228 Aristotle denies that the spurious F is 
an F at all. Things can resemble each other in many ways, but in this 
context, the outer shape seems to be of particular importance:
PA I.1, 640b33-35: Καίτοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς 
ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματος μορφήν, ἀλλ’ 
ὅμως οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.
Yet, a dead body has exactly the same out-
ward shape as a living one, but still, it is not 
a man. 
641a18-21: ἀπελθούσης γοῦν οὐκέτι ζῷόν 
ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τῶν μορίων οὐδὲν τὸ αὐτὸ 
λείπεται, πλὴν τῷ σχήματι μόνον, καθάπερ 
τὰ μυθευόμενα λιθοῦσθαι
What is left is no longer an animal, neither 
are the left-behind parts the same, except 
only in shape, like those <animals> that 
turned into stone according to the fable
After death, i.e. after having lost the soul, a dead body only shares its 
outer shape with a living. If one continues to call the dead body “man” 
or “animal”, one commits a serious mistake, since the dead man or ani-
mal is not a man or an animal, at least not unqualifiedly. If one asserts 
of the genuine man “this is a man”, the “man” can be replaced by its 
definition “rational animal” and the assertion would still be true. This 
is not possible in the case of the spurious man, because the spurious 
man is not a rational animal, not even an animal at all. This leads to 
another remarkable difference between genuine and spurious Fs. For 
instance, spurious hands are not genuine specimens of hands, while this 
is the case for many other homonyms such as chests. This is the exam-
226 This distinction is not analogous to the former distinction of accidental and non- 
accidental homonyms, since it cuts across the former distinction. All accidental homonyms 
qualify as genuine homonyms since their accounts do not overlap, but, also some non- 
accidental homonyms (both weak, e.g. keys and strong, e.g. healthy things, or friendship) 
qualify as genuine homonyms. The example of key – κλεὶς is taken from EN I.5, 1129a26-31.
227 If this question were answered positively spurious cases would qualify as pros hen cases. 
All pictures of animals would contain a reference to the living animal in their definition.
228 See also Pol. I.2, 1253a23-25 and DA II.1, 412b17-22 below.
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ple Irwin (1981: 527–528) uses to show that in some cases, two homon-
ymous things can be considered a genuine specimen of the same “kind”. 
The example is parallel to the example of “key”. Both the bone and the 
tool, in this sense, are genuine keys. This is not the case for spurious Fs. 
Now, unravelling question (2) regarding their definitions, shows this 
question has no simple answer. Accepting that the definitions of the 
spurious and the genuine F are not identical, there are two options: 
either there is definitional overlap, or there is none. In the literature, one 
finds both options. Shields and Irwin answer the question for the defi-
nitional overlap differently. Since both scholars deny that this is a case 
of accidental homonymy, the two options to which they adhere comply 
with what I called weak and strong non-accidental homonymy in the 
digression of the last chapter. Shields’s view may be deemed equivalent 
to weak non-accidental homonymy and Irwin’s view with strong. Irwin 
(1981: 528) presupposes that one needs to define the picture of a man 
as “semblance of a biped animal.”229 Hence, the definition of the spu-
rious F contains the definition of the genuine F. This can be called the 
usual reaction230 regarding the question of their definitions. The usual 
reaction supports the InfH-view of homonymy since it qualifies a par-
ticular class of common standard examples for homonymy (namely all 
those spurious homonymies) as strong non-accidental homonyms (cf. 
also Irwin 1981: 529). 
Shields’s (1999: 31) view deviates from this one, but he also supports the 
InfH-view.231 Interestingly, Shields denies definitional overlap between 
the two things.232 He assumes that Aristotle wanted to express by locu-
229 Surprisingly, Irwin admits this kind of definition, but denies focal connection in cases 
that are based on similarity with reference to Met. ix.1, 1046a6. 
230 Apart from Irwin (1981), this reaction is also found in Hintikka (1959: 144); carefully 
also Fine (2004: 145) assumes that they might have “connected definitions”. Lewis (2004: 4 
n. 6 and 24 n. 56) also opts for this option and criticises Shields’s view of this, which is pre-
sented below. 
231 Ward (2008: 102) agrees with Shields on this: “Shields correctly points out, what appears 
to be a case of core-dependent homonymy [the spurious cases] is not a genuine case insofar 
as one of the requisite conditions for being a causal, core-dependent homonym is not satisfied.” 
232 This view is also shared by Owen (1960: 188): “An eye or a doctor, a hand or a flute, is 
defined by what it does; but an eye or a doctor in a painting cannot see or heal, a stone hand 
or flute cannot grasp or play. So, when they are used in the latter way, ‘eye’ and the other 
nouns must be used homonymously. And Aristotle, who allows that ambiguity is a matter of 
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tions such as some x is no F, or some x is no longer an F, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως233 – 
except homonymously that there is no definitional overlap:
“In so speaking, he means that the Fs in question have nothing defini-
tionally in common with genuine Fs, and are called Fs only by custom or 
courtesy. These are discrete homonyms which nevertheless form a class 
worthy of our attention; unlike the puns mentioned at Sophistici Elenchi 
33, they will not be ‘clear to just anyone’.”
According to Shields, this does not mean that those homonyms are 
accidental. He assumes that spurious Fs are associated by custom or 
courtesy.234 This complies with the approach of weak non-accidental 
homonymy: There is a particular explanatory relation between the two 
homonyms, but no definitional overlap. 
Shields’s position is connected to the following thoughts on the 
determination of things: Aristotle has suitable means to explain why 
those sculpted or dead things are not genuine Fs. It is a well-known 
practice of Aristotle to define things, especially body parts, by their 
function and power – ἔργον and δύναμις.235 In the following passage, 
this principle is testified combined with a remark about the loss of the 
defining function and power:
degree (Phys. 249a23-5, EN 1129a26-31), nowhere suggests that this homonymy is redeemed 
and brought nearer to synonymy by the sensible resemblance, which in his view, forms 
the sole connexion between the eye or doctor in the painting and its fleshly counterpart.”
233 PA 640b36; DA II.1, 412b2; similarly, GA 734b25-27 and 735a8; Meteor. 389b20-390a16; 
Pol. I.2, 1253a20-25.
234 On the one hand, in this context Shields could have referred to Met. ix.1, 1046a6. 
(and Met. V.12, 1019b33-35). Instead of speaking about custom and courtesy he could have 
spoken about similarity. Similarity between things is apparently not sufficient for a PHR. 
Whether it is reason enough to deny logical priority is discussed in the aftermath of this 
section. On the other hand, Shields’s thesis about custom and courtesy might actually com-
ply with Aristotle’s estimation of these cases. Cf. the last paragraph of this section.
235 E.g. Meteor. 390a10-13: Everything is defined by its function a thing truly is itself if it can 
perform its function, e.g. the eye when it can see, if it is not capable to do so it is that thing 
homonymously, like a dead or stony eye, just as a wooden saw is no more a saw than one in 
a picture – ἅπαντα δ‘ ἐστὶν ὡρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον 
ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ἕκαστον, οἷον ὀφθαλμὸς εἰ ὁρᾷ, τὸ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενον ὁμωνύμως, οἷον ὁ τεθνεὼς 
ἢ ὁ λίθινος· οὐδὲ γὰρ πρίων ὁ ξύλινος, ἀλλ‘ ἢ ὡς εἰκών.
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Pol. I.2, 1253a23-25: πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ 
ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι 
τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι 
ἀλλ’ ὁμώνυμα
All things are defined by their function and 
power, and we should not call them the same, 
but homonyms, when they are such beings not 
anymore.
This passage shows that Aristotle is aware of the well-established habit 
that things are often still called by the same name despite really not 
being what they have been. Further, from this passage it emerges that 
Aristotle does not suppose that referring to them with the same name 
is a “good custom” since he explicitly says οὐ λεκτέον – we should not 
call them the same.236 In the following passage, this kind of defining 
things is applied:
DA II.1, 412b17-22: θεωρεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ 
τῶν μερῶν δεῖ τὸ λεχθέν. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ 
ὀφθαλμὸς ζῷον, ψυχὴ ἂν ἦν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις· 
αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ κατὰ τὸν 
λόγον (ὁ δ’ ὀφθαλμὸς ὕλη ὄψεως), ἧς 
ἀπολειπούσης οὐκέτ’ ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν 
ὁμωνύμως, καθάπερ ὁ λίθινος καὶ ὁ 
γεγραμμένος.
One has to consider what has also been said 
concerning the parts. For if the eye was an 
animal, then sight would be its soul: for this 
is the substance of the eye according to its 
account (the eye is the matter of sight), which, 
if having fallen short of it [sight] is not an eye 
anymore, except homonymously, just like the 
stony and the painted <eye>. 
Aristotle compares the role the sight plays in connection to the eye with 
the role the soul plays concerning the body. The fundamental function 
of the eye is to see; this is the essence237 of the eye. If the eye loses the 
ability to see, e.g. when it becomes blind or dies, it loses its defining 
function, (or rather its essence or its soul). If the eye has lost its essence, 
it cannot be an eye anymore, at least not strictly speaking, which is 
why Aristotle says πλὴν ὁμωνύμως – except homonymously. In this con-
text Shields (1999: 31ff.) speaks of “functional determination.”238 By this 
approach, we know under which conditions x falls into a certain class 
F. While Shields interprets this approach quite stringently by assuming 
Aristotle denies a connection between these homonyms reaching the 
236 This conforms with Aristotle’s general remark that one should follow the crowd regard-
ing the denomination of things, but one should not follow them regarding the question 
what things are of certain kinds and what not (cf. Top. II.2, 110a16-20).
237 In the sense of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, cf. DA II.1. 
238 Shields (1999:33) defines this in the following way: “FD: An individual x will belong 
to a kind or class F iff: x can perform the function of that kind or class.” 
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level of their definitions,239 Irwin does not see the need to deny defini-
tional overlap. I deem Shields’s view more plausible since he provides 
an explanation for the lack of definitional overlap while Irwin’s view is 
based on mere presupposition.
The disagreement between Irwin and Shields is related to the ques-
tion “what is the spurious F?” since they have different views about 
their definitions. According to Irwin’s approach to “spurious”, it is suffi-
cient for definitional overlap that something is similar to a genuine F 
in its appearance but lacks some fundamental function of the genuine 
F: some x is a spurious F iff x lacks an essential feature of genuine Fs, but 
outwardly resembles genuine Fs. This account refers to genuine Fs and 
hence creates a definitional overlap. Shields’s view on spurious Fs rather 
diminishes the relationship to the genuine F, when he says that the “Fs 
in question have nothing definitionally in common with genuine Fs, 
and are called Fs only by custom or courtesy.”240
We may then summarise two available options regarding the ques-
tion of definitional overlap: (1) The usual reaction admits definitional 
overlap right away and supports the InfH-view. Thus, the definition 
of the spurious eye as “semblance of a genuine eye” sounds perfectly 
adequate, and hence, those examples may be considered examples for 
strong non-accidental homonymy. (2) Furthermore, the denial of defi-
nitional overlap has justification.241 The denial qualifies those examples 
as weak non-accidental cases of homonymy. Thus, the lack of overlap 
does not imply that the spurious eye is called “eye” by a mere linguistic 
chance. As the distinction between weak and strong non-accidental 
homonymy has shown, the lack of definitional overlap does not neces-
sarily qualify a homonym as accidental homonym. 
239 Shields (1999: 30 n. 32): “It is natural to suppose that an account of an axe, which can-
not chop will make reference to an account of an ‘axe’, that is that an axe and an ex-axe will 
be related. Here Aristotle seems to disagree, by relying on the thought that the essences 
of things are functionally specified, so that an ex-axe, which cannot cut — which does not 
fulfil the function of axes — will not qualify as an axe at all.”
240 Shields (1999: 31). 
241 In Shields’s terminology, spurious homonyms are called discrete, non-accidental hom-
onyms, cf. Shields (1999:29ff.). It is actually surprising that a scholar who follows the InfH-
view denies that there is definitional overlap in the so-called spurious cases. To propose 
definitional overlap in those cases would actually support his view.
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The difference between these two views primarily rests on Shields’s 
assumption that definitional overlap is not the only way, which can 
establish a connection between homonyms. Yet, the question for the 
definition of spurious Fs remains vague within his account. Shields 
does not tell us how their definition can be accomplished. Still, one 
should not consider this a flaw of his theory, since Aristotle is silent 
in this regard as well. One can justifiably wonder about Irwin’s sugges-
tion that the definition of spurious homonyms is dependent on their 
genuine counter-parts. At least, there is no textual basis for this thesis. 
A possible classification of spurious homonyms, which applies to 
Aristotle’s own means might be the following: In SE 4, 166a14ff. Aristotle 
distinguishes three ways – τρόποι, which are connected with homon-
ymy and amphiboly. The second of these ways explicitly mentions habit-
ual uses (166a16-17: εἷς δὲ ὅταν εἰωθότες ὦμεν οὕτω λέγειν). Shields’s 
suggestion about custom and courtesy could be supported with a hint 
to this passage. In addition, it connects spurious cases with (unassoci-
ated) homonymy. The examples given immediately prior to the second 
way are clearly examples of accidental homonymy: ἀετὸς 242 and κύων243 
(when either the account or the name signifies a multiplicity as in the 
case of ἀετὸς or κύων – ὅταν ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ τοὔνομα κυρίως σημαίνῃ πλείω, 
οἷον ἀετὸς καὶ κύων). 
4.1 Aftermath: The Relevance of Spurious 
Homonyms to the Question of the 
Relation of Multivocity, Homonymy  
and Synonymy
Irwin (1981: 529) uses the case of spurious homonyms to argue for his 
preferred view on homonymy in Aristotle, i.e. the “moderate view”. This 
view resembles the InfH-view in many ways.244 As argued above, spuri-
242 “Ἀετὸς” can mean “eagle”, “omen” or the “iron part of spoke of wheel”.
243 “Κύων” can mean “shark”, “the ace” i.e. the worst throw at dice and other things.
244 Initially, the InfH-view was called the moderate view. But since within Irwin’s approach 
there are no distinctions regarding the different kinds of “association” that is implied by the 
ANAD (as e.g. strong and weak non-accidental homonymy) I use here a different name. 
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ous homonyms allow for different interpretations regarding the ques-
tion of definitional overlap, none of which supports the assumption that 
“homonymy” as used in those contexts amounts to accidental homonymy, 
which would be desirable for adherents of the DefH-view. Since these 
examples of spurious homonyms are so frequent, the case of spurious 
homonyms plays a crucial role concerning the question of the most ade-
quate overall assessment of Aristotle’s notion of homonymy. To preserve 
the appeal of the DefH-view, a thorough discussion of this kind of exam-
ple is necessary. I will show that the alleged support those examples for 
the adequacy of the InfH-view can be weakened. Although the case of 
spurious homonyms is admittedly challenging the general adequacy of 
the DefH-view, the impact is not strong enough to disqualify the DefH-
view as the most appropriate approach. None of the views presented 
in this work are without flaws regarding the question of the relation of 
homonymy, synonymy and multivocity. Both the InfH- and DefH-view 
(alongside the tertium-quid-view) have serious difficulties that need to 
be addressed. According to my analysis of spurious homonymy, it poses 
a serious difficulty for the DefH-view only if one assumes definitional 
overlap in these cases.245 To support the DefH-view, I will address sev-
eral difficulties in the following subsections. This will demonstrate that 
most of the problems one may assign to the DefH-view can be defused. 
4.1.1 First Argument – The usual reaction
The first argument addresses the usual reaction: The usual reaction is 
convincing since it meets our intuitions about the alleged definitions 
of spurious Fs. Yet, the adequacy of the usual reaction is spurious itself 
because Aristotle states nowhere that the copy or the dead counterpart 
is defined with reference to the original. Each time the usual reaction 
is proposed, it is based on the mere assumption that Aristotle would 
define the spurious F in that way, when in fact, he is silent in this regard.246 
245 The difficulties of the InfH-view are all those occurrences in which Aristotle states 
that something is said in many ways but not homonymously, i.e. all cases in which they 
would apply the SAA. 
246 Because of that, I appreciate that Shields is silent as well in this regard.
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He also does not express that it is impossible to know what the dead 
body, body-part or artwork is without knowing the original. He states 
instead that the dead eye is no actual eye, it is just a chunk of matter 
(cf. Met. VII.16, 1040b5-8: Aristotle asserts that no part of an animal 
can exist separately from the animal. If they are separated they merely 
exist as matter – ὡς ὕλη).
In the same way, the painted eye neither is an eye; it is just a spread of 
paint, which is not a genuine eye. The question for definitional overlap 
is not raised by Aristotle in those contexts and does not seem to be of 
interest for him. It is carried into this context by several scholars who 
try to solve the question for Aristotle to be able to delineate his notion of 
homonymy accordingly. There are reasons to reject definitional overlap 
as given by Aristotle’s principle of functional determination, while there 
are no reasons to assume the opposite. Thus, the usual reaction is not 
a tenable interpretation as it cannot be supported by textual evidence.
4.1.2 Second Argument – Distinction of technical  
and non-technical applications of 
“homonymous”
Another strategy to minimise the impact of spurious homonyms is 
by referring to the distinction of technical and non-technical applica-
tions of “homonymous”.247 There are reasons to assume that the πλὴν 
ὁμωνύμως-locution is used in a non-technical sense, which is a simple, 
literal way, i.e. a way it was (allegedly) used before Aristotle, which pre-
sumably amounts to nothing more than “having the same name”.248 The 
πλὴν ὁμωνύμως-locution is indicative for those cases that were called 
spurious homonyms. For this argument, one needs to recapitulate Aris-
totle’s background in the Academy. The examples of genuine and spuri-
ous F strongly resemble the relation between forms249 and sensibles250 in 
247 Cf. section 2.1.
248 Fine (2004: 144) claims “Plato uses ‚homonymy‘ in this simple, literal sense.” I called 
this use non-technical in section 2.1. 
249 What in Plato is called ἡ ἰδέα, τὸ εἶδος or sometimes οὐσία.
250 Overall, this refers to particulars – καθ‘ ἕκαστα, which often are described as μιμήματα – 
imitations, εἴδωλα – images or ὁμοιώματα – likenesses, because of their relationship to forms, 
which is called μέθεξις – participation.
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Plato’s metaphysical theory. In Plato, the sensibles and their forms bear 
the same name. Often Plato adds an “itself ” to the name of the form as, 
e.g. in αὐτο-ἄνθρωπος – the man itself (EN I.6, 1096a35) to keep them 
apart. Aristotle is explicitly sceptical about what the “itself ” suppos-
edly means since he assumes that for the man and the man-itself there 
is just one and the same definition – εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν (EN I.6, 
1096b1, also Met. XIII.4, 1079a33-b3 = Met. I.9, 991a2-8). Thus, accord-
ing to Aristotle’s analysis, sensibles and forms must be synonyms in 
Aristotle’s technical sense, although Aristotle sometimes refers to them 
as homonyms when they are not “homonymous” in his technical sense.251 
Because of that, I assume that in this context, a sense of homonymy is 
applied that is non-technical and does not indicate anything beyond 
“having the same name”. Since the examples of spurious and genuine 
Fs strongly resemble the Platonic examples of sensible and form, one 
can assume that the πλὴν ὁμωνύμως-locution, which regularly occurs 
together with these examples also applies a non-technical notion of 
homonymy. If this is the case, definitional overlap is not part of the 
notion of homonymy that is applied in that locution.
The relation between spurious and genuine Fs is almost systemat-
ically qualified by remarks given in the context of the applications of 
the πλὴν ὁμωνύμως-locution, which further supports this idea. Aristotle 
repeatedly states that the spurious F is not an F at all. By saying this, he 
251 Cf. Met. I.6, 987b9-10: for the multiplicity of things which are homonyms with the forms 
exists by participation in them – κατὰ μέθεξιν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ ὁμώνυμα τοῖς εἴδεσιν. 
Further, cf. Met. VII.16, 1040b32-34: ideas and particulars are the same in form – τῷ εἴδει. 
Similarly, Met. I.10, 1059a13-14 (and 1086b10-11: the universals (καθόλου) and the partic-
ulars (καθ‘ ἕκαστον) have the same nature). Owen (1960: 181ff.) rightly remarks that from 
considering the forms and the sensibles as synonymous, notoriously, the third man regress 
follows and that this assumption is part of Aristotle’s polemic against the Platonists: “the 
Form ‘Man’ and the individual man can now be treated as a single class whose existence 
entails that of a further Form ‘Man’, and so ad infinitum.” The regress would disappear if 
Aristotle allowed the Platonists to apply the pros hen relation in this context. By doing so 
there would be a way in which one could deny synonymy, but also deny (accidental) hom-
onymy of the form and the sensible, which would stop the regress. Owen assumes that 
Aristotle’s omission of this solution proves his (Owen’s) developmental thesis, which claims 
that Aristotle simply did not have the solution available at the time he wrote the polemic 
against the Academy. For more details of the relation of Aristotle’s and Plato’s use of hom-
onymy and synonymy cf. also Fine (2004: 144 and n. 10) and Cherniss (1944: 178 n. 102). 
Cherniss’s view has been picked up and revised again by Ward (2008: 12ff.).
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emphasises that the relation between spurious and genuine F cannot 
be synonymy. Furthermore, in the light of these statements, there is no 
reason to insist on definitional overlap either. 
4.1.3 Third Argument – Spurious homonyms  
are based on similarity only 
There is no definitional overlap in spurious homonyms since they are 
based on mere similarity – ὁμοιότητα. In Met. ix.1, 1046a8 Aristotle uses 
the example of δυνατὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα in geometry to explain what is hom-
onymous by mere similarity and he explains that this kind of potencies 
do not belong to those he is interested in that chapter, namely those 
that are pros hen related. The same train of thought is essentially stated 
in Met. V.12, 1019b33-35. This, of course, does not a fortiori exclude the 
possibility of logical priority, as not every case of logical priority implies 
a PHR, but what reason other than that could there be to dismiss those 
cases explicitly from the pros hen related cases of potency? Since all 
standard examples of spurious homonyms are also based on similarity, 
they equally disqualify as cases for the PHR. 
4.1.4 Fourth Argument – A different source  
of priority 
The cases of spurious homonyms disqualify from being relevant for 
the PHR, because even if one admitted logical priority in those cases, 
the reason for this priority is different from the reasons for the logical 
priority that is found in pros hen cases. In the following, I will apply a 
distinction that I call a de re and a de dicto cause of association.252 
Let us assume that the dead hand is defined with reference to a real 
hand (even though Aristotle nowhere states anything like that). The 
difference between this case and the case of a healthy banana is that 
the banana contains a form of healthiness. The cause of the association 
between the banana and health is about the thing, i.e. de re. If such a 
252 Here de re is to be understood in the neutral sense of “about the thing” and de dicto 
in the sense of “about what is said”. 
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cause is responsible for the definitional dependence between two multi-
vocals nothing prevents to assume also a PHR. In contrast, the case of 
the dead hand is dissimilar. In this case, the dead hand is called a hand 
merely by convention. The logical priority here is about what is said, 
i.e. de dicto. The definition of the dead hand contains the definition of 
the living hand because the definition concerns the name only. This de 
dicto cause of association is merely linguistic, it does not concern the 
nature of the dead hand, moreover, the convention could be different 
in a different language or at a different time. There is no de re cause 
of association, i.e. there is nothing in the dead hand that is analogous 
to the healthiness that inheres within the healthy banana. There is no 
ontological basis but only a conventional basis.
This argument mainly rests on the assumption that even if there is 
definitional overlap in spurious homonyms, the reasons for that over-
lap are genuinely different from the reasons of definitional overlap in 
genuine cases of the PHR. This argument alludes to what Shields (1999: 
31) called custom and courtesy as mentioned above. Ward (2008: 102) 
agrees with Shields on this: “Shields correctly points out, what appears 
to be a case of core-dependent homonymy [the spurious cases] is not a 
genuine case insofar as one of the requisite conditions for being a causal, 
core-dependent homonym is not satisfied.” 
The distinction of de re and de dicto kinds of association may be 
helpful in cases where we already know the result. The problem of this 
approach is that we do not know how to distinguish de re from the de 
dicto cases reliably. Shields (1999) and Ward (2008) both suggest a kind 
of causal analysis that is supposed to deliver the required criteria, cf. 
section 6.1.1.5 for a detailed discussion of Shields’s argument.
4.1.5 Last Argument – Single science assumption
The last argument of this list rests on the oddity that definitional over-
lap in spurious homonyms would imply that there is a single science 
in which they would have to be considered together, cf. section 8.4.3.
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The distinction between homonymy and polysemy has received much 
attention within contemporary studies on these topics. As stated before, 
the present study proposes that the terminology of this distinction rep-
resents Aristotle’s doctrine of the relation of homonymy, synonymy and 
multivocity more appropriately than the terminology of approaches 
that follow the InfH-view. The acknowledgement of the distinction 
between different kinds of homonymies as, e.g. realised by the acciden-
tal /non-accidental distinction, does not conform to the modern termi-
nology of the same concepts.253 Today, one broadly agrees to regard the 
cases, which were labelled non-accidental homonyms, as neither weak 
nor strong, not as cases of homonymy, but one would instead address 
them with the notion of polysemy. Usually, polysemy is not considered a 
kind of homonymy but a different and, in some sense, complementary 
class to it. Today, homonymy is widely accepted to cope with what above 
was called accidental homonymy. In this regard, the terminological 
restriction of Aristotle’s notion of homonymy to accidental homonymy 
that has been proposed is largely consistent with the modern notion 
of the term. According to The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics 
(2007: 178), homonymy is the “relation between words whose forms are 
the same but whose meanings are different and cannot be connected: 
e.g. between pen ‘writing instrument’ and pen ‘enclosure’.”254 It is imme-
diately obvious that the modern notion of homonymy is described as a 
relation between words. As discussed already above, this might deviate 
253 For an introduction of the distinction of homonymy and polysemy and further refer-
ences see Brown (2006 vol. 9: 742–744). 
254 Continued: “distinguished from *polysemy in that the meanings cannot be connected: 
therefore, the words are treated as different lexical units. Also distinguished from cases of 
 *conversion: e.g. for either of these homonyms, that of pen (noun) to pen (verb). Also from 
 *syncretism, which is between forms of the same paradigm. […].” A similar approach is 
found in Murphy (2010: 84). There are two types of lexical ambiguity in homonymy and 
polysemy: “If two form–meaning pairings involve two different lexemes that just happen 
to have the same spoken and/or written form, then it is a case of homonymy – that is, there 
are two lexemes that are each other’s homonym. For instance, the noun kind meaning ‘type’ 
and the adjective kind meaning ‘considerate’ are two different words that just happen to 
have the same spelling and pronunciation.”
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from the Categories’ account of homonymy but, as reported, this view 
is not at all alien to Aristotle.
Polysemy is a notion that was first introduced by Michel Bréal (1897). 
It can be described as a grouping of related meanings under a single 
(word) form.255 A word has two or more related but distinguishable 
meanings, e.g. a chip: a potato chip, a chip of wood, and a computer 
chip. They are connected because they are all small pieces, and this is 
part of their meaning.256 Nowadays, the difference between homon-
ymous and polysemous words can be found in dictionaries. Usually, 
homonymous words are given at least two main entries in a dictionary, 
while the different variants of a polysemous word are listed under a 
single main heading. The reason for this is that often one considers 
polysemy the phenomenon that a single word may have more than 
one (and moreover connected) meaning and that homonymy is the 
phenomenon that two or more words have the same form, but uncon-
nected meanings.257 Of course, this description is problematic. How 
should one know whether in a given case, two “different” words are 
applied or whether there is a single word, which is used in different 
ways? What makes a word “different” if not its form? Accounting for 
the pairing of word and meaning does not help much either since both 
homonymous and polysemous words have different meanings while 
their forms are identical. 
The problem contemporary linguists are dealing with is to find 
proper ways to distinguish homonymy from polysemy.258 This usually 
255 What is meant here by the single word-form is a lexeme: a unit of the vocabulary of a 
given language that is often also called a lexical item. Murphy (2010: 84) defines polysemy 
in the following way: “If a single lexeme has two distinguishable senses associated with it, 
then we say that it is a polyseme or it is polysemous. The ‘bound pages’ and ‘information’ 
meanings of book are related to one another, so we would not want to conclude that we 
have two completely different words when we use the ‘text’ and ‘tome’ senses of book.”
256 Being a small piece belongs to them all, but is specific to none of them. This is similar 
to the problem Aristotle describes regarding the most common definition of soul in DA II.1, 
412a6: κοινότατος λόγος.
257 Cf. Murphy (2010: 84, 90, 91); Panman (1982: 107). Panman, O. (1982). Homonymy 
and polysemy. Lingua 58 (1-2): 105–136.
258 For adherents of the ANAD their task is to find criteria to distinguish accidental from 
non-accidental homonymy. As discussed above, the most dominant strategy is to compare 
the definitions and search for overlap.
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amounts to formulating criteria that describe the relationship of poly-
semes. Several criteria have been suggested in the literature, e.g. con-
ceptual or historical, i.e. etymological criteria. On the one hand, one 
may argue to determine a case of polysemy in the following way: if a 
single expression whose meanings for historical reasons diverge into 
different ones, while related meanings stay formally the same, it is a case 
of polysemy. On the other hand, in those cases where etymologically 
different words converge to a single form (which can be studied in the 
phonetic history of the words), we do not speak of polysemy, but hom-
onymy. Another approach focuses on semantic similarity: one needs to 
compare the closeness of the relationship between the related meanings. 
Homonymous are considered those meanings, which are further apart 
or even unrelated, and polysemous are those that are closely related. 
The challenge is to provide robust criteria that enable us to determine 
when meanings are closely related and when meanings are unrelated 
or remotely related. Definitional overlap offers itself as a criterion, such 
that the definitions of the polysemes overlap, and those of homonyms 
do not. In general, the difference between homonymy and polysemy is 
just as precise as the criteria available.
The difference between these notions is apparent in many of Aristo-
tle’s works. He is aware of the problem of independence and association 
connected to homonymy and polysemy. One reason to appreciate the 
polysemy-homonymy distinction rests upon the fact that Aristotle quite 
precisely describes the difference between these concepts by phrases 
such as “F is said in many ways, but not homonymously”. In those cases, 
it is clear that Aristotle applies a notion of homonymy identical to the 
contemporary one (which presumably is not a mere coincidence).259 
The whole debate on the so-called (Aristotelian) non-accidental hom-
onyms and the questions about appropriate criteria as, e.g. definitional 
overlap are questions that from the point of view of a contemporary lin-
guist deal with criteria for the distinction of homonymy and polysemy 
and not with a distinction within homonymy.
259 Adherents of the InfH-view reach the same conclusion only by applying and relying 
on the SA assumption to explain Aristotle’s manner of expression in all those cases.
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In this context, I do not introduce the notion of polysemy to enter the 
contemporary debate but to provide a terminological alternative to the 
InfH-view and the way it fuses the different sorts of relations between 
things with the same name under a single concept. Speaking of poly-
semy instead of non-accidental homonymy is not primarily supposed 
to import doctrinal differences. Yet, the advantage of this terminology 
essentially lies in the improved representation of Aristotle’s doctrine. A 
side effect of this terminology is that it reveals the close connection of 
the problems Aristotle deals with regarding the question of the relation 
between different kinds of health or different sorts of beings with the 
contemporary debate on the difference between homonymy and poly-
semy, and moreover, the debate on different kinds of polysemy.260 It is 
also clear that Aristotle knows at least two kinds of polysemous con-
nections, namely analogy and the PHR. 
Although the notion of polysemy has not been applied by Shields 
(1999: 35 n. 40), he found a way to integrate a notion of polysemy into 
his terminology, which Aristotle does not discuss. He notices that there 
is “logical space for non-core dependent associated homonyms”. The 
idea is that there may be polysemous cases that are neither analogical 
nor pros hen but associated nevertheless.261 Shields’s idea is appealing, 
albeit deviating from the terminology preferred here. Whether there 
260 There are various ways in which one draws distinctions within polysemy. The most 
prominent ones are the so-called regular or systematic polysemy and the non-systematic 
polysemy. Cf. on this Apresjan, J. D. (1974). Regular Polysemy. Linguistics 12 (142). The for-
mer “refers to word senses that are distinct, but which follow a general pattern or rule in the 
language. For example, words for containers can generally refer to both a kind of container 
and the contents of the container, as can be seen in (19): ‘container’ sense: I put some sand 
into a box/bottle/tin/canister. ‘contents’ sense: I dumped the whole box/bottle/tin/canister 
onto the floor. The relation between the ‘container’ and ‘contents’ senses is completely reg-
ular, which is to say it is entirely predictable. If we invent a new kind of container, we can 
be certain that the name of the container will also be able to denote its contents in some 
situations.” Murphy (2010: 89–90 emphasis in original). In the case of non-systematic poly-
semy one assumes that “the word’s two senses are semantically related, but are not part of 
a larger pattern, as for arm of government versus human arm.” (Brown 2006 vol. 9, p. 742). 
261 This idea is similar to weak non-accidental homonymy, but it allows definitional over-
lap, however, without an analogy or a pros hen relation.
5 Polysemy 121
are Aristotelian examples to fill this logical space is debatable.262 In the 
following, those cases are addressed as non-focal polysemes.
The notion of polysemy is an essential part of the terminology of the 
DefH-view. In the terminology of the DefH-view, the polysemes are a 
subclass of multivocals, which contains (at least) two further subclasses, 
namely pros hen polysemes and analogical polysemes (although, as sta - 
ted above it is debatable whether there is logical space for other kinds 
of associations, i.e. the distinction of analogical and pros hen cases is 
not exhaustive). The origin of these two subclasses of polysemous multi - 
vocals is the topic of the next section.
262 Walker (1979) discusses whether the Aristotelian example of friendship is a case that 
is neither analogical nor pros hen related but a “third and little noticed form of homonymy”. 
Walker, A.D.M. (1979). Aristotle’s account of Friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics. Phronesis 
24 (2): 180–196.

6 Polysemous Multivocals
Many philosophically relevant concepts are said in many ways, e.g. 
cause, principle, nature, necessity, substance, friendship263, part, whole, 
priority and many more. The Met. V contains more examples. This 
book of the Metaphysics is about those things that are said in many 
ways, i.e. multivocals. One may call this book “Aristotle’s philosophi-
cal lexi con”. Despite the book lacking an introduction, Aristotle some-
times refers to a book with ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς (Met. VI, 1028a5; 
Met. VII, 1028a10-11 and X, 1052a16) where “περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς” could 
be considered the title of his philosophical lexicon.264 The multivocals 
collected and disambiguated in Met. V book are not entirely homoge-
nous.265 There are many, which are focally related266 (e.g. V.1 principle, 
V.5, necessity and V.7 being) but also many where a focal reference is not 
determined (e.g. V.2 cause; V.4 nature and V.28 genus). Because of this, 
it is a philosophically important task to reveal the differences behind 
any single common name. According to the DefH-view, multivocity 
divides into three different main chunks, i.e. homonymous multivocals, 
synonymous multivocals and polysemous multivocals. The latter kind of 
multivocals covers those cases that are most interesting for most phi-
losophers, i.e. pros hen and analogical cases. This division is notoriously 
based on the following passage. Unfortunately, this passage does not 
explain the options listed, except briefly the analogical case. 
263 The friendship-example is special in a certain way. From the EE to the EN Aristotle 
seems to have changed his mind concerning this case. In the EN friendship does not seem 
to be pros hen related anymore. In the EN, the different kinds of friendship are related only 
by resemblance, which is different from a PHR. For a detailed discussion and further hints 
to literature concerning this example see Ward (2008: 149–156). 
264 Cf. for more speculation Menn (2008: 40 appendix vii).
265 A complete investigation of the chapters of Met. V concerning the kind of multivocity 
is not intended in the present study. However, it is likely that an investigation of that kind 
could support the classificatory approach of DefH proposed in this study.
266 Homonymous uses of those terms are not excluded by this thesis, since a single term 
might exhibit homonymous and polysemous uses at the same time. A clear example for 
this possibility is the case of δύναμίς. One can find it in Met. ix.1, 1046a4-9 and Met. V.12, 
1019b33-34.
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EN I.6, 1096b26-28: ἀλλὰ πῶς 
δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε 
ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ’ ἆρά 
γε τῷ ἀφ’ ἑνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἓν 
ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ’ 
ἀναλογίαν;
However, how are <they (i.e. the good things)> said? 
[1] For it seems, that they do not belong to the 
homonyms by accident. [2] But <does it seem, that 
they> are <good> by being from one <good> [3] or 
by bringing all towards one <good>, [4] or rather by 
analogy?
As argued in section 3.4.1.1, this passage (especially [1]) is the basis of 
the ANAD (accidental / non-accidental distinction), which is an inter-
pretation that cannot be categorically rejected. Yet, if this interpretation 
is used to constitute a terminological framework such as the InfH-view 
with the aim to be valid to the whole corpus, it is based on a weak foun-
dation, since the way homonymy is divided up in this passage is excep-
tional rather than canonical.
In the following, I focus on the alternatives [2], [3] and [4]. The 
group of these alternatives constitutes the class of multivocals in which 
homonymy is denied in many passages.267 In the context of the quoted 
passage (EN I.6, 1096b26-28), Aristotle argues against the Platonic 
assumption of there being a (single) idea of the Good.268 Aristotle dis-
cusses why everything that is called “good” is not good in the same way 
as it differs for honour, pleasure or wisdom.269 From Aristotle’s remark 
1096b21-23 that “good” is not said in the way some things are said to 
be white, e.g. “white” applied on snow and “white” applied on lead it 
is clear that it is not said synonymously, which would be desirable for 
the Platonic assumption that there is a single idea of the good. Thus, he 
concludes that the good is nothing common that falls under a single idea – 
οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν (EN I.6, 1096b25-26). 
Then Aristotle proceeds stating that “good” is not a homonym by acci-
dent at [1], which is tantamount to claiming that not everything that is 
267 Met. IV.2, 1003a33-34; Met. ix.1, 1046b4-7; GC I.6, 322b29-32; Met. VII.4, 1030a29-b3, 
and also Top. II.3, 110b16-22; homonymy is also denied in EE VII.2, 1236a16-22. If one 
accepts that the current passage does not imply that there are several species of homon-
ymy beside accidental homonymy, one has to count this passage also to the list of passages 
where homonymy is denied of something that is said in many ways.
268 For further details about this passage and Aristotle’s set of arguments against this cf. 
Brüllmann, P. (2011). Die Theorie des Guten in Aristoteles‘ „Nikomachischer Ethik”. Berlin, 
New York.
269 EN I.6, 1096b24-25: The accounts [of honour, pleasure and wisdom] insofar they are 
goods are various and different – ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ᾗ ἀγαθά.
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good bears the same name by accident. Then he asks but how is <the 
good> said? – ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; I assume that this question asks 
for the relation of the different ways the good is said. The rest of the 
passage [2], [3] and [4] lists different possible ways the commonality of 
the different things that are called good could be explained. I think a 
definite answer concerning the good is not Aristotle’s intention in this 
passage. The ἆρά particle in indicates this. Nevertheless, this passage is 
a key point of reference concerning the question of the various kinds 
of association between things with the same name.
At first sight, this passage seems to suggest three possibilities: at [2] 
the ἀφ’ ἑνὸς-, at [3] the πρὸς ἓν-, at [4] the κατ’ ἀναλογίαν-case. All these 
three cases fall into polysemous multivocity.270 Analysing this further 
reveals that although the disjunction in that sentence lists three candi-
dates, there are reasons to prefer summarising them in the following way: 
a. the πρὸς ἓν- and the ἀφ’ ἑνὸς-case 
b. the κατ’ ἀναλογίαν-case
I list the πρὸς ἓν- and the ἀφ’ ἑνὸς-case together, but they are not sup-
posed to be identified, at least not without explanation. While “ἀφ’ ἑνὸς” 
means “from one”, “πρὸς ἓν” means “in relation to one” or “towards 
one”. It is not clear whether there is a doctrinal difference related to the 
linguistic/prepositional difference since there is no further explanation 
given in that context. One could refer to other passages. Unfortunately, 
the exact same locution is not found anywhere else. Some passages are 
similar: cf. Met. XI.3, 1060b37-a7; EE VII.2, 1236b20-21 (ἀπ’ ἐκείνης) and 
more remotely also in GC I.6, 322b31f. There has been the thesis that 
the πρὸς ἓν- and the ἀφ’ ἑνὸς-case describe the same relation under a 
different aspect.271 I accept this thesis as correct as there is no reason to 
believe that these cases genuinely differ. There is even a passage where 
Aristotle apparently uses these phrases interchangeably. 
270 Although this list is not necessarily exhaustive, cf. footnote 262.
271 This has been suggested by Krämer (1967: 339 n. 86) and by Joachim, H. H. (1951, Aris-
totle: The Nicomachean ethics, Oxford, (p. 46 n. 6). Also Owens (1963: 117–118) identifies 
the two cases. They are identical in as much the way to Rome and the way from Rome is 
identical.
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Met. XI.3, 1061a1-5: λέγεται δὲ τοῦτον 
τὸν τρόπον ἕκαστον τῷ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν 
ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνάγεσθαί πως τὸ δὲ 
πρὸς ὑγίειαν τὸ δ’ ἄλλως, πρὸς ταὐτὸ δ’ 
ἕκαστον. ἰατρικὸς γὰρ λόγος καὶ μαχαί-
ριον λέγεται τῷ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς 
ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τὸ δὲ ταύτῃ χρήσιμον.
One calls <“medical” or “healthy”> each thing 
because it either leads towards (πρὸς) the 
medical science or to health or in a different 
way, but everything to the same thing. One 
calls “medical” a term and a knife because the 
is from (ἀπὸ) the medical science and the other 
because it is useful for the medical science. 
Nothing in this passage suggest that the ἀφ’ ἑνὸς-case is crucially dif-
ferent from other ways of being related to one thing. The lack of appli-
cations of the ἀφ’ ἑνὸς-locution and the fact that identical examples 
reduce the need to differentiate between these cases in such a way that 
this distinction as it is drawn in the passage of EN I.6, 1096b26-28 can 
be neglected in the following discussions. Hence, we continue with the 
premise that the disjunction in this passage concerns two cases, i.e. the 
ἀφ’ ἑνὸς- / πρὸς ἓν-case and the analogical case.272 
The question raised in EN I.6, 1096b26-28: How is the good said? – 
ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; has received various answers. Different scholars 
have favoured each of the possibilities, though strictly speaking, he does 
not propose this answer.273 
6.1 Polysemous Multivocity by Pros Hen 
Relation
Unfortunately, in Aristotle’s works, there is no strict definition of the 
PHR, even though one could expect one since it plays a very important 
role in Aristotle’s philosophy. Many contributions about this notion 
tie it narrowly to its role for the possibility of a general metaphysics.274
272 It is actually up to debate whether the analogical case is really on a par with the pros 
hen case. Shields (1999: 10 n. 3) does not discuss the analogy as a candidate that explains 
how multivocals can be related. Cf. section 6.4. 
273 For a discussion of this topic consider Brüllmann (2011: 88ff.) and Höffe (1996: 148–156) 
who prefer the analogy. The PHR as favoured option has been suggested by Wolf (2002: 
33) and Mirus, C. V. (2004). Aristotle’s “Agathon”. The Review of Metaphysics 57 (3): 515–536. 
Wolf, U. (2002). Aristoteles’ ‘Nikomachische Ethik’. Darmstadt.
274 Cf. Senfrin-Weis (2009: 261): “Its sole purpose is to establish the possibility of a syste-
matic inquiry into being”. Senfrin-Weis, Heike. 2009. Pros hen and the Foundations of Aris-
totelian Metaphysics. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 24 
(2008), ed. Gary M. Gurtler, John J. Cleary, J. J. Cleary and Gurtler, 261–285. Leiden.
6.1 Polysemous Multivocity by Pros Hen Relation 127
Aristotle primarily works with examples without providing a detailed 
list of criteria. Because of this, this notion is controversial. To approach 
the PHR, the next section begins with an overview of the literature on 
this topic. This overview contains only a selection of contributions to 
this topic and does not claim to represent each position in the detail it 
may deserve. Within this section, I express criticisms of the presented 
views that prepare my assessment of the PHR. I address in this section 
the important relationship of logical priority (τῷ λόγῳ) and priority in 
being (τῇ οὐσίᾳ) which both have been claimed to be essential to the 
PHR.275 Within this overview, I show that only logical priority is essen-
tial to the PHR.
6.1.1 On the Literature about the Pros Hen Relation
In this section, I present and evaluate several seminal contributions 
on the notion of pros hen in Aristotle. I discuss their main theses and 
highlight their most important findings on the PHR.
In the first subsection 6.1.1.1, I compare Owen (1960), Bostock 
(1994) and Yu (2001). These scholars assume that there is a philosoph-
ical development in Aristotle’s thought from allegedly earlier to later 
works. They agree on that fact that there is a development, but they 
disagree on what exactly this development comprises. 
In the second subsection 6.1.1.2, I discuss Hamlyn’s contribution. 
Primarily, I argue against his thesis that the focal reference is prior in 
existence to the focally related entities. 
The third subsection, 6.1.1.3, concerns Ferejohn (1980). I evaluate 
Ferejohn’s definition of the PHR arguing that it is too narrow as it is not 
suitable to cover all examples of the PHR in Aristotle. 
The fourth subsection, 6.1.1.4, is concerned with the contribution of 
Senfrin-Weis (2009). Largely, her paper deals with the role of the PHR 
for the possibility of a unified science of being. I consider her paper 
valuable because it attracts attention to the question whether it is pos-
sible to distinguish distinct kinds of logical priority. 
275 Primarily by Hamlyn (1977) and in a different way also by Shields (1999).
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Finally, in 6.1.1.5, I analyse Shield’s attempt to define the PHR. I deal in 
detail with three of his successive attempts to define the PHR. I discuss 
his propositions and express several serious concerns connected with 
the arguments that support his final definition of the PHR.
6.1.1.1 On Owen (1960), Bostock (1994) and Yu (2001)
Owen’s seminal papers still dominate the subject area of the PHR. Pri-
marily relevant are the views of Owen (1960; 1965; 1966). Owen coined 
the term focal meaning (1960: 169), which has become the standard to 
refer to the PHR. Although his interpretation was often challenged, it 
still dominates the scholarship concerned with the PHR.276 The most 
influential article is Owen’s (1960) Logic and Metaphysics in Some Ear-
lier Works of Aristotle in which he predominantly argues for a develop-
mental thesis of Aristotle’s thought. He is notoriously quoted for his 
thesis of reductive translation, which claims that “‘being’ is an expres-
sion with focal meaning is a claim that statements about non-sub-
stances can be reduced to – translated into – statements about sub-
stances”, Owen (1960: 180). He claims that the reason for this is that 
all the senses in which “being” is said, “have one focus, one common 
element” (1960: 167). The emphasis on “senses” was often held to mis-
represent the nature of Aristotle’s doctrine of the PHR.277 I assume that 
although Owen’s reductive translation is elucidating in a way, but it is 
not sufficient to define the PHR.278 The problem is that the reductive 
276 Owen’s views are mentioned, discussed or criticised in the following, selected works 
(in chronological order) Leszl (1970); Hamlyn (1977); Ferejohn (1980); Irwin (1981); Bos-
tock (1994); Shields (1999: 57); Yu (1999; 2001); Ward (2006); Senfrin-Weis (2009). One of 
the most regular complaints concerns the choice of Owen’s label “focal meaning”. It is often 
criticised that this label implies that Aristotle’s doctrine of the PHR is primarily concerned 
with meaning or sense although Aristotle is actually more concerned with the ontological 
relations of different beings. Instead of “meaning” many scholars suggest calling it focal – 
 “relation”, “connection”, “reference” or “association”. But since the label had such an impact 
on the following scholarship, the label is sometimes kept and adopted despite of the con-
notations that are usually held to be misleading. In contrast to that, Owen’s developmental 
thesis often is agreed upon or not addressed at all. For instance, Ferejohn (1980: 117) clearly 
agrees with it stating that this “matter is put beyond serious dispute by the relatively plain 
structure of Metaphysics IV.2”. Yu (2001) provides an alternative explanation of the tension 
between the alleged earlier and later works of Aristotle, see the remarks below.
277 E.g. Irwin (1981), Hamlyn (1977) and Leszl (1970). 
278 Cf. on this Senfrin-Weis (2009: 262ff.). 
translation also applies to non-focally connected entities. For instance, 
statements about snow can be reduced to statements about water, state-
ments about men can be reduced to statements about animals. By this, 
the reductive translation is inapt to account for the difference between 
generically unified classes (i.e. synonymous classes) such as the class of 
animals and focally unified classes, such as healthy things. 
It is also noteworthy that Owen’s investigation of the PHR is almost 
inseparably tied to the most prominent application of the PHR, i.e. its 
application to being, and the role of the PHR for the possibility of a uni-
fied science of being. He is not primarily interested in characterising the 
PHR independently of its various applications, i.e. to determine what 
is common in all applications of the PHR. As indicated earlier, Owen’s 
seminal paper of 1960 is guided by a developmental thesis. Owen claims 
one has to distinguish between early (Organon), intermediate (EE VII) 
and mature stages (Met. IV.2) of Aristotle’s works. This order primarily 
orientates towards the different ways Aristotle dealt with the ambiguity 
of “being” and with the possibility of a science of being. Owen makes 
three claims connected the three developmental stages. The first claim 
is that in the early works Aristotle was convinced that the verb “to be” 
and its cognates were ambiguous expressions, i.e. expressions without 
any association.279 Consequently, a single science of being was held 
impossible. The second claim proposes that in the intermediate stage, 
which according to his remarks is essentially restricted to EE VII.2, the 
pros hen relation was available to Aristotle (in the sense of a systematic 
ambiguity) but not applied to being. The third claim proposes that in 
the mature stage of Aristotle’s writings, i.e. in the Metaphysics, Aristotle 
discovered that also being has focal meaning, which allowed Aristotle to 
revise his denial of a single science of being, stemming from EE I.8 and 
EN I.6. Owen considers the application of focal meaning to being a rev-
olutionary project which was realised by Aristotle in the Metaphysics IV. 
The application of the PHR to being allows Aristotle to “convert a special 
science of substance into the universal science of being” (Owen 1960: 
169). In addition, Owen recognises similarities of the project described 
279 I.e. there was a time in which Aristotle did not assume definitional overlap or even a 
PHR.
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in Met. IV as the Platonic programme of universal science, and there-
fore, sometimes calls this project Aristotle’s Platonism.280 
The developmental thesis is based on the doctrinal tension between 
the works of the Organon/Ethics and the Metaphysics regarding the treat-
ment of being and the possibility of its scientific investigation. Owen 
states that the “argument of Metaphysics IV, VI seems to record a new 
departure” (Owen: 1960: 168–169). This possibility contradicts Aristo-
tle’s prior view that (unified) sciences of things that are said in many 
ways such as “good” are not possible.281 I deem Owen’s developmental 
thesis a means to release the tension between the different works.282 
David Bostock (1994) follows Owen in this regard in his commen-
tary on Met. Z and H. Also, Bostock is primarily interested in the devel-
opment of the treatment of the verb “to be”. He distinguishes two dif-
ferent approaches within Aristotle that are related to different works. 
He calls them the accounts “A” and “B”. A: Being applies to all things, 
but primarily to (first) substances and derivatively to the rest. B: Being 
applies to all kind of things, but each application has its sense. Approach 
B explains why there are as many kinds of being as there are categories. 
A cannot explain this, but A can explain the priority of substance. Bos-
tock agrees with Owen that there are two conflicting doctrines in those 
works. To release the tension Bostock uses the developmental idea of 
Owen. He states (1994: 67) that Account B belongs to an earlier stage 
and that things from distinct categories do not definitionally depend on 
some common element. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle has come to the 
view that there is some common element after all. With this common 
280 Cf. Owen, G.E.L. (1966). The Platonism of Aristotle. Proceedings of the British Academy 
51: 125–150.
281 Aristotle concludes in the passages EE I.8, 1217b27-18a1 and the parallel EN I.6, 1096a24-
33 that it is hardly possible, that the good-itself will be considered in the leisure of one i.e. 
in one single science – ὥστε σχολῇ αὐτό γε τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς (cf. also 1218a40-b1; 
compare also lines 1217b33-35).
282 As stated in section 2.4 I assume that Owen’s developmental thesis provides some 
insight about Aristotle’s distinction of homonymy and multivocity. The absence of the PHR 
in earlier works corresponds to Aristotle’s loose distinction of homonymy and multivocity 
while the presence of the PHR in later works also sharpens the distinction of homonymy 
and multivocity. 
element, the definitory dependence between all beings enables Aristotle 
to investigate being (qua being) within a single science. 
Since the developmental views of Owen (1960) and Bostock (1994) 
are very closely related, Yu (2001) felt encouraged to reassess their 
approaches and to offer an alternative. He denies the assumption that 
a radical development is the core of the tension between the different 
views in the works. Instead, he suggests that the views are not incompat-
ible, but making different points.283 Yu’s interesting claim against Owen 
and Bostock will be called the expansion of science-claim in the follow-
ing. Yu denies that Aristotle changed his mind regarding the question 
of what being is, but instead, he suggests that he changed his mind on 
the question of what science is. Yu’s approach is promising since Aris-
totle indeed creates a new, non-generic kind of science within Met. IV.2, 
1003b12-16. According to these remarks, two different kinds of domains 
can be investigated by a single science, i.e. generically unified domains 
as it is the case in zoology and botany and those that are unified by a PHR, 
e.g. medicine and ontology. For further remarks on this cf. the section 
8.4 about καθ’ ἕν vs πρός ἓν sciences and section 8.2, which concerns 
the “real” innovation of Met. IV.2.
6.1.1.2 On Hamlyn (1977)
Already the first page of Hamlyn (1977) contains a small parenthesis 
supposed to improve Owen’s label “focal meaning”. He states: “or as 
Aristotle calls it, pros hen homonymy”. Aristotle never uses a phrase one 
could translate with “pros hen homonymy”. From these remarks, it is 
obvious that he disagrees with Owen’s (focal) meaning-label on Aristo-
tle’s doctrine. I agree with Hamlyn that, as he states, Aristotle’s remarks 
at the beginning of Met. IV.2 do “not in itself to embrace any thesis 
about meaning or the place of homonymy in such a thesis” (1977: 2). I 
also agree that the different uses of “healthy” might well be regarded as 
constituting ambiguity, but that the pros hen homonymy, as he calls it, is 
not a relation that primarily holds between the senses or meanings, but 
283 Cf. Yu (2001: 207). Presumably in order to indicate the similarity of Owen’s and 
Bostock’s views Yu calls the “Account A” the “focal meaning account” and “B” the “multi-
plicity account”. 
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between things. One of his major worries is that an analysis of the pros 
hen homonymy in terms of a semantic analysis of the terms under con-
sideration does not do justice to the doctrine Aristotle has in mind. He 
worries that the distinction between focally related and primary cases 
of being F, which are at the heart of any pros hen homonymy if described 
in terms of secondary and primary senses of a term “F”, is controversial 
because it depends upon a theory of primary and secondary meanings. 
For this reason, a long part of his paper concerns the question: what are 
secondary and derivative senses or meanings? To illustrate the difficulties 
of this approach he introduces the example of the term “chair”. The term 
is ambiguous as “chair” can refer to a seating possibility and a professorial 
chair. The prof. chair is used in a derivative sense because “it has clearly 
arisen since and from the ordinary use of ‘chair’”, Hamlyn (1977: 6). 
Although he claims that not all cases with a primary and a derivative, 
secondary sense of a term have a focal connection, he does not tell under 
which circumstances this is not the case. Hamlyn’s best point against the 
interpretation of the PHR as a thesis on primary and secondary meaning 
is mentioned in a parenthesis (p. 6). Some of Aristotle’s examples are 
not concerned with primary and secondary meaning of the same word 
as it is the case in “healthy” and its focal reference “health”.284 He rightly 
infers that in those cases, a theory based on the distinction of primary 
and secondary senses of the same words must fail to do its job. I fully 
agree with him in this respect as I will claim in section 6.1.2 that there 
are two kinds of examples for the PHR. One involves paronymy, and one 
does not. If health is the focal reference of all healthy things, it is not nec-
essary to try to distinguish primary and secondary senses of “healthy”. 
One has to determine the relation between them differently, namely by 
focussing on the relevant kind of priority between the things that are 
healthy. Unfortunately, Hamlyn revokes his best point when he assumes 
(p. 8 and 10) that “Aristotle claims, or seems to claim, that health is the 
primary application for the predicate ‘healthy’ in such a way that to call 
284 Hamlyn does not explicitly address the variety within Aristotle’s examples for the PHR. 
There are two kinds of cases that need to be distinguished. Below they are called friendship 
and health-examples. The latter involve paronymy while the former do not. 
it healthy is to use the predicate in its primary meaning.”285 I think this 
assumption is redundant and not supported by the text. Unfortunately, it 
influences large parts of the rest of the paper. Hamlyn could have taken 
the lack of evidence as an argument against the theory that the PHR is a 
thesis about primary and secondary meaning, but instead, he continues 
focussing on other alleged problems of the PHR. It seems his “best point” 
as I called it above was just the result of a happenstance.
I highly disagree with the following claims of Hamlyn (1977: 8). He 
seems to infer that non-substances existentially depend upon sub-
stances that also healthy things depend for their existence on health. 
Existential dependence is not explained in detail in that context. I pro-
pose the following operational definition based on Met. V.11, 1019a1-4:
Existential priority: x is existentially prior to y iff x can exist without y, 
but y cannot exist without x.
Hamlyn assumes that there “is an obvious sense in which there 
could not be healthy things of any kind unless there was health” (p. 8). 
I think this thesis is not in line with some of Aristotle’s remarks I men-
tion within the following attempts to explain Hamlyn’s strategy. 
(1) The transfer thesis: Apparently, Hamlyn did not worry about the 
transfer of the existential priority of one application of the PHR (i.e. 
being) to all other applications of the PHR. While it is true that this kind 
of priority belongs to substance, none of Aristotle’s remarks requires 
that this priority is an essential part of the PHR. In the case of health 
and healthy things quite the opposite is the case, i.e. that the existence 
of health depends on the existence of healthy things. In Met. XII.3, 
1070a22-24, Aristotle explains the relation of health and the healthy 
man. He claims that when the man is healthy then also health exists.286 
285 Cf. Hamlyn (1977: 10). The more common suggestion is that animal is the primary 
application for the predicate “healthy”, which actually makes more sense, however, the 
PHR is not a relation between prior or posterior senses of words, in spite of some cases of 
the PHR, i.e. in friendship-examples, where one could construe the PHR with reference to 
prior and posterior senses of words. However, the possibility of this construction can 
be considered as an accidental feature of those cases, since the relation primarily holds 
between the different kinds of friendship, not their names. 
286 Yu (2001: 219) also suggests that the things related to medicine do not ontologically 
depend on it, but he does not justify this claim. I think one should say they are neither prior 
nor posterior in being as it is suggested in Met. XII.3.
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Thus, not in every case with a PHR the focal reference is prior in exis-
tence and hence this cannot be an essential feature of the PHR.
(2) The implication thesis: Another way I may explain Hamlyn’s strat-
egy is to assume Hamlyn attempts to infer existential priority from log-
ical priority, cf. p. 8–9. He assumes that the dependence of the meaning 
of “healthy” on “health” “is of a particular and important kind” (p. 9).287 
Because of this, “the existential dependence rests upon a dependence 
of meaning” (p. 9). Furthermore, “there is both an existential, because 
meaning, dependence and also place for speaking of primary and sec-
ondary meaning. Aristotle claims, or seems to claim, that health is the 
primary application for the predicate ‘healthy’ in such a way that to call 
it healthy is to use the predicate in its primary meaning.” (p.10). 
I disagree with Hamlyn because Aristotle clearly claims that exis-
tential priority and priority in definition are not dependent on another. 
They do not necessarily occur together (ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ἅμα ὑπάρχει; Met. 
XIII.2, 1077b4).288 There are many cases in which what is prior in defi-
nition (τῷ λόγῳ) is posterior in being (τῇ οὐσίᾳ).289 Aristotle unmis-
takably reveals this in Met. XIII.2, 1077b1-7. The point is prior in defini-
tion to the line but posterior in being. This kind of relationship is most 
evident in the case of accidental compounds as, e.g. the white man.290 
Since an accident such as the white cannot exist separately from the 
white man, the white is posterior in being – τῇ οὐσίᾳ. At the same time, 
the white is prior in definition (τῷ λόγῳ) to the white man. In addition, 
implied by this is that not everything that is prior in being is prior in 
definition. The example just confirmed it. The compound “the white 
man” that is prior in being is posterior in definition. There are no rea-
sons to doubt that the same also pertains to focally related cases like 
healthy things. The healthy man is prior in being but posterior in defi-
287 I assume that his “meaning dependence” is on the whole equivalent with definitional 
dependence.
288 For further remarks on this passage see Cleary (1988: 89–90).
289 Assuming that priority in being (τῇ οὐσίᾳ) identifies with “existential priority”. 
290 cf. also Met. V.11, 1018b34-35: The accident is prior in definition to the whole, as the 
musical is prior to the musical man; for without the part there will be no account of the whole – 
καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦ ὅλου πρότερον, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν τοῦ μουσικοῦ 
ἀνθρώπου· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ὁ λόγος ὅλος ἄνευ τοῦ μέρους.
nition to health. This is also confirmed in Met. XII.3, 1070a22-24. When 
the man is healthy, then also health exists.291 
To conclude, the major problems of Hamlyn’s investigation are the 
deficit of textual references and his omission of a clear distinction 
between existential and logical priority. He does not mention logical 
priority or dependence in definition at all in his article. Moreover, he 
does not see that there is no necessity assuming that the focal reference 
bears the same name as the focally related entities. Hamlyn’s contribu-
tion nevertheless has a positive influence on the present work. Although 
I disagree with his assessments, he brought my attention to a critical 
issue: the independence of logical and existential priority. 
6.1.1.3 On Ferejohn (1980)
Ferejohn (1980: 118) claims that Owen’s reading of the PHR infuses 
an intensional character into Aristotle’s doctrine of the PHR because 
Owen’s (1960: 167) claims, paraphrasing Aristotle, that the senses or 
meanings of a pros hen term “have one focus, one common element”. 
Ferejohn suggests there is no need to assume that Aristotle theorised 
about intensional entities such as senses or meanings. Instead, he claims 
that Aristotle usually theorises about language without reference to 
entities such as meanings and senses, but instead his analysis contains 
nothing more than “pieces of language” and those extra-linguist entities 
they signify. Ferejohn shows in an endnote (no. 4) that he is aware of 
the fact that signification is a controversial topic in the scholarly debate, 
however, he does not enter this debate. For this reason, an interpre-
tation of Aristotle’s notion of pros hen will be “truer to Aristotle” if it 
eschews Owen’s intensional reading. Thus, Ferejohn joins the ranks of 
those scholars that criticise Owen’s focus on meaning. Nevertheless, he 
does not abstain from applying Owen’s terminology, i.e. focal meaning. 
291 Yu (2001: 219) also suggests that the things related to medicine do not ontologically 
depend on it, but he does not justify this claim. I think one should say they are neither prior 
nor posterior in being as it is suggested in Met. XII.3. 
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Further, one has to appreciate that Ferejohn assesses the importance of 
EE VII.2 as the most informative source regarding the PHR in Aristotle – 
a view that the present work shares.292 Based on his analysis of that 
passage, Ferejohn defines what he calls the πρὸς ἕν ambiguity: 
“(FM) A term T has focal meaning iff (i) T is “said in many ways”, and 
(ii) one of T’s many logoi is non-reciprocally contained in T’s remaining 
logoi (i.e. its significata are logically prior to theirs).” Ferejohn (1980: 120)
I appreciate that Ferejohn does not determine the PHR as a certain kind 
of homonymy. I also agree with his definition since it rests upon the 
plurality of logoi-view on multivocity that I discussed in chapter 1. How-
ever, in his further clarificatory remarks on this definition, he states that 
the things most properly called “medical” are logically prior to every 
other thing that is medical as well. In this regard, the present study dis-
agrees with Ferejohn (and his explanation that follows on p. 121). In the 
case of medical things, it is not true that the focal reference, which is 
medicine or the medic, respectively293, must be what is primarily med-
ical.294 According to Ferejohn, the doctor who is the focal reference of 
all medical things needs to be himself medical, however, in a primary 
way. Besides the fact that one can barely imagine what it means to call 
the doctor medical, Aristotle merely states that the focal reference is 
the medic without any further qualifications, i.e. without claiming that 
the medic is primarily medical. The same pertains to analogous exam-
ples like the healthy things, for they are all related to health, cf. ἅπαν 
πρὸς ὑγίειαν in Met. IV.2, 1003a35. In the case of “being” also the focal 
reference itself is a being although it is usually addressed with the term 
“οὐσία” – “substance”. The mere possibility that the focal reference and 
the focally related entities may bear the same name does not entitle us 
to determine it a general feature of the PHR. 
In the third (of four) part of his paper, Ferejohn discusses the appli-
cation of the PHR to being. Although I do not agree with some of his 
292 This passage is analysed thoroughly below.
293 Aristotle suggests the medic in EE VII.2, 1236a16-22 and the medical science in Met. 
XI.3, 1061a1-5. Cf. also footnote 325.
294 Cf. the distinction of friendship- and health-examples in section 6.1.2. 
assessments of the last two parts of the paper, I will omit a discussion of 
it as I try to discuss the PHR without a focus on its application to being.
To conclude, Ferejohn does not recognise that there is no neces-
sity that the focal reference and the focally related entities bear the 
exact same name. Because of this, his definition is too narrow. Antici-
pating my assessments in section 6.1.2, his definition only covers 
cases I call friendship-examples but not the more common case of 
healthy-examples.
6.1.1.4 On Senfrin-Weis (2009)
The paper of Senfrin-Weis (2009), published with extensive commen-
tary of Devereux, takes a quite narrow perspective on the notion of 
pros hen in Aristotle. Although she states that she wants to clarify what 
Aristotle means by pros hen (without qualification), she is primarily 
interested in its application to being and its role for the possibility of a 
science of being. Because of this, she focuses only on Met. IV.2 trying to 
determine what Aristotle means by pros hen, in spite of there being other 
more elucidating passages on pros hen in the corpus. In her paper, she 
presents several theses, many of which are directed against Owen (1960) 
and especially against his thesis of reductive translation (as mentioned 
above). Her most interesting claim is that about “pure, content-neutral 
referentiality in pros hen” (p. 263).295 This claim demands a little bit of 
interpretation. The following remarks are intended to be kept short: The 
rewarding performance of her paper is to lay the grounds for a distinc-
tion of different kinds of logical priority, yet this does not seem to be 
her primary target. Her main worry is that Owen’s claim that pros hen 
is closely related to synonymy in connection with his thesis of reductive 
295 This is an approximate list of some of the claims she makes: 1. Pros hen is not ade-
quately represented by Owen’s reductive translation. 2. Pros hen is not an extension of syn-
onymy (also against Owen (1960)). 3. She claims that pros hen is “content-neutral” in a way 
synonymy is not. What is meant by “content-neutral” is discussed in Devereux’s review. 
4. Pros hen as applied to being does not involve logical priority. 5. She claims that the senses 
of “being” are not reducible to or derivable from substance. 6. “Its sole purpose is to estab-
lish the possibility of a systematic inquiry into being” (p. 261). 7. “It is not a device or actual 
tool to be used within metaphysics for analysis and argument, because it denotes the non- 
analyzable substructure of all discourse, and not a type or actual part of discourse.” (p. 261). 
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translation,296 which involves logical priority misrepresents the notion 
of pros hen, in the following way: Qualities become substances of some 
kind297, just as men are animals of some kind. However, this cannot be 
Aristotle’s proposal since he spends much effort on distinguishing pros 
hen and kath hen/generic unification in Met. IV.2. Senfrin-Weis tries to 
elucidate the difference between these two kinds of unification in the 
following way: she calls the kath hen unification “content-based” (p. 264) 
and “’two-way’: towards the primary item and from it” (p. 276).
In contrast to that, she claims that the proper interpretation of the 
pros hen unification is not content-based and only “one-directional: 
towards the focal item, not back from it” (p. 276). Unfortunately, it is 
not straightforwardly clear what this means. One may assume that the 
(logical) dependency of man to animal can be called content-based in 
the way Senfrin-Weis thinks about it because the animal plays the role of 
the genus in the definition of man and hence “animal” is an appropriate 
(though not complete) answer to the question what a man is. In contrast 
to that the (logical) dependence of quality to substance cannot be called 
content-based, because the substance does not play the role of the genus 
in the definition of the quality, i.e. “a substance” is not an appropriate 
answer to the question what quality is. If this reconstruction of her 
thesis is correct, the present study completely agrees with her claims.298
Still, one has to disagree with the claim of the denial of logical pri-
ority of substance to other beings and the claim that the “content” of 
the focal item is “irrelevant” for pros hen relations (cf. p. 274 and also 
273, 263, 264). It is true that it is not stated by Aristotle how the content 
of the focal reference (e.g. health) influences or determines the content 
of the related items (e.g. a healthy item), but this does not make the 
296 Cf. my remarks about Owen’s reductive translation at the end of the first paragraph 
of 6.1.1.1.
297 Cf. especially p. 275. She assumes that Owen’s reductive translation implies that enti-
ties which belong to one of the non-substantial categories must be defined as having sub-
stance as their genus. 
298 She is seriously worried about the reduction of non-substantial categories to the cate-
gory of substance, which she ascribes to Owen (I doubt that this is Owen’s proposal, however, 
I agree that Owen’s thesis of reductive translation might be misleading especially if one 
focuses (as she does) on his statement that “non-substances are no more than the logical 
shadows of substances” Owen (1960: 180)).
content e.g. the definition of health irrelevant for the pros hen relations. 
To understand the definition of something healthy one needs to under-
stand the definition of health and to understand the definition of a 
non-substance, one must understand the definition of the kind of sub-
stance it belongs to. 
She does discuss the different ways in which things can be defined. 
Her distinction between content-neutral and content-based defini-
tions appears to be analogous to the distinction between genus – dif-
ferentia definitions and those of things that are defined by addition – 
ἐκ προςθέςεως (cf. Met. VII.4 and 5, 1031a1-4). Non-substances (e.g. 
healthy things) are defined not by genus and differentia but by addition – 
ἐκ προςθέςεως. This kind of definition, if, as Aristotle argues, it should 
be considered a definition at all, is different from the genus-and- 
differentia-mode of definition. So far, it is not evident how they differ. 
As stated above, the former could be considered content-neutral while 
the latter needs to be considered content-based. However, since in both 
definitions, there is logical priority of some sort, one cannot determine 
anything that is part of that definition as irrelevant. The mere fact that 
there is a difference in the way species depend on their genera and the 
way focally related items depend on the focal reference does not dis-
qualify the latter cases from involving logical priority or posteriority at 
all. Senfrin-Weis’s distinction between content-based, i.e. kath hen and 
non-content-based, i.e. pros hen unification lays the ground for a distinc-
tion of two different kinds of logical priority even though she does not 
draw the distinction. This has also been noticed by Devereux (p. 292) 
who suggests one could call them “intra-generic” and “inter-generic” 
logical dependence. Within normal genus-species relations, the logical 
priority of the genus to the species is hence called intra-generic, whereas 
this is not possible for the focal reference of pros hen relation. Although 
Devereux rejects that the definitional dependence of a non-substance to 
substance cannot be content-free, one can admit a certain kind of “con-
tent freedom”, i.e. assuming that “content-free” here means nothing but 
being free of unification by a specific genus. This presumably deviates 
from Senfrin-Weis’s notion of “content” in this context. For a thorough 
discussion of the various ways content figures in the different examples 
of the PHR please be referred to Devereux’s commentary p. 292ff. 
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6.1.1.5 On Shields’s CDH2-4
As Aristotle does not provide a rigorous theory or a detailed list of 
criteria, scholars attempt to supplement “missing” criteria. In the fol-
lowing, I discuss Shields’s approach in detail, which attempts to aid in 
specifically this respect.
Discarding improper pros hen cases from proper cases: Aristotle 
states in Met. IV.2, 1003a34-b1 that all healthy things are related to 
health. I agree with Shields (1999: 107) that, although Aristotle does 
not discuss this matter, there may be borderline cases of “healthy”, i.e. 
cases which are hard to classify. Shields offers the examples of “healthy 
salary” and “healthy appetite”. He suggests that although one could 
construct an awkward relation to health, those attempts would estab-
lish an artificial and unintended connection. I think Shields associates 
one apparent difficulty with these cases, and it is one Aristotle is aware 
of.299 It is unwarranted to assume that focal connection ranges over all 
ways of using the same term. Of the entirety of ways in which a single 
term may be used, there may be a partial multiplicity that is focally con-
nected, while there may be other uses lacking this connection. Even if 
there was some kind of association between the groups of the focally 
connected and other uses, as it is the case in the examples of healthy 
salary and healthy appetite, it is not necessary that a PHR underlies 
this association. Instead, these cases may be connected analogically. 
Moreover, these cases could be spurious homonyms or those that were 
addressed as weak non-accidental cases in section 3.4.1.1.
In order to distinguish proper cases of focal connection from 
improper cases, Shields intends to find appropriate criteria that enable 
us to discard improper cases. Unfortunately, Aristotle primarily works 
with examples to convey which cases have a PHR and which do not. 
Shields discusses the PHR in the first part of his book called “hom-
onymy as such”. One of the varieties of homonymy he distinguishes he 
calls “core-dependent homonymy” (CDH). Under this heading, he dis-
cusses polysemous multivocity cases connected by a PHR. In his efforts 
to define CDH, he presents four definitions, which improve successively. 
His main efforts concern the adequacy of the sought definition. Let us 
299 Aristotle’s example of δύναμις in geometry applies to Shields’s worry. 
consider his second definition CDH2 since this one is the key element 
of his discussion:
“CDH2: x and y are homonymously in a core-dependent way F iff: (i) they 
have their name in common, (ii) their definitions do not completely over-
lap, and (iii) there is a single source to which they are related.” Shields 
(1999: 106)
All of Shields’s definitions are based on the assumption that the core 
itself is one of the Fs although this is not the case in the standard exam-
ples for the PHR, i.e. the healthy-things, which are related to health. 
There is no primary application of the term “healthy” in the same way 
there is one for the term “friendship”.300 In general, the PHR is not a 
theory about primary and secondary applications of terms.301 Although 
the friendship-example allows a distinction of primary and secondary 
applications this must not become a condition in the definition of the 
PHR as in some cases there is no primary application.302
Shields calls his CDH2 “profligate” since it is open towards “dummy 
relations”, which necessarily need to be avoided.303 In addition, he is 
aware that everything is related to everything in some way and thus any 
homonym will stand in some relation to a core homonym. Because of 
this, Shields assumes that the appropriate account of CDH will depend 
on how the third condition, i.e. CDH2 (iii) unfolds.
300 Healthy things are related to health, beings to substance, medical things to medicine 
(or the medic). In those examples, the focal reference itself is not one of the Fs. Shields (1999: 
125 n. 150) notices that his approaches are all based on this assumption and states that this 
is not a problem as such and offers a reformulation. However, the third condition within 
the reformulation he offers appears to become irrelevant since the causal relationship is 
not supposed to hold between focally related entities, but between the focal reference and 
the focally related entities. Thus, his definitions work well only for those examples that I 
will call friendship-examples. This is a kind of example I will define in the section 6.1.2. In 
those cases the focal reference itself is one of the Fs.
301 A claim that is similar but not identical to the view proposed by Hamlyn (1977).
302 Because of that, basically all of Shields accounts that start with “(i) there is some core 
instance of being F” address only examples that exhibit the friendship-structure. In the 
case of health-examples, there is no core instance of being F, because the core of the Fs is 
not necessarily privileged way of being F. 
303 He refers to the case of the healthy salary. Cf. Shields (1999: 107) for other examples. 
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He suggests defining a relation R to unfold CDH2 (iii) properly. R is 
a relation that all focally related entities bear to the focal reference in 
addition to focally related entities (i) bearing the same name and (ii) 
overlapping in their definition. R is supposed to be asymmetrical and 
open-ended.304 His specification of R results in a causal analysis of the 
relation between the focal reference and the focally related entities.305 
In the most general way, he calls it “four-causal core primacy” (FCCP).306 
FCCP claims that each focally related entity stands in one of the four 
causal relations to the focal reference. In contrast to Shields, I do not 
see how the text justifies such a causal analysis. I think the causal anal-
ysis is a good neo-Aristotelian theory but not Aristotle’s. Shields tries 
to justify this approach by showing that the focal connection in stan-
dard examples of the PHR all exhibit one or the other of the four causal 
relations. Shields “rewrites” or “translates” Aristotle’s examples into a 
form making the specific cause becomes more obvious. He claims what 
is “productive of health” is “standing in an efficient causal relation to 
health”. Thus “the scalpel counts as ‘medical’ not because it is related by 
an efficient cause to medicine, but because its function is given by the 
role it plays in medical practice” (Shields (1999: 111). 
FCCP (four-causal-core-primacy) apparently works fine with these 
two examples. Shields admits that often it is not evident in which of 
the four causal relations something stands, e.g. in the case of “being a 
sign of health”, or “preserving health”. This may be considered a flaw of 
the theory, but Shields faces this challenge and is convinced that also 
these examples are compatible with his explanatory pattern. Though 
the approach of FCCP works fine for final and efficient causes, it falters 
in the case of the material cause307 and even more in the case of formal 
causation. The reason is that formal causation seems to require, or be 
304 “Open-ended” means here that R must admit new instances of non-core homonyms.
305 A causal analysis of the PHR is a common suggestion. Shields refers for this to Cajetan. 
Ward (2008) adopts Shields’s approach of causal analysis. 
306 Shields (1999: 111ff.) provides a reformulation of a claim made by Cajetan and calls 
it “Cajetan’s proposal” “FCCP: Necessarily, if (i) a is F and b is F, (ii) F-ness is associatively 
homonymous in these applications, and (iii) a is a core instance of F-ness, then b’s being F 
stands in one of the four causal relations to a’s being F”. Shields agrees with the aim of this 
approach and tries to defend this claim in the following pages.
307 Cf. Shields (1999: 114). 
the basis of synonymy since in the case of formal causation x’s being 
F is the cause of y’s being F only if both are synonymously F. Thus, no 
multivocity could be explained by the formal causal relation. Neverthe-
less, Shields tries to rescue the case of formal causation. He assumes that 
formal causation as described above is too narrow. His strategy is to 
show that not every case of formal causation implies synonymy. In that 
way, he wants to show that FCCP also works for these cases. 
For his explanation, he needs to go far afield. It is based on an inter-
pretation of the way in which Aristotle describes the perception of form 
without its matter as described in the DA II.12. In the case of perception, 
Aristotle adheres to a thesis, I will call the assimilation thesis. It is a thesis 
about the organs of perception and their relation to the objects of per-
ception. The organs of perception acquire or assimilate to the qualities 
of the perceived objects. According to Aristotle’s theory of sense percep-
tion, the sensory faculties can receive the form of the perceived object 
without their matter (Shields refers to DA II.12, 424a18-24, 424a32-b3, 
III.2, 425b23, III.8, 431b28-432a2). It is a matter of a longstanding debate 
what this means exactly. There are dozens of views on this, but here a 
distinction of two might suffice: 
Highly simplified, there are literal interpretations and allegorical 
interpretations.308 The literal view assumes that the eye that perceives a 
colour “literally” becomes red. In that case, it has often been proposed 
that the eye exemplifies redness just like the perceived object exempli-
fies redness. The allegorical view assumes that there is “some other kind” 
of affection involved, i.e. the eye acquires the form of redness without 
itself literally becoming red, i.e. without exemplifying redness. In order 
308 Usually, the alternatives are called literalism and spiritualism. For an overview on that 
debate see Caston, V. (2004). The Spirit and the Letter: Aristotle on Perception. In Meta-
physics, Soul and Ethics: Themes From the Work of Richard Sorabji, ed. Ricardo Salles, 245–
320. Moreover, Caston proposes an alternative called “the analogical reading (p. 299). The 
main participants in this debate are Sorabji, R. (1974). Body and Soul in Aristotle. In Philo-
sophy 49 (187): 63–89 and Burnyeat, M. (1992). Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still 
Credible? (A Draft). In Essays on Aristotle’s de Anima, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie 
Oksenberg Rorty, 15–26. Castons interpretation is also picked up by Johnstone, M. A. (2012). 
Aristotle on Odour and Smell. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43: 143–183. A similar 
view is found in Bolton, R. (2005). Perception Naturalized in Aristotle‘s de Anima. In Meta-
physics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes From the Work of Richard Sorabji, ed. 
Ricardo Salles.
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to denominate what the eye does instead, it has become quite usual to 
speak of encoding. In that case, the eye encodes redness without exem-
plifying it.309 
With this explanation in the background, Shields claims to have 
found a way to deny that formal causation always implies synonymy. 
One has to assume therefore, that the red object and the eye that per-
ceives it are not synonymously red. According to Shields’s approach 
to the relation of synonymy and homonymy, the denial of synonymy 
implies homonymy.310 This distinction in the background enables 
Shields to suggest that in Aristotle’s theory of perception, there is a sort 
of formal causation according to which the red eye and the red object 
are homonyms. Since the eye encodes but does not exemplify redness 
whereas the red object exemplifies and encodes redness, he infers, they 
are homonymously red (and thus formal causation itself is said in many 
ways311). He concludes that “It is, consequently, possible for a’s being F to 
be a formal cause of b’s being F, even while a and b are homonymously 
F” Shields (1999: 117). 
There are several things to be criticised. Firstly, Shields admits that 
no textual evidence confirms this thesis, i.e. that the object of perception 
and the perceiver are homonymously F which would support his the-
ory. Secondly, and this is a vital error, he concludes that some non-core 
homonyms (focally related entities) stand in formal causal relationship 
to core homonyms (focal references), even though he has not shown 
why the homonymy of “red” in the given example qualifies as core- 
dependent homonymy at all. He does not address the issue of logically 
priority between these cases, which is required by the PHR. However, 
this step is crucial since even in Shields own terminology there is not 
just one sort of associated homonymy, there are non-core, associated 
homonymy and the analogical cases of associated homonymy, moreover 
309 Cf. for exemplifying and encoding Shields, C. (1995). Intentionality and Isomorphism 
in Aristotle. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 11: 307–330. 
There are several reasons to prefer the latter option as there are exceptions to the assim-
ilation thesis. Most obivous this is in the case of haptics. The flesh, which is the sensory 
organ in that case does not acquire the sensory qualities literally speaking, i.e. it does not 
become soft or solid.
310 This is not the case in the DefH-view, or the tertium quid-view.
311 Cf. Shields (1999: 116 n. 140; 117). 
discrete, non-accidental homonyms, i.e. those that were called spurious 
homonyms above. Shields does not explain why the example of the red 
object and the red in the eye disqualifies from falling into one of these 
cases. Nothing prevents to determine this case as different from the man 
in the mirror image and the real man or the dead and the living thing. 
To show that formal causation is not sufficient for synonymy, Shields 
could also refer to the DA II.12. There is the example of the golden 
seal and the wax to illustrate how the form is transferred. Although 
one would call the imprint in the wax “golden seal”, it is clear that the 
imprint is not synonymously the “golden seal”, but homonymously. This 
example avoids the difficulties connected with Shields’s reference to the 
theory of perception and its complications. Nevertheless, showing that 
this case of formal causation does not imply synonymy is one task, and 
it is yet another task to show that the homonymy, in that case, is core- 
dependent homonymy, even if synonymy and homonymy are mutually 
exclusive, as Shields proposes. The case of the wax and the seal may 
also qualify as a spurious homonym, even according to Shields’s own 
description, i.e. that sometimes by custom or courtesy things bear the 
same name. Another explanation of their non-core dependence could 
be given by Shields’s account of functional determination (FD).312 Since 
the golden seal can be used to seal things, it is clear that the imprint is 
not a golden seal in the same sense since it cannot seal things. It might 
not be a golden seal at all, just like the dead man is not a man at all. If 
that is true, then Shields’s account of functional determination demon-
strates that the kind of formal causation that does not imply synonymy 
implies (discrete/ accidental) homonymy. The sort of formal causation 
here disqualifies this case from core-dependence, despite its intention 
to qualify it. I consider this a serious flaw of the adequacy of FCCP. 
Because of all this, I disagree with Shields’s (1999: 118) assessment 
that “FCCP grows naturally out of Aristotle’s own illustrations of core- 
dependent homonymy”. The endorsement of this claim is tied to a com-
plicated string of additional hermeneutic assumptions, not all of which 
can be accepted. In general, one can criticise this approach since Aris-
312 As quoted earlier: “FD: An individual x will belong to a kind or class F iff: x can per-
form the function of that kind or class.” Shields (1999: 33).
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totle’s theory of causality itself is too opaque to be effectively illuminat-
ing in this context. 
As a next step, Shields improves CDH2 by integrating the allegedly 
successful FCCP. It is added to determine the relevant R. With this 
step, Shields intends to screen unwanted relations. His third definition 
CDH3313 can explain with reference to FCCP why river banks and sav-
ing banks are no core-dependent homonyms: “even if all savings banks 
stand in the non-contingent relation ‘being within five hundred miles 
of ’ a river. For though a genuine relation, ‘being within five hundred 
miles of ’ is not an instance of any one of the four causes.”314 Another 
example that can be rejected is the healthy salary or the healthy appe-
tite.315 He asserts that neither of these stands in one of the four causal 
relations to health, and thus, they do not qualify as core-dependent 
homonyms. 
The latter example also reveals how open-endedness is a “virtue”.316 
If it turns out that a particular healthy appetite is somehow causally 
related to health, then it is a core-dependent homonym. Whilst Shields 
calls this a virtue, it also is a vice. The open-endedness of FCCP reopens 
the doors for sham relations. If we find a way in which the healthy appe-
tite indeed is causally related to the health of our body, it will reenter 
the class of things that are pros hen related. As we have seen that a cer-
tain difficulty may be attributed to assigning one of the four causes to 
the examples given by Aristotle, the open-endedness of FCCP obstructs 
its initial intention, i.e. to determine R. Some of Aristotle’s examples 
seem to fit this pattern only by shoehorning them through very creative 
translation processes that emphasise the causal relation to the core.317 
313 “CDH3: a and b are homonymously F in a core-dependent way iff: (i) they have their 
name in common, (ii) their definitions do not completely overlap, and (iii) necessarily, if 
a is a core instance of F-ness, then b’s being F stands in one of the four causal relations to 
a‘s being F.” Shields (1999: 119). 
314 Shields (1999: 119).
315 Shields (1999: 107; 119).
316 Cf. Shields (1999: 119).
317 “being a sign of health” has been mentioned by Shields as one of the cases that at least 
not obviously fits into the scheme of FCCP, but nevertheless is supposed to fit. The prob-
lem in this case is that FCCP fails to do its job, i.e. to clarify R. 
I think FCCP tries to systematise an area, which in this way was not 
systematised by Aristotle.
The last step of Shields’s attempt to define the PHR contains a further 
problem. Shields improves CDH3 by adding a principle of ordering. He 
refers to Cat. 12 and the distinction between the five kinds of priority 
in that chapter. He assumes that the fifth kind of priority (Cat. 12, 
14b11ff.) is relevant for CDH. This type of priority holds between two 
things, which reciprocate as regards implications of existence, wherein 
the existence of one of them is caused by the other. The example Aris-
totle uses is of the true proposition that Socrates is white and Socrates’s 
actual being white. Those two things reciprocate as regards implication 
of existence, but it is clear that Socrates’s being white is the cause of the 
truth of the proposition, whereas the truth of the proposition is not the 
cause of Aristotle being white.318 Shields proposes that this type of pri-
ority also holds between the core and non-core instances. He states that 
“Core and non-core homonyms may reciprocate as regards implication 
of existence, even though core homonyms are responsible for the exis-
tence of non-core homonyms in a way that non-core homonyms are 
not responsible for the existence of the core cases.” Shields (1999: 124). 
This insight leads to his fourth and final account of CDH:
“CDH4: a and b are homonymously F in a core-dependent way iff: 
(i) they have their name in common, (ii) their definitions do not com-
pletely overlap, (iii) necessarily, if a is a core instance of F-ness, then b’s 
being F stands in one of the four causal relations to a’s being F, and (iv) 
a’s being F is asymmetrically responsible for the existence of b’s being 
F” Shields (1999: 124). 
No textual evidence explicitly draws the connection of the fifth sort 
of priority of Cat. 12. In light of the following passage, the direction of 
the asymmetrical relation appears to be opposed to Shields’s suggestion. 
I referred to this passage earlier, i.e. within the discussion of Hamlyn’s 
proposal.
Met. XII.3, 1070a22-24: ὅτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνει ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος, τότε καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἔστιν
for when the man is healthy, then also health 
exists
318 Cf. also Met. ix.10, 1051b6-8. 
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According to this passage, health does not exist prior to the healthy 
man. On the contrary, the combination of ὅτε and τότε usually has 
a temporal but no conditional connotation. Accordingly, one should 
expect that health exists posterior to the healthy man. The context of 
this passage is found suggests that they exist simultaneously. Neverthe-
less, the formulation indicates that a healthy man is the cause of there 
being health. If this is true, the fourth condition of CDH4 would not 
determine health as the core instance but the healthy man, which clearly 
contradicts Shields’s assessments.
This could have been avoided if Shields’s approach focused on the 
asymmetry given by the logical priority of the focal reference, which 
is well-documented in many passages. This type of priority yields the 
asymmetry Shields sought. Thus, it is not necessary to introduce a sense 
of priority into the definition of CDH, i.e. the fifth sense of Cat. 12 that 
seems unrelated to any of the passages where Aristotle provides infor-
mation on the PHR. Even if the priority of Cat. 12 actually applies to 
each relation of core and non-core instances in a core-dependent hom-
onymy relation, the priority of CDH4 (iv) is not on target in any of 
Aristotle’s remarks on the relationship of these cases. Because of this, 
this condition is not Aristotle’s. As stated earlier, one may consider it 
a neo-Aristotelian extension of the PHR, i.e. a condition that requires 
further metaphysical assumptions such as explicit assumptions about 
an existential priority order. But no textual evidence urges to integrate 
this notion of priority into a reconstruction of Aristotle’s notion of the 
PHR. In addition, Shields proposes the existential priority order in the 
wrong direction, at least when it comes to examples other than sub-
stances and non-substances. 
Shields’s whole approach of CDH4 (iv) is remarkably similar to Ham-
lyn’s proposition to showing that the focal reference is prior in existence 
to the focally related entities. I think both attempts fail as they were 
assuming that existential priority is an essential feature of the PHR as 
such. In the case of “being”, the focal reference is prior in existence to 
the focally related entities, but this priority has to be scrutinised sepa-
rate from the PHR. 
To conclude, Shields’s FCCP does not hold for formal causes. More-
over, a causal analysis of the relation between focal reference and focally 
related entities is not based on textual evidence. In addition, the sort of 
priority (Cat. 12, 14b11ff.) he integrates into the definition of the CDH 
works only properly for a single application of the PHR, namely its 
application to “being”. It seems that Shields disregards that logical pri-
ority does not imply any sort of existential priority. As stated earlier319, 
according to Met. XIII.2, 1077b1-7 it is not necessary that they occur 
together. 
6.1.2 The Pros Hen Relation – An Analysis of  
EE VII.2
In Aristotle, there is no rigorous definition of the PHR. In an attempt 
to understand this notion and its impact, one has to choose a synoptic 
approach to collect information about it. Its most important application, 
i.e. to being, is found in the Metaphysics IV. In that book, the PHR also 
unfolds its most significant impact, i.e. its role for the foundation of a 
science of being. Nevertheless, there is a more elucidating passage about 
the nature of the PHR in EE VII.2. We have seen that many contributions 
on the notion of pros hen are coined by an intense focus on Met. IV.2, 
its application to being, and the role of the PHR for the establishment 
of non-generic sciences. But, although the PHR is most prominent for 
its role as a principle of unity for the science of being, I doubt the PHR 
“was created” solely for that purpose (as Senfrin-Weis (2009) suggests 
it). Aristotle presents it, presumably the first time,320 in the context of a 
discussion on different kinds of friendship in EE VII.2:
319 In the discussion of Hamlyn (1977). 
320 According to Owen’s (1960) developmental approach. Cf. also Brakas (2011). 
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EE VII.2, 1236a16-22: ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία 
φιλίας εἴδη εἶναι, καὶ [1] μήτε καθ’ ἓν 
ἁπάσας μηδ’ ὡς εἴδη ἑνὸς γένους, [2] 
μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως. [3] 
πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρώ-
την, [4] ὥσπερ τὸ ἰατρικόν. καὶ <γὰρ> 
ψυχὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ 
ὄργανον καὶ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τὸ 
πρῶτον. [5] πρῶτον δ’ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐν 
πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει. [6] οἷον ὄργανον 
ἰατρικὸν, ᾧ ἂν ὁ ἰατρὸς χρήσαιτο· [7] 
ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἰατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν 
ὁ τοῦ ὀργάνου.
Necessarily there are three kinds of friendship, [1] 
neither they are all <synonymously> one, i.e. (μηδ’ 
explicative) they are not species of one genus, [2] 
nor are they said altogether homonymously. [3] For 
they are said related to one particular <kind of 
friendship> that is primary, [4] like <what is called> 
medical. For we call a medical soul and a <medical> 
body a <medical> instrument and operation, but 
ordinarily (κυρίως) the first. [5] The primary <is 
that> of which the definition is contained in all. [6] 
As the instrument is medical in consequence of the 
use of a medic: [7] in the definition of the medic 
<the definition of> the instrument is not included.
EE VII.2, 1237b9 αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ 
πρώτη φιλία, ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν· 
αἱ δ’ἄλλαι δι’ αὐτὴν καὶ δοκοῦσι καὶ 
ἀμφισβητοῦνται.
[8] This, then, is the primary friendship, the one 
everybody agrees upon. The other <kinds> are 
considered and questioned <as kinds of friend-
ship> based on it.
EE VII.2, 1238a30-31 ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη 
φιλία, καὶ δι’ ἣν αἱ ἄλλαι λέγονται, ἡ 
κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐστί.
[9] The primary friendship, i.e. the one in virtue 
of which the others are called <friendship>, is the 
one that corresponds to virtue. 
These passages contain lots of information on the notion of pros hen.321 
The example in these passages is friendship. Aristotle assumes three 
kinds (εἴδη) of friendship322, which are somehow related. The explana-
tion of their relationship is made in three clear assertions [1], [2], [3] 
followed by an example analogous to the friendship example at [4], 
from which we can gather important characteristics given in [5], [6] 
and [7] about the PHR: 
[1] The kinds of friendship are not said all according to one – καθ’ ἓν.323 
In this context “καθ’ ἓν” means “synonymously”.324 Here, “καθ’ ἓν” re-
321 Cf. also EE VII.2, 1236b20-27 to this passage. The same example including ὑγιεινὸν 
can be found in Met. VI.2, 1003a33-b10. Cf. for the ἰατρικὸν and similar examples also Met. 
VII.4, 1030a34-b3, XI.3, 1060b36-a6, also MM II.11.15.6ff.
322 EE VII.2, 1236a13-14: One based on virtue, one on utility, one on pleasure.
323 A similar occurrence of καθ’ ἓν is also found in EE VII.2, 1236b23.
324 For the assumption of the identity of καθ’ ἓν and synonymy cf. Top. VI.10, 148a29-33: 
ἡ δὲ ζωὴ οὐ καθ‘ ἓν εἶδος δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ἀλλ‘ ἑτέρα μὲν τοῖς ζῴοις ἑτέρα δὲ τοῖς φυτοῖς 
ὑπάρχειν. ἐνδέχεται μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν οὕτως ἀποδοῦναι τὸν ὅρον ὡς συνωνύμου 
καὶ καθ’ ἓν εἶδος πάσης τῆς ζωῆς λεγομένης – It seems, also “life” is not said in accordance 
with one form, but that there are different <forms of life> for animals and different for plants. 
It is possible, however, to assign on purpose – κατὰ προαίρεσιν the definition of all so-called 
animals in such a way, as of <something> synonymous and [or: ‘i.e.’] according to one form. 
ceives the additional qualification by the explicative μηδ’, which adds 
that the three kinds of friendship are not species of one common genus. 
If they were species of a common genus, it would turn out that the three 
kinds of friendship are synonymously called friendship. This is explic-
itly denied here. There is no common genus for the different kinds of 
friendship as there was the genus birds for the different species of birds.
[2] I addressed this passage and the relevance of πάμπαν already 
in section 2.4, where I suggested that πάμπαν can be interpreted not 
as meaning “wholly” or “entirely” but as meaning “altogether” in the 
sense of “collectively”. In this way, πάμπαν does not insinuate a more 
comprehensive notion of homonymy. Then, this passage only states that 
in combination with [1] friendship is neither said synonymously nor 
homonymously. I take this remark to be on par with the interpretation 
of EE VII.2, 1236b23-26 as given above in section 3.4.1.2. 
[3] The particle γάρ indicates that an explanation follows: Aristotle 
qualifies the relationship between the different kinds of friendship by 
pointing out that they are related to a primary -πρώτην kind of friend-
ship. By [1], it is clear that this relationship is different from a genus-spe-
cies relation. The exact difference remains unclear.
[4] In order to explain the relation of the primary to the deriva-
tive with a more familiar example, Aristotle refers to the medical – τὸ 
ἰατρικόν. A knife may be medical because it can be used in a medical 
operation or simply by a medic – ἰατρὸς, who in this passage can be 
identified as the focal reference for all medical things.325 Still, it is not 
clear (i) whether the medic is primary because it is itself medical and 
that in a primary way, or (ii) whether it is sufficient that the medic is 
primary because the definition belongs – ὑπάρχει to the definitions of 
all medical things, which are paronymously called like the primary, or 
(iii) whether both are necessary. There are reasons arguing for both 
325 In other places, the focal reference of medical-things seems to be medicine – ἰατρική 
and not the medic. Cf. Met. XI.3, 1061a1-5 and Met. IV.2, 1003b1: τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικήν. 
In English, it may seem that according to these passages there is a primary application of 
 “medical” just as there is a primary application of “friendship”, but as the passage of Met. 
IV.2 shows the names are paronymously related also in that case. The flexibility of the 
focal reference in the medical-example does not violate the difference of friendship- and 
health-examples which I describe in the following lines.
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being possible but not for both being necessary. Some other examples 
do require a distinction. In the case of the medical things, the focal 
reference is the medic, since it is the medic that is addressed in the 
definition of the other things, but it does not seem necessary that the 
medic itself is medical in some primary way. This is different in the case 
of friendship. The primary friendship is also contained in the defini-
tion of the other friendships, but the primary friendship is also called 
“friendship” in a primary way. In the case of “being”, both are possible. 
The focal reference is not called “being” but “substance”, yet it is also 
what is called “being” primarily and simply without qualification (Met. 
VII.1, 1028a31-32: ὥστε τὸ πρώτως ὂν καὶ οὐ τὶ ὂν ἀλλ’ ὂν ἁπλῶς ἡ οὐσία 
ἂν εἴη). Hence, these three different cases need to be distinguished. I 
pick this up again later in this section.
[5] This part tells us something about the focal reference, i.e. how it 
is connected to the dependent cases: [5] Primary is that thing of which 
the definition exists in all – πρῶτον δ’ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει.326 In 
a way, this is a response to the question raised in [4], opting for (ii), but 
thereby not excluding (i). Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear what is 
meant by “ὑπάρχει”: Also, the definition of a genus ὑπάρχει – belongs to 
or is exists in all of its species (Cat. 2a16-17; An. Pr. 25a13). In related pas-
sages, instead of ὑπάρχειν, one also finds the related terms ἐνυπάρχειν 
and ἔχειν. The occurrences of these terms are connected to the pros hen 
application to being in Met. VII.1, 1028a35-36: ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἑκάστου 
λόγῳ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἐνυπάρχειν – it is necessary that in the definition 
of each <being> the definition of the substance is included. Similarly, in 
Met. IX.1, 1045b31: πάντα γὰρ ἕξει τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον – for all things 
have/contain the definition of the substance. Also for potency 1046a15-16: 
for in all those definitions the definition of the first potency is included – 
ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστι πᾶσι τοῖς ὅροις ὁ τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως λόγος. 
326 I follow the conjecture of Bonitz and Susemihl to read πᾶσιν instead of ἡμῖν. A passage, 
which may be cited in favour of this conjecture is found in Met. ix.1, 1045b31: πάντα γὰρ 
ἕξει τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον. In this context all – πάντα derivative notions of being have to 
contain the primary one i.e. τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον – the definition of the substance. A further 
passage may be found in MM 1.1.12.5: The common element exists in all and is therefore not 
identical to the independent <Form> – τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἐν ἅπασιν ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστιν δὴ ταὐτὸν 
τῷ χωριστῷ. Moreover, MM 1.1.12.7 / MM I.1, 1182b11ff.
I assume these passages essentially agree although a different vocab-
ulary is applied to (presumably) state the same thoughts. The defini-
tion of the focal reference is part of the definition of the focally related 
entities. This may be confirmed by [7] where the contrary of ὑπάρχειν 
can be identified as “not being in”.327 From passage [1] we learn that 
the focally related entities do not belong to a common genus. Thus the 
focal reference which exists in the definition of all focally related enti-
ties cannot exist in or belong to (ὑπάρχει) them as a genus. This is how 
the focal reference and the focally related entities are related. I identify 
this relation as priority in λόγος – account/definition.328
[6] Here, Aristotle tells us what it is to be medical for an instru-
ment. Before, it was only indicated that there needs to be a relation 
to the medic, but now it is made explicit. In the phrase “οἷον ὄργανον 
ἰατρικὸν, ᾧ ἂν ὁ ἰατρὸς χρήσαιτο”, one should read “ἰατρικὸν” predica-
tively to highlight the aspect correctly: “e.g. an instrument <would be 
something> medical – ἰατρικὸν, in consequence of (ᾧ) the use by a 
medic.” This is a paradigmatic explanation since we can construe muta-
tis mutandis accounts for the other cases, e.g. the ἔργον – action is 
something ἰατρικὸν – medical if a medic does it. It is most important to 
realise that by comparison of the definitions of the medical action and 
the medical instrument and possibly other cases an underlying com-
monality can be revealed, namely a reference to the same thing, i.e. the 
medic. By this comparison, the primary notion is identified, since this is 
the one, which belongs to – ὑπάρχει329 all derivative cases, while accord-
ing to [7] the derivative notions will not be – οὐκ ἔστιν in the primary.
[7] Knowing that the derivative cases are not in the definition of 
the primary while the primary is in or belongs to the definition of the 
derivatives, we know that the relation between the two definitions is 
asymmetrical. Because of this, the focal reference and the definition of 
the focal reference is called prior to the derivative ones. As stated ear-
327 From the phrase [7] 1236a22: ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἰατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ὀργάνου – in 
the definition of the medic <the definition of> the instrument is not included.
328 Cf. Met. XIII.2, 1077b3-4; Met. VII.1, 1028a34-36 and the remarks to [7] and section 
6.2. Remotely related are: Met. VII.10, 1034b31-32 and 1035b3-14. 
329 Cf. the remarks on [5]: In Met. IX.1, 1045b31 Aristotle uses is kept in – ἕξει instead of 
ὑπάρχει and in Met. VII.1, 1028a36 he uses is contained in – ἐνυπάρχειν.
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lier, this priority is priority in account or definition. A standard example 
for this relation are the following: The acute is defined as smaller than 
the right angle – ἐλάττων γὰρ ὀρθῆς ἡ ὀξεῖα (example from Met. VII.10, 
1035b8). The definition of the right angle is part of the definition of the 
acute and hence prior in definition. However, Aristotle states nowhere 
that the acute is pros hen related to the right angle. Neither does he in 
the following case: Thunder is defined as the extinction of fire in the 
clouds.330 Surely, the parts of the definition describing the fire or the 
clouds are prior in definition to thunder, because they are in or belong 
to the definition of thunder, but thunder surely is not pros hen related 
to those things. Thus, priority in definition is necessary for the PHR, 
whilst it is not sufficient for it.331 
[8] It is not entirely clear whether Aristotle states here that the pri-
mary kind of friendship he is talking about coincides with the one 
everyone agrees upon or whether the primary form of friendship should 
be the one everyone agrees on. It does not seem likely that any primary 
point of reference is primary because people recognise it as primary. 
Rather it seems to be likely that one agrees upon this kind of friend-
ship as primary because it is δι’ αὐτὴν – the one by which the others are 
friendships. Another thought on this is the following: Aristotle’s discus-
sion of the different kinds of friendships apparently explains a state of 
affairs that did not have or did not require an explanation before. Let us 
assume that the different kinds of friendships are ordered axiologically 
and that this axiological order is agreed upon by everyone. Friendship 
based on virtue is more valuable than other friendships for several rea-
sons. If we assume that this is a simple fact of common knowledge, then 
Aristotle’s discussion of the different kinds of friendship provides us 
with a good explanation for the priority of this kind of friendship, which 
goes beyond the axiological convention, i.e. the occurrence of the first 
friendship in the definitions of other kinds of friendships. 
The last remark [9] states that the subordinate friendships derive their 
name from the primary. Thus, it is not a coincidence that they bear the 
same name. However, as other examples have shown, e.g. the health- 
330 An. Post. II.8, 93b8f., similarly Met. VII.17, 1041a25.
331 See the section on priority in a PHR. 
example, it is not always the case that the primary and the focally related 
entities bear the same name but bear paronymous names. But [9] does 
not exclude this possibility. For a similar remark regarding nomination 
cf. Met. IV.2, 1003b16-17. 
The analysis of these passages allows us to characterise the PHR as 
follows:
a. A PHR is not a genus-species-relation (from [1]) 
b. Pros hen related entities are not homonymously related (from [2]). 
c. Definitional containment: In a PHR, there is a common point of 
reference (from [3]), the “primary”, which is primary because its 
definition “belongs” to all derivative cases (from [5]), but the defi-
nition of the derivative cases is not in the definition of the proto-
type (from [7]). 
d. The prototype can be identified by comparison of the definitions 
(from [6]).
e. The prototype is the reason for the others being named so [from 9].
f. The derivatives either bear the same name as the prototype or a 
derivative one: as in friendship – φιλία or in medic – ἰατρὸς and 
ἰατρικόν – medical (from [4]).
These features represent what Aristotle tells us about the PHR in EE 
VII.2. No other place in the corpus contains a more detailed account 
of the PHR. Unfortunately, this is not a precise definition, but merely 
a conglomerate of features. A definition of the PHR would, therefore, 
need to import criteria that are not defined by Aristotle. Hence, any 
reconstruction of this association would rest upon presumptions.332 
While one has to appreciate the effort of intentionally precise accounts 
such as Shields’s CDH4 and Ferejohn’s definition, both of which are 
given above, it is clear that they do not rest upon something one could 
call “Aristotle’s definition” since this does not exist. Because of this, one 
has to agree with Owen, who puts it the following way:
332 There is another feature of the PHR that is not mentioned in this context. It is the 
function of the PHR to feature as principle of unity of sciences. A feature that is developed 
not until Met. IV. Cf. section 8. 
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“Aristotle has not solved the problem of defining focal meaning fully and 
exactly so as to give that idea all the philosophical power that he comes to 
claim for it: he has given only the necessary, not the sufficient, conditions 
for its use. But there is no reason to think that this problem can have a 
general answer. Aristotle’s evasion of it may come from the conviction that 
any answer would be artificial, setting boundaries that must be endlessly 
too wide or too narrow for his changing purposes.” Owen (1960: 189) 
Nevertheless, this does not mean one should stop investigating this 
notion: There is one feature in the list that has been widely neglected 
so far. Scrutinising the last point f), there are two different examples 
given in the passage, i.e. the friendship- and the health-example. While 
both examples are supposed to illustrate the same relationship, namely 
the PHR, they differ in some respect. Let us dissect the examples. It 
contains examples for the PHR, such as the medical- or the health- 
example, in which the primary and the derivatives are paronyms: for 
the medical, it is the medic – ἰατρός (or medicine333), for the healthy it is 
health.334 This is not the case for examples such as friendship. Here, the 
primary and the focally related entities share the same name. Because 
of this, the first kind of examples are paronymous,335 while in the sec-
ond case there is no paronymy between prototype and derivatives pos-
sible, but only polysemous multivocity. This influences the number of 
derivatives necessary to establish a PHR. In examples without paronymy 
(friendship-examples) it is not necessary, albeit possible, that there is 
more than one focally related entity. Why is this so? In examples with 
paronymy (health-examples), it is necessary that there is a multiplicity 
of derivatives (see the diagram below) because otherwise there would 
not be any case of multivocity and hence there would be nothing the 
PHR could explain. Medicine is prior to the medical things since it is 
the medicine that occurs in the definition of a multiplicity of medical 
things, which are all medical but not homonymously so. If there were 
no multiplicity, the relationship between the prototype and the focally 
333 Cf. Met. IV.2, 1003b1: τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικήν.
334 Met. IV.2, 1003a35: ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν.
335 Also in Met. IV.2, 1003b16-17 it seems likely that the following phrase οὗ τὰ ἄλλα 
ἤρτηται, καὶ δι‘ ὃ λέγονται amounts to paronymy. 
related entity would reduce to mere paronymy. Thus, it is clear that in 
order to establish a PHR, there must be a polysemous multivocity either 
between the primary and at least one derivative or between a multiplic-
ity of derivatives. Consequently, another aspect in which friendship- 
and healthy-examples differs concerns the “placement” of the poly-
semous multivocity. The following diagram illustrates the differences: 
friendship-cases medical-cases
PM { FR: friendship
PHR   
FR: medicine } Paronymy (or disparate)FRE1 (FRE2) FRE1, FRE2, FRE3, …
if more than one PM  
is also possible
 PM
“FR” abbreviates “focal reference”; “FRE” abbreviates “focally related 
entity”; “PM” abbreviates Polysemous Multivocity. As stated earlier, the 
medical-example can involve things such as an action or an instrument. 
Further, it has been said that it is the medic (or medicine), which is 
responsible for the names of the derivatives (e). This is not always the 
case since there is at least one counterexample, i.e. the σπουδαῖος – good/
excellent. Thus, there is the bracketed “or disparate” on the righthand 
side. As will be shown in the next section of the good/excellent there is 
not even paronymy between the alleged prototype and the derivatives.
In light of all these features of the PHR, I attempt to define it. The 
definitions will not include all the features mentioned above, but only 
those I consider essential. I agreed with Hamlyn (1977) that the PHR 
itself does not embrace a thesis about meanings or senses of words and 
their connection since the PHR holds between different sorts of enti-
ties, e.g. between different kinds of being healthy. These things lack 
generic unity. Nevertheless, they belong together for a specific reason. 
The principle of their unity is their shared relation to the same thing, i.e. 
the focal reference, which is identified by an analysis of the accounts 
of the focally related entities. Although all these things bear the same 
name, it is not necessary to determine the PHR as a theory of meanings 
or senses of words. The PHR is a principle of unity that could even be 
determined independently of any linguistic representation  it is primar-
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ily determined by definitional dependence among things, not words. 
I assume it is best conceived as a principle of unity alternative to generic 
unity and other forms of unity. One may even assume that the com-
monality in the name should not be considered a condition of the PHR, 
but a consequence of the real relationship between certain things.
I deem the PHR a principle that unifies a multiplicity of things. This 
multiplicity has certain characteristic features. These things bear the 
same name but are defined differently and they can belong to different 
categories. However, their definitions are not entirely but only partially 
different. It is crucial that there is one element in their definition that all 
things have in common. This thing either bears the same name as the 
other things (friendship-cases), or it bears a paronymous name (healthy 
cases). My attempt involves two definitions, one that covers friendship 
examples and one that covers healthy examples. 
Healthy cases: 
A multiplicity of F things is pros hen related iff (1) “F” is multivocal 
and (2) there is a common element in the definitions of the Fs. (3) 
the common element bears a name F* paronymous to “F”. 
Friendship cases: 
A multiplicity of F things is pros hen related iff (1) “F” is multivocal 
and (2) the definition of one of the Fs is non-reciprocally contained 
in the definitions of at least one other F. 
The first definition does not require the focal reference to be itself one of 
the Fs, whereas the second does require it. Another difference concerns 
the scope of these definitions. According to the first definition, the PHR 
holds between those things that are called F. I purposely formulated it 
this way. This formulation tries to reflect Aristotle’s assertion that all 
healthy-things are related to health – ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν (cf. Met. IV.2, 
1003a35). The focal reference is not a part of that multiplicity. According 
to the second definition, the focal reference is part of that multiplicity 
and in those cases, there is a primary application of the term “friend-
ship” while there is none in the case of “healthy” or at least none that 
signifies the focal reference “health”. 
These definitions are relatively simple. They do not tell us whether there 
must be some kind of causal relationship between the focal reference 
and the focally related entities.336 I prefer it this way since I assume that 
problematic cases such as spurious homonyms should be discarded not 
by specifying the conditions of the definition of PHR directly, as there 
is no textual basis for this, but instead by a clear theory about the way 
in which Aristotle defines things. As I argued in section 4, the man and 
the image of a man, which may both be called man are homonyms, and 
thus, they disqualify from being pros hen related since they lack over-
lap in definition.
6.1.3 Paronymy and the Pros Hen Relation
There is a close relationship between paronymy and the PHR, which has 
often been discussed.337 Revisiting the example of the medical – ἰατρικὸν, 
the “medical” means something like “of ” or “for a ἰατρός”. “Medical” is 
a paronym of the medic – ἰατρὸς.338 Furthermore, as stated in the last 
section that “everything”339 that is called “medical” is pros hen related 
to the medic. The same pertains to the example of health. The healthy – 
τὸ ὑγιεινὸν, is a paronym of health – ὑγεία and pros hen related to health 
(ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν).340 Naturally, at least in those cases, paronymy and 
the PHR occur together, which does not mean they are the same. This 
is corroborated by the terminological introduction of paronymy in 
Aristotle:
336 As discussed earlier (section 6.1.1.5), a causal relationship is required by Shields’s defia-
nitions of the PHR.
337 Cf. Oehler (1986: 197–200); Ross (1924); Krämer (1967). 
338 Or of medicine – ἰατρική. As mentioned earlier cf. Met. IV.2, 1003b1: τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς 
ἰατρικήν. In Met. XI.3, 1061a4 the focal reference of “medical” is the medical science as 
Aristotle states that what is called medical is called to ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἐπιστήμης.
339 As long as no exceptions are determined. 
340 Met. IV.2, 1003a35. Cf. For medical and healthy cf. also Met. XI.3, 1060b37-a7. Also 
cf. Patzig (1961: 192ff.) who emphasised the close relationship of paronymy and πρὸς ἕν 
λέγεσθαι. Patzig, G. (1960)/61. Theologie und Ontologie in der Metaphysik des Aristoteles: 
Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft. Kant-Studien (52): 185–205.
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Cat. 1a12-15: παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται 
ὅσα ἀπό τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώ-
σει τὴν κατὰ τοὔνομα προσηγο-
ρίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματι-
κῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς 
ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.
Paronyms are called those things, which have <their> 
description (τὴν προσηγορίαν) according to the 
name <of the other thing> from which they are 
different in their grammatical form [τῇ πτώσει], like 
the grammatical from grammar and the courageous 
from courage.
What is called the paronym is that thing, which is called after the name 
of another thing. The paronymous name is modified with respect to the 
name of the other thing. Aristotle states that the paronymous name dif-
fers in its grammatical form – τῇ πτώσει from the other. According to the 
examples, the two different names belong to different word classes; one 
is a noun, the other an adjective. The names are similar not for etymo-
logical, but for logical reasons and usually can be derived by grammati-
cal rules. The grammatical and the courageous derive their names from 
grammar and courage. The converse does not hold.341 Thus, in contrast 
to homonymy and synonymy, there is no symmetry in paronymy, since 
x may be a paronym of y, while y is not a paronym of x. Because of this, 
it is possible to determine one of the two forms of the words as prior to 
the other, in this case: “courage” is prior to “courageous”. The reason for 
this priority on the linguistic level is found on the extra-linguistic level. 
Courage is also prior to the courageous. Unfortunately, Aristotle remains 
silent on the exact kind of priority between courage and the courageous 
in this context. According to this view, linguistic features exactly mark-
0ff metaphysical features (which is a view one may find implausible).
In the Categories, there is a hint from which one could draw infer-
ences about the relationship of courage and the courageous. The cor-
responding extra-linguistic counterparts of the names “courage” and 
“courageous” are qualities – ποιότητες and qualified things – ποιὰ.
Cat. 8, 10a27-29: Ποιότητες μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν 
αἱ εἰρημέναι, ποιὰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ ταύτας 
παρωνύμως λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως 
ἀπ’ αὐτῶν.
Qualities are those mentioned; qualified are 
those things [1] which are called according to 
those <qualities> paronymously or [2] which 
are in some or other way derived from them.
341 In addition, the structure seems to orient on different word-forms: the noun is prior 
to adjective.
Aristotle calls qualified – ποιὰ [1] those things, which have their names 
derived from the names of qualities, e.g. the courageous from courage 
and the grammatical from grammar, or [2] those things, which are 
related in some other, rather exceptional, way.342 While “courage” is the 
name of a quality, “courageous” is the name of a qualified thing, i.e. a 
thing that bears or receives the quality courage.343 From this, it is clear 
that paronymy involves four elements: Two things, i.e. a quality and its 
name related to two other things, the qualified thing – ποιόν τι and its 
name which is derived from the name of the quality.344 Moreover, since 
the qualified thing bears or receives the quality, it is clear that the quality 
must be logically prior to the qualified thing. I assume that the analog-
ical pertains to the paronym and the name it is related. Thus, courage 
is logically prior to the courageous.345
Paronymy, just like synonymy and homonymy, is tied to linguistic 
conditions. This becomes evident by the following remarks: Aristotle 
states in Cat. 8, 10a27-b12, that in some cases there is no paronymy 
possible, although something may be called after something else. Yet, if 
there is no name for the quality from which the qualified things derive 
their names, then this is not a case of paronymy. Thus, it is evident that 
linguistic derivation is a necessary condition for paronymy.
An example is the good/excellent – σπουδαῖος man. A man is called 
“good” because he has virtue, but “virtue” is a term that is not relative to 
the term “good” / “excellent” (σπουδαῖος). Thus, he is not called good par-
onymously from virtue. Ancient Greek does not have an adjective that is 
derived from ἀρετή – virtue, while there is one in English, i.e. “virtuous”.346 
In addition to that, if “σπουδαῖος” was a polysemous multivocal 
just as “ἀγαθόν” as stated in EE I.8 and EN I.6, then it would mark off 
the third kind of pros hen-examples, which cannot be subsumed under 
342 Cat. 8, 10a31: almost in every case one speaks <of the qualified things> paronymously – 
σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων παρωνύμως λέγεται. The exceptional case will be mentioned in the fol-
lowing along with the example of the good/excellent – σπουδαῖος man.
343 Cf. e.g. Cat. 8, 9a32: e.g. honey is called sweet because it receives sweetness – οἷον τὸ μέλι 
τῷ γλυκύτητα δεδέχθαι λέγεται γλυκύ.
344 Cf. Oehler’s (1986: 191) graphical illustration.
345 While the courageous is prior in being to courage as shown earlier. Cf. section 6.1.1 
or for a summarised version 6.4.
346 Ancient Greek uses different words instead e.g. ἐπιεικής, καλός, ἀγαθός, σπουδαῖος.
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the two separate cases of the friendship and the healthy-examples. This 
class would be closer to the class of the healthy-examples, since also in 
this class, the linguistic means, which are used for the primary and the 
derivatives are different already. The only difference here would be that 
the means are entirely different. Nevertheless, Aristotle states nowhere 
that the name of the focal reference and the focally related entities must 
exhibit any similarity. Yet, as said above, it is necessary that there is a 
multiplicity of things with the same name. 
6.1.3.1 On the Relation of Paronymy and Pros Hen 
The PHR and paronymy are not identical.347 These notions are related 
but not congruent. It is clear from specific examples that paronymy is 
possible in cases in which there cannot be a PHR, e.g. the grammatical 
and the grammar. There is no polysemous multivocity possible since 
there is no plurality of things said in many ways for there are no other 
things except grammatical men. The ability to know grammar is idio-
syncratic of men and hence “grammatical” is synonymously predicated. 
Thus, paronymy can be considered the narrower notion. If the paronym 
is said in one way only, there is no need to apply the PHR because there 
is no explanatory necessity. There is not a plurality of things whose 
association required an explanation. Hence, I assume that the neces-
sity to introduce a relationship such as the PHR is directly connected 
to there being a plurality of things exceeding a generic unity. If there is 
no plurality of entities, which is related to some one thing, as it is the 
case when the paronymous term is said synonymously, then there is 
no need for the PHR. In this regard, the PHR is broader than paronymy. 
In another but related way, Krämer (1967: 341 n. 91) suggests that 
Aristotle broadens paronymy to the PHR.348 He states that the phenome-
non of paronymy has a model-character for PH-λεγόμενα. From a devel-
opmental perspective, one could argue that Aristotle takes the relation 
347 Cf. e.g. Ross (1924: 256; 1936: 559) and Patzig (1961: 192ff.). Though it has been claimed 
by Fonfara (2003: 67 n. 27), that Patzig identifies the PHR with paronymy he actually does 
not, at least not strictly, cf. Patzig (1961: 192 n.21).
348 He describes pros hen as “sinngemäße Neuformulierung des Paronymie-Verhältnisses 
in einem Bereich, in dem die Ordnung der Glieder nicht mehr durch die Sprache angezeigt 
wird”.
of paronymy and “broadens” it, in order to apply it in areas where the 
order of things is linguistically undifferentiated, as it is the case with 
friendship-examples. Although this is correct, one must emphasise that 
it is not specific to the PHR since in many pros hen cases the order is still 
indicated by the language. This is true for all health-examples of pros hen. 
Further, this kind of “broadening” limits paronymy, as an essential 
feature of paronymy is lost, namely the derivation of names. One has 
to keep this in mind if one proposes that “paronymy is broadened to 
apply also to linguistically undifferentiated cases”. Instead, as suggested 
above, one should suggest that it is broadened in regard to the number 
of things, which can be paronyms of one and the same thing. From 
this perspective, the phenomenon of paronymy is broadened and not 
diminished (at least in the cases of health-examples). Still, one has to 
exclude that the paronymous name, e.g. “healthy” is said synonymously. 
Since this is the case in the class of healthy-examples, it is appropriate 
to call all healthy-examples paronyms, however, multivocal paronyms. 
In this respect, it is entirely appropriate to assume that paronymy is to 
be placed between homonymy and synonymy. While homonyms differ 
completely in definition, synonyms have the same definition; paronyms 
derive their name and the corresponding definition by their relation to 
one thing. Nevertheless, the notion of paronymy is too narrow to per-
form the explanatory work that is done by the PHR. 
To conclude, paronymy and the PHR are closely related primarily 
because paronymy is involved in all healthy-examples of the PHR and 
because the paronym depends in its definition on its point of reference 
just as focally related entities depend on their focal reference. Paron-
ymy does not require multivocity, while the PHR does. Grammar and 
the grammatical are paronyms but not focally related since the gram-
matical is said in one way only. In this regard, it seems that the scope 
of paronymy is wider. But as outlined above, there are also cases of 
the PHR that do not require paronymy, i.e. friendship-examples. Thus, 
paronymy and PHR occur together in all healthy-examples. They do 
not occur together in all friendship-examples, and they do not occur 
together in all grammatical examples. There is only one set of cases 
where both occur together. This may suffice to answer the question of 
similarity and difference of paronymy and PHR.
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6.2 Logical priority in the Pros Hen Relation 
I argued earlier that logical priority (λόγῳ or κατὰ τὸν λόγον) is the 
“most” essential characteristic of the PHR.349 In this section, I attempt to 
characterise the alleged “kind” of logical priority essential to the PHR. 
The following trains of thought are primarily designed to contribute to 
a more detailed understanding of the relationship of the focal reference 
to the focally related entities and do not provide a detailed analysis of 
Aristotle’s theory of definition. 
To be able to reveal the alleged kind of logical priority that is applied in 
the PHR one has to justify that there are different kinds of logical priority 
in Aristotle at all. Yet, Aristotle distinguishes nowhere different senses of 
logical priority, at least not explicitly. Nevertheless, to a certain degree, it 
is possible to draw a distinction between different ways in which some-
thing can be logically prior as Aristotle defines things in different ways.350
Before trying to distinguish different kinds of logical priority, let us 
consider first how Aristotle describes logical priority. In Met. XIII.2, 
1077b3-4 Aristotle “clearly” states that “[Things are prior] in definition 
to those things whose definitions are compounded from definitions of 
them” 351 – τῷ λόγῳ δὲ ὅσων οἱ λόγοι ἐκ τῶν λόγων. According to this 
passage, everything that is part of a definition of something else is log-
ically prior to it.
LP: A is logically prior to B iff A, or the definition of A is contained 
in the definition of B while B or the definition of B is not contained 
in the definition of A
The following example illustrates the definition of a substance by a 
genus-differentia definition. The man is a biped animal. This definition 
contains the differentia biped and the genus animal, which defines the 
349 Cf. especially Owen (1960) and Ferejohn (1980). Beside these cf. Irwin (1981: 531 n. 
12): “If Fs are focally connected, then the focus F1 has the definition „G,” and subordinate 
Fs have the definition „G + H,” „G = J,” etc. F1 is primary and the focus because other Fs 
include its definition in theirs.” 
350 Also “definition” is said in many ways. Cf. Met. VII.5, 1031a9-10, similarly before in 
VII.4, 1030a17-18; b4-7; b12-13. 
351 Translation of Annas. Annas, J. 1988. Aristotle‘s Metaphysics: Books M and N. Oxford.
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species of man. This kind of definition often is called diairetic defini-
tion.352 In this case, both the differentia and the genus are prior in defi-
nition to the species man. As outlined in the first chapter of this study, 
Aristotle distinguishes between things that are strictly definable (such 
as substances) and those that are not strictly definable, such as non-sub-
stances, for instance.353 To understand a definition of a non-substance 
we must understand the definition of the kind of substance it belongs 
to. Aristotle explains this in Met. VII.5 with a reference to necessary 
accidents.354 If one defines “odd” we must make reference to kind of 
thing it belongs to, i.e. number. Because of this, he claims that non-sub-
stances are defined by addition – ἐκ προςθέςεως (cf. Met. VII.5, 1031a1-4). 
I propose this also pertains to focally related entities. In order to under-
stand the definition of something healthy one needs to understand the 
definition of health. Because of that, I assume that healthy-things and 
other focally related entities are defined in the way that Aristotle class 
by addition – ἐκ προςθέςεως. 
Aristotle states that if we admit that a definition is possible of acci-
dental compounds (e.g. the white man) as well, then it is clear that 
“ὁρισμός”355 is said in many ways.356 Because of this, one could assume 
352 A definition in general answer the what-it-is question, cf. Top. I.5, 101b38 and Met. 
VII.4, 1030a6-9. The ways in which this task can be fulfilled vary. For an overview on defi-
nition in Aristotle cf. Charles (2010) part II. 
353 Cf. Met. VII.4–6. In general, things that lack the appropriate form of unity such as 
heaps, accidental compounds, artefacts, events and the like are strictly speaking not definable.
354 These properties are often also called per se 2-properties as they occur in Aristotle’s 
discussion of “per se” on the second place. Cf. An. Post. I.4. 73a37ff. For instance, even and 
odd, male and female, or the risibility of men.
355 Be aware that not every λόγος is a ὁρισμός, cf. Met. VII.10, 1034b20. Moreover, An. Post. 
II.7 and 10. The details of this difference are not discussed here, since they are of remote 
importance for my purposes. The study primarily reflects on Met. IV.7, 1012a23f. where 
Aristotle states that the combination of words (logos) whose name is a sign is a definition – 
ὁ γὰρ λόγος οὗ τὸ ὄνομα σημεῖον ὁρισμὸς ἔσται. 
356 Cf. also footnote 350. This study does not intend to enter the topic of definitions in 
Aristotle too deeply but the main reason for the difference between the phrase “biped ani-
mal” and the phrase “white man” is that in the latter case there is something trans-catego-
rially predicated of something else and this combination does not form a unity, though a 
proper definition should do that (cf. Met. VII.12 and VIII.6). Aristotle calls this an some-
thing of something else – ἄλλο κατ‘ ἄλλου – predication (1030a4, 11 cf. on this also An. Post. 
I.22). This difference enables Aristotle to explain why not any combination of words can 
be considered as definitory of something. 
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that there are also differences between the logical priority related to 
each kind of definition, i.e. in our context the genus-differentia defi-
nition and the definition by addition – ἐκ προςθέςεως. One may think 
that the genus is logically prior in a different way the accident or the 
substance is logically prior to the accidental compound. But Aristotle 
does not address this question. LP holds equivalently of them.
Nevertheless, one may narrow down the way the focal reference is 
logically prior to the focally related entities to get a better understand-
ing of the logical priority that is part of the PHR. We know that the 
focal reference cannot play the role of a genus since the pros hen related 
entities are decidedly not species of a common genus – μηδ’ ὡς εἴδη ἑνὸς 
γένους (EE VII.2, 1236a17). Thus, there has to be a difference in the way 
the focal reference is part of all the definitions of the focally related 
entities and the way the genus is part of the definition of all its species. 
Senfrin-Weis (2009), in some sense, addresses this difference. In her 
opinion, Owen’s thesis of reductive translation357 blurs the difference of 
the function of the genus and the focal reference in the definition of 
things.358 According to Owen, statements about non-substantial beings 
can be reduced or translated into statements about substance. The worry 
of Senfrin-Weis is, and it is a justified worry, that it makes substance a 
genus of non-substances. Indeed, as I outlined earlier, Owen’s reductive 
translation seems possible, maybe even primarily possible, for things 
that are unified by a common genus. To address this worry, one has to 
reassess the distinction and the difference between the functions of the 
genus and focal reference in the respective definitions. The following 
paragraphs will explain the dissimilarity between the logical priority 
of genus and what falls into that genus and that of focal reference and 
what is focally related.
The focal reference and the genus may appear similar, yet they differ 
in several regards. The relation of these notions seems to be a source 
of confusion. I will address two issues. 1. The essence-issue and 2. The 
universality-issue. The example of the medical and the man will help 
357 Cf. section 6.1.1.5. 
358 As a reminder: She tries to explain this with her terminology of content-based and 
non-content based predication which is elusive.
illustrating these issues. Contained in the definition of all medical things 
is the medic. In this regard, the medic behaves similarly to the genus 
animal, which also is contained in the definition of a multiplicity of 
things with the same name, e.g. men. But according to Top. I.5, 102a31-b3 
the genus is an answer to the what-it-is question, i.e. a question for the 
essence. Even if one ignores the remainder of the definition, the genus 
is a valid (although partial359) answer to the what-it-is question. To state 
what the man is, one can also provide the abbreviated answer: the man 
is an animal. In accordance with that, he states in Cat. 3a17-18 that the 
name and the definition of the genus (as secondary substance) may be 
predicated of the subject. All of this does not pertain to the focal ref-
erence. It cannot be such a (partial) answer to the what-it-is question. 
Neither can its definition be predicated of the focally related entity. A 
non-substance is not a certain kind of substance, and a medical knife 
indeed is not a kind of a medic, and the healthy banana is not a certain 
kind of health either. Thus, the genus is prior in definition in a different 
way compared to focal reference.
Another issue concerns the universality of genus and focal refer-
ence. In Met. VII.13, 1038b11-12 Aristotle states: one calls universal that 
which by nature belongs to many things – τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὃ 
πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν. The genus is said of a multiplicity of things 
and is in this way common to many things. It is by nature common to 
a plurality of things because it is a universal.360 Every genus is predica-
ble of a multiplicity of species. In contrast to that, the focal reference is 
not predicable of a multiplicity of things. Although the focal reference 
belongs to or exists in (ὑπάρχει) the accounts of a multiplicity of things 
(which may belong to different categories) it is not common to the multi - 
plicity it belongs to in the same way as the genus. I assume one should 
say that the focal reference is common to a multiplicity of things, but it 
is not a universal, at least not in the same way the genus is a universal. 
Devereux (2009) suggests in his commentary on Senfrin-Weis 
(2009) that one should conceptualise this difference by proposing dif-
359 Cf. Top. I.5, 102a33-35.
360 Cf. Frede; Patzig (1988: 246).
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ferent types of logical priority.361 He proposed inter- and intra-generic 
logical priority. I agree with these labels, although they seem to be 
designed to address only one part of the universality issue as I outlined 
above, i.e. the fact that the focal reference may belong to definitions of 
things of different categories while the genus only belongs to definitions 
of things within a single category. Nevertheless, also the essence-issue 
is supposed to be addressed by this distinction. Intra-generic logical 
dependence describes the subordination of a multiplicity of things under 
a genus while the genus is a partial answer to the what-it-is question. 
Inter-generic logical dependence describes the relation of a multiplicity 
of generically different things to one and the same entity whereas this 
entity does not function as a partial answer to the what-it-is question 
like the genus. 
To conclude, as focally related entities cannot be defined in the 
genus-differentia mode of definition since they do not belong to a com-
mon genus, they are defined in a different way. I assumed that, overall, 
they are defined in the way non-substances are defined, i.e. by addition – 
ἐκ προςθέςεως (cf. Met. VII.4 and 5, 1031a1-4). Furthermore, although 
the focal reference also belongs to or exists in the accounts of a plurality 
of different things, it is not, or at least not in the same way, universal as 
the genus and it is not a partial answer to what-it-is question. Aristotle 
does not distinguish between different kinds of logical priority. Never-
theless, we have seen that they play vastly different roles in the definition.
6.3 Polysemous Multivocity by Analogy
In EN I.6, 1096b26-28 Aristotle lists the analogy as a possibility, which 
may explain how the things that are called “good” are related. Shields 
(1999: 10 n. 3) does not believe that the occurrence of analogy in that 
passage is meant to demarcate an alternative explanation for the con-
nection of certain multivocals.362 Indeed, the analogy seems to play a 
subordinate role compared to the PHR in the debate about multivocity 
and homonymy. In contrast to Shields I assume, as indicated in chapter 5, 
361 Section 6.1.1.
362 Neither does Ward (2008). 
6.3 Polysemous Multivocity by Analogy 169
that the analogy is a coordinate alternative to the PHR in the sense 
that one may refer to an analogy in order to explain how two disparate 
things can be called the same thing. 
In Aristotle “analogy” signifies what is called analogia proportion-
alitatis363 in medieval philosophy.364 The term “ἀνάλογος” means in as 
much as “in proportion”, “equivalent to”, “resembling” or “according to a 
ratio”. The analogy is a relationship that is based on the identity of a ratio. 
He also calls it also “geometrical”365 analogy, which can be expressed in 
an arithmetical proportion, a : b = c : d.366 This is read in the following 
way: As a is to b, c is to d. Thus, the analogy holds between four items 
or two pairs of items respectively, which exhibit an identical ratio.367 
Let us fill in some values for the variables, e.g. as 4 is to 2, 12 is to 6. The 
pairs of 4 and 2 and 12 and 6 are analogous because of the identity of 
the ratios between the elements of the pairs:
4 : 2 = 12 : 6 
As the ratio is a property that is identical on both sides of the identity 
sign neither of the sides can be said to be the reason for the other side 
exhibiting this ratio, which implies there are no priority relations to a 
single point of reference involved in the analogy.368 
The analogy is also applicable in non-mathematical contexts. It can 
be applied in all cases in which it is possible to identify a correspon-
dence in different systems or structures. For instance, the point and the 
363 Which usually is contrasted with the analogia attributionis. Central cases of the anal-
ogy of attribution are the examples of “healthy” and “medical” Aristotle mentions in Met. 
IV.2. Aquinas refers to these examples in De Veritate, 21, 4, ad 2 and Sum. Theol. I, 13, 6. 
In Aristotle there are no hints that he thought of the PHR as of a form of analogy. For him 
 “analogy” only means the analogy of proportion. 
364 For a detailed overview about the relation of Aristotle and medieval philosophy see 
chapter 4, “Analogy in Aristotle”, in Rocca, G. P. (2004). Speaking the incomprehensible 
God: Thomas Aquinas on the interplay of positive and negative theology. Washington, D.C.
365 EN V.7, 1131b12-14.
366 Cf. Poet. 21, 1457b16-19; EN V.3, 1131a30-32; MM I.34, 1193b3f.
367 Cf. EN V.6, 1131a30-33: Aristotle mentions a special case of the analogy which he calls 
continuous – συνεχής. It is also possible to draw an analogy only having “three” items. He 
states that one of the three is simply repeated: As a is to b, b is to c. The regular case with 
four different items is called separated – διῃρημένη.
368 Moreover, the convertibility of the numbers allows to exchange certain elements with 
each other, while the equation remains true: a : c = b : d.
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number one are analogous.369 Both are principles – ἀρχαὶ: The point the 
principles of the line, the number one the principle of numbers. They 
occupy the same position in a different system. In this sense, the anal-
ogy explains the unity of the point and the number one.370 Aristotle 
uses the analogy also very often in his biological works. For instance, he 
claims that the functions of nails and hoofs, and hands and claws, feath-
ers and scales are analogical (HA I.1, 486b17-22). In the PA I.4, 644a13-23 
he tells us that groups of animals that only differ in the more or less an 
identical element they possess are aggregated under a single class while 
groups whose attributes are only analogous are separated. For instance, 
in this sense, one class of birds differs from another by shorter or lon-
ger feathers, while birds and fish only agree in having analogous organs. 
For instance, what in the bird is the feather in the fish is the scale.371 The 
analogy is one of the many ways in which things can be one. Scales and 
feathers are one by analogy. They are one because feathers are to birds 
what scales are to fish. 
Moreover, Aristotle uses the analogy as an explanation of meta-
phors372 in the Poetics and the Rhetoric, and he applies the analogy in 
his Metaphysics where he uses the analogy to form trans-generic con-
cepts such as being in potentiality and actuality. 
In Met. IX.6, 1048a36-37, Aristotle suggests that one should not look 
for a definition of everything, but one should also detect what is ana-
logical. He uses several examples to illustrate the analogical structure, 
which explains his notions of being in potentiality and being in actu-
ality: As what builds a house is to what can build a house and what is 
awake to what is asleep and what sees and what has closed the eyes but 
can see, so is what has been distinctively formed from matter to matter 
and what is perfect to what is imperfect (cf. Met. IX.6, 1048b1-4). With 
these examples, Aristotle tries to show the structural similarity of all 
369 Cf. Top. I.18, 108b26-29.
370 Met. V.6, 1016b34-35: by analogy any <two> things which are related as a different thing 
to a another – κατ‘ ἀναλογίαν δὲ ὅσα ἔχει ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο.
371 Although scales and feathers have a communality that is revealed by the analogy there 
is no name for this. The lack of a name in similar cases is also mentioned in Meteor. IV.9, 
387b3; An. Post. II.14, 98a20-23.
372 Cf. Rhet. III.10, 1411a1-b21; Poet. 21 1457b6-33.
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these cases. A philosopher should be able to spot the similarity of these 
cases, although they do not fall under a genus.373 Relevant for us is the 
claim that follows on these examples that ‘in actuality’ is not in all cases 
said in the same way, but it is said by analogy, like this in this or to this, 
so is that in that or to that – λέγεται δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως ἀλλ’ ἢ 
τῷ ἀνάλογον, ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο, τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε ἢ πρὸς τόδε· 
(Met. IX.6, 1048b6-8).374 What is awake and what is distinctively formed 
from matter is both, as he states, in actuality – ἐνεργείᾳ. In contrast to 
the case of the scales and the feathers, there is a name for the common-
ality of the different cases (i.e. “in actuality”). As in each case “being in 
actuality” is said in a different way but as all cases are associated by the 
analogy, they are not said homonymously. 
In Aristotle’s example in EN I.6, 1096b26-29, he suggested that the 
analogy may be an alternative to the PHR as in the body is sight, so in the 
soul is intellect, i.e. another thing in something else – ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι 
ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. More freely paraphrased: The 
role sight plays in the body, intellect plays in the soul.375 I assume that 
the “καὶ” before the “ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ” is explicative since it underlines 
an important feature of the analogy in general as it is known from other 
passages.376 It is quite salient that, as in the case of the feather and the 
scale, there is no common name for the commonality of soul and eye. 
Unfortunately, Aristotle does not provide any further clarifying remarks 
about how to deal with the example. However, directly before Aristo-
tle raises the question, how is <the good> said? – ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; 
(EN I.6, 1096b26) he distinguishes between things that are per se goods 
and those that are good as means to these.377 Some of the examples of 
things that are per se goods are thinking and seeing – τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν 
(1096b17). I assume that the eye-intellect-example may pick up again 
373 Aristotle suggests practising detecting similarities of even the most remote genera in 
Top. I.17, 108a12-14.
374 Cf. also Met. XII.4-5 where, among other things, Aristotle claims that causes and 
principles are by analogy one for all things. 
375 The example is also given in Top. I.17, 108a7-17.
376 Met. V.6, 1016a34-35 and Met. IX.6, 1048b6-8.
377 EN I.6, 1096b13-15: the good must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in 
themselves, the others by reason of these – διττῶς λέγοιτ‘ ἂν τἀγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ‘ αὑτά, 
θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα.
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the examples of the per se goods. Thus, I the name for the commonality 
of the eye and the intellect in this context is “good” or “per se good”.378 
This section was supposed to show that it is not necessary to neglect 
the analogy as a way in which multivocals can be related as it is sug-
gested by Shields. If my remarks are cogent, the PHR and the analogy 
are both coordinate ways to explain the connection of multivocals. 
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter investigated polysemous multivocals, i.e. multivocals that 
are either related by a PHR or by analogy. Polysemous multivocals form 
one category of multivocity beside homonymous and synonymous mul-
tivocals. They are as such of particular interest to most philosophers, 
because many interesting philosophical concepts are said in many ways, 
but not homonymously. In this chapter, I examined what kind of rela-
tion the PHR is and how things are connected by it.
Section 6.1.1. contained an overview and a discussion of several sem-
inal contributions to the PHR. One of the most important results of 
the survey of the contributions on the PHR is that quite often it was 
assumed that the PHR implied some kind of existential priority relation. 
The focal reference is supposed to be prior in existence to the focally 
related entities, as without it nothing could be focally related. I argued 
within that survey (6.1.1.2) that there is no need to propose such a thesis. 
Firstly, there is no textual evidence for this. Secondly, I deem that the 
necessity to propose such a thesis originates from an overemphasis of 
the application of the PHR to being. In the case of being, the focal refer-
ence indeed is prior in existence to the focally related entities. I argued 
that the presence of this kind of priority in that case of the PHR does not 
suffice to consider this kind of priority essential to the PHR. My main 
argument is that the only kind of priority essential to the PHR is logi-
cal priority, and there is no need to assume that what is logically prior, 
is prior in existence as well. Aristotle claims this explicitly. There are 
378 This interpretation agrees with Brüllmann (2011: 92–93).
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things that are prior in definition but posterior in existence.379 I referred 
to Met. XIII.2, 1077b1-7: The point is logically prior to the line but pos-
terior in existence. I claimed that existential priority of the focal refer-
ence to the focally related entities could be essential to the PHR since 
the healthy-thing is prior in being to health, but posterior in definition 
to it. Thus, I claimed that questions of existential priority or posteriority 
are not essential parts of the PHR. These questions are answered inde-
pendently of there being a PHR. Moreover, in section 6.1.1.5, I pointed 
out that there are serious problems within Shields’s attempt to define 
the PHR by a causal analysis of the relation between the focal reference 
and the focally related entities.
In section 6.1.2, the main result of the investigation of the PHR in 
EE VII.2 was that there are two different kinds of examples of the PHR. 
1. the healthy-examples, which involve paronymy and 2. the friend-
ship-examples, which do not involve paronymy. I took this distinction 
to be influential on the attempts to define the PHR. Because of this, I 
devised two definitions of the PHR, which are comparatively simple and 
primarily based on logical priority.
Section 6.1.3 demonstrated how the PHR and paronymy are related. 
I claimed that they overlap in healthy-examples but that they do not 
occur together in other cases. It is possible that there is paronymy with-
out a PHR in examples I called “grammatical-example”, and there is 
paronymy but no PHR and in friendship-cases where there is a PHR 
but no paronymy. 
In section 6.2, I discuss the way the focally related entities are defined 
and how the focal reference differs from a genus. I claim that overall 
focally related entities are defined in the way Aristotle non-substances 
are defined, i.e. by addition – ἐκ προςθέςεως. However, in those cases, 
the focal reference needs to be added, which plays a slightly different 
role in the definition compared to the role substance plays in the defi-
nition of a non-substance, as the focally related entity does not inhere 
in the focal reference. 
379 I assume that priority in being – τῇ οὐσίᾳ identifies with “existential priority” (cf. Met. 
V.11, 1019a1-4) which may be controversial. In this context, I do not see difficulties follow-
ing from it.
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Section 6.3 aimed to demonstrate how it is possible to consider the anal-
ogy as a real alternative to the PHR as this has been doubted by Shields 
(1999). I illustrated that the analogy indeed is a real alternative as it 
is possible to refer to the analogy as an explanation for a polysemous 
multivocity. I provided an interpretation of the soul-example in EN I.6, 
1096b28-29, which suggests that the eye and the intellect are examples 
for (per se) goods. In this regard, it makes perfect sense to assert that 
“good” is said of them as a polysemous multivocal by analogy. 
7 The Pros Hen Relation and Ordered 
Series
Having clarified the difference between analogical and pros hen cases, 
I now turn to another controversial case involving the PHR, namely 
things that are ordered in series – τὰ ἐφεξῆς.380 Ordered series is a topic 
of widespread discussions381, and it remains a difficult topic since it can 
easily be discussed from many different points of view and with differ-
ent purposes.382 The following section primarily focuses on the relation 
of ordered series and the PHR as sometimes there is a tendency to regard 
ordered series as a variant of the PHR.383 The attributed close connec-
tion between serial order and the PHR is not so much based on clear 
textual evidence,384 but rather on similarities that have been noticed by 
several scholars. Yet, the acknowledgement of similarities does not war-
rant describing pros hen cases as ordered series, at least not in the same 
sense the conventional examples of ordered series are ordered in series. 
Before investigating the relation between ordered series and the PHR, 
one has to determine what conventional ordered series are. 
When Aristotle speaks about ordered series, it seems as if it is a well-
known notion, not necessitating any detailed explanation. Yet, it is not 
true that any order of priority and posteriority among things form a 
380 Cf. DA II.3, 414b22. Compare for ἐφεξῆς in general Met. XI.12, 1068b31ff; Phys. 226b34ff. 
231a21ff., b8ff.
381 Cf. for an overview about the various views about the definitions of soul and the 
problems of its seriality Ward, J. K. (1996). Souls and Figures. Ancient Philosophy 16 (1): 
113–128. Furthermore, cf. Krämer (1967); Lloyd, A. C. (1962). Genus, species and ordered 
series in Aristotle. Phronesis 7 (1): 67–90; Wilson, J. C. (1904). On the Platonist Doctrine of 
the ἀσύμβλητοι ἀριθμοί. The Classical Review 18 (05): 247–260; Fortenbaugh, W. W. (1976). 
Aristotle on Prior and Posterior, Correct and Mistaken Constitutions. Transactions of the 
American Philological Association (1974-) (106): 125–137. Cf. also Lewis (2004: 19 n. 43).
382 I am alluding to the possibility to connect the topic of ordered series either with a 
metaphysical (anti-Platonic) claims or with logical claims. Cf. Lloyd (1962: 68). For more 
remarks about these options see below.
383 It has been suggested by Robin (1963: 168 n. 172) that ordered series are a special case 
of the PHR. Robin, L. (1963). La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres d‘aprés Aris-
tote. Paris. Krämer (1967) follows him in this regard. This tendency is also found in Owen 
(1960: 173) though he goes not into detail.
384 The only allegedly “clear” connections between the PHR and serial order are found 
in Met. XII.1, 1069a19-21; EN I.6, 1096a17-23 and Met. IV.2, 1005a8-11. 
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series in the relevant sense. As in the case of the PHR Aristotle deter-
mines the relevant cases not by definition but by examples. I will follow 
Lloyd (1962) and abbreviate those groups of things that are ordered in 
series in the relevant sense as p-series (read as priority-series). Regular 
examples of p-series are the following:
Figures: triangle – tetragon – pentagon … 
Souls: vegetative – perceptive – thinking 
Numbers: 2, 3, 4, 5 … 
Dimensions: unit/point – line – surface – body
(constitutions/citizens)385
The main issue about p-series is that they lack something. It is a matter 
of context and interpretation of what exactly it is they are lacking. In 
general, the issue about p-series is based on their unity. It is possible to 
distinguish two claims, which are both legitimate within their respec-
tive passages: 
1. The NF-claim: There is no Platonic form F besides – παρά things 
that are ordered in series (because it would be prior to the first).386 
2. The NG-claim: There is no (Aristotelian) genus G for things that are 
ordered in series 
The NF-claim, according to Aristotle, is Academic. The NG-claim is 
the version Aristotle adopted and applies in his investigations, some-
385 Among the common examples there is usually also the citizen and the constitution 
mentioned cf. Pol. III.1, 1275a22-b5. This case is bracketed here because of the elucidating 
remarks of Fortenbaugh (1976). However, there are also reasons to consider the example 
as a direct parallel to the soul/figure analogy in the DA as argued by Ward (1996: 121). 
386 Cf. especially EN I.6, 1096b17ff.; Met. B.3, 999a6-14 and EE I.8, 1218a1-8. This claim 
does not exclude other kinds of common entities as e.g. Aristotelian genera and it does not 
exclude that one can define e.g. figures or souls in some way. There is a group of scholars 
who argue for the possibility of (strict) definability in those cases, cf. Ross (1961: 223); Ross, 
W. D. (1961). Aristotle’s De anima. Oxford. Hamlyn (1968: 94); Aristoteles. (1968). Aristotle’s 
De anima. Oxford. Hicks (1965: 334–336). Hicks, R. D. (1965). Aristotle: De anima, 1907th 
edn. Amsterdam.
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times without indicating that it has an Academic origin.387 According 
to the NG-claim, p-series do not fit into Aristotle’s standard taxonom-
ical scheme of genus and species, i.e. that any two species of a given 
genus must be synonyms with respect to the connected genus-term, as, 
e.g. “figure” or “soul”.388 What do we infer from that? Since they are not 
synonyms the alleged genus of p-series, e.g. “figure” or “soul” must be 
said multivocally of the various souls and figures.389 Aristotle does not 
draw this inference explicitly, but it is an immediate consequence of the 
non-synonymy. This train of thought plays a role in the very prominent 
(ad hominem) argument against the existence of a single idea of the 
good in EN I.6, 1096a17-29. In his polemic against the Academy, Aristo-
tle tries to show that there cannot be an idea of the good because there is 
an order of priority and posteriority in the different applications of the 
good. Aristotle infers this from the fact that the good applies to all cate 
gories.390 Since the categories are ordered by priority and posteriority 
(substantial vs non-substantial categories; cf. also Met. xii.1, 1069a19-21 
and VII.1, 1028a13-20) the good must also behave like that. Because of 
that, it is not only clear that the good is a multivocal, but even that the 
good itself is a serial notion, and hence (given the premise that there 
are no ideas for p-series), there is no idea of the good.391 
387 It is ascribed to the Academy in EN I.6, 1096b17ff.; Met. III.3, 999a6-14 and EE I.8, 
1218a1-8 (the NF-claim is based on these passages. Lloyd (1962) formulates his metaphys-
ical thesis with respect to these passages. His logical thesis is based on the remarks in 
DA II.3, 414b22-23 and Pol. III.1, 1275a34-38. The NG-claim is related to these passages.
388 For the sake of brevity, this section does not discuss the NF-claim. Since the lack of a 
Platonic idea for p-series does not imply the logical thesis, i.e. that there is no logical genus 
for p-series (i.e. an essential and unequivocal predicate) some scholars thought for instance 
in the case of soul a single strict definition is possible, see footnote 386.
389 This is also seen by Lloyd (1962: 76) and Lewis (2004: 19 n. 43) although their termi-
nology differs. Another important remark concerns the example of figure. One might raise 
serious worries about the claim that Aristotle truly believed that there is no genus for fig-
ures since he tells us in Met. V.28, 1024a36ff. that plane – ἐπίπεδον is the genus of all figures. 
390 In Top. I.15, 107a3-17 Aristotle confirms this stating that whatever is predicated in dif-
ferent categories is said in many ways. 
391 This argument shall not be discussed in detail. Broadly speaking, the line of argument 
is repeated in EE I.8, 1218a1-8 with the example of the double – διπλάσιον which is the first 
of the multiples – πολλαπλασίων. In Met. III.3, 999a6-14 it is repeated for numbers. In the 
DA II.3, 414b20-a2 for souls and figures, however applying the “logical” version of the claim.
In EN I.6, 1096b26-28 Aristotle suggests different possibilities in which 
the many ways the good is said may be related (either by the PHR or 
by analogy). I discussed this passage in the section about polysemous 
multivocals, whilst we focus on a different aspect here: The possibility 
of a connection between the seriality of the good and the idea that the 
good might be a pros hen legomenon.
One may assume that the question in EN I.6, 1096b26-28, indicated 
by the ἄρα, is really related to the good in the various categories as pro-
posed in EN I.6, 1096a17-26 (which is not assumed here).392 In addition 
to that, one might overstretch the analogy and assume that as there 
is a primary being, i.e. substance, there must be a primary good, and 
just as being is a pros hen legomenon, so the good must be one. On this 
background, the difference between the PHR and p-series seems to be 
marginal, and the possibility to identify them as closely related seems 
to be within reach. One may propose that every pros hen case could be 
described as an abbreviated p-series, i.e. a “two-member p-series” since 
among all the focally related entities there is no further order. 
There is another similarity potentially supporting the closeness of 
the two concepts: Both the PHR and the p-series explain the unity of 
things that lack generic unity. Met. IV.2, 1005a8-11 supports this. It states 
that some things are unities or beings because they are related to one, 
others because of serial succession (τὰ μὲν πρὸς ἓν τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς). 
Despite this similarity, there are reasons to also maintain the dis-
tinctness of p-series and PHR. The impression that the PHR and p-series 
are quite different explanatory tools deepens under the following 
circum stances: The argument from p-series has never been straightfor-
wardly used to show that the different kinds of being are not synonyms 
with respect to a common genus of being (just like man and ox are syn-
onyms with respect to their genus).393 This is particularly surprising as 
it seems the argument from p-series could also be applied in that case 
(if the interpretation from above were correct). In addition to that, it is 
also surprising that Aristotle never applied the pros hen analysis to the 
392 I follow Brüllmann (2011: 91–92) as stated above.
393 Cf. for this Lewis (2004: 19 n. 43). 
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priority and posteriority of figures, souls, and numbers even though an 
application appears to be possible.394 
This complicates the relationship between the PHR and p-series, as 
they appear to have different fields of application. The reason for assum-
ing a close connection originates from the fact that both notions apply 
orders of priority and posteriority. Because of this, the best approach 
to distinguish p-series from the PHR is to analyse the kinds of priority 
and posteriority that are involved in the various applications of the 
notions. The sparse explicit information available exacerbates drawing 
a distinction between them. The following investigation concludes with 
the acknowledgement of many similarities, albeit not enough to identify 
one of the two as a subspecies of the other.
What is the priority of p-series? I propose that Aristotle’s lists a sense 
of priority in Cat. 12, 14a30-31 that may be called a priority sui generis 
for p-series. This priority applies to the relevant examples for p-series. 
In that passage, the examples are numbers and figures. Aristotle states 
that in those cases, the order of being is fixed and cannot be reversed.395 
In the corpus, there are some remarks suggesting that pros hen 
legomena indeed were considered by Aristotle as constituting p-series. 
The most straightforward case is the following: The categories of being 
are described as ἐφεξῆς in Met. xii.1, 1069a19-21. One may doubt 
whether this implies that the categories of being form a p-series in the 
same sense figures or souls form a p-series. The reason for doubting 
this is that the structure of those series is not the same. While in “regu-
lar” series (like numbers and figures) the prior is contained in the pos-
terior in potentiality I doubt this applies to the case of the categories 
of being.396 One would have to believe that in the quality of whiteness, 
there is a substance contained in potentiality. However, substances do 
not inhere within anything, as Cat. 1b3-5 states it. Thus, one may assume, 
rather, that the passage Met. XII.1, 1069a19-21 applies the notion of serial 
order more flexibly. 
394 This is noted also by Fortenbaugh (1976: 129). 
395 Cf. also Met. V.11, 1018b26. Aristotle describes a priority according to order – κατὰ 
τάξιν which is resembles the notion of Cat. 12.
396 I call this the containment-thesis below.
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The EN I.6, 1096a17-23 provide the same thought as part of the argu-
ment described above. The strong tendency to consider the relation-
ship of p-series and pros hen legomena very close is probably based on 
the following hypothesis: If the good is a serial notion, then nothing 
prevents that also being is a serial notion since, with reference to being, 
the seriality of the good was shown. Yet, since being is the most prom-
inent case of the PHR, what prevents us from thinking that every case, 
which qualifies as a pros hen case also qualifies as a p-series? In order 
to approach the relation of the PHR and p-series one needs to analyse 
the case of p-series with regard to the relationship between its mem-
bers in greater depth. 
All subsequent members of a p-series are related somehow to their 
antecedents. Just by considering the examples, one can expect the pre-
decessors to be simpler/less determined than the following ones, e.g. the 
line is simpler than the surface, the triangle simpler than the tetragon. 
There is always something less in the prior in comparison with the pos-
terior (a dimension less, an angle less, a faculty less). In this regard, pos-
terior members are always more complex than prior members. Unfor-
tunately, there is hardly a comprehensive theory given in the relevant 
passages, which explains the kind of relationship present between the 
prior and the posterior entities. I assume that the most elucidating pas-
sage is one from the DA II.3 about the case of figures and souls. Let us 
examine it in more detail.
As stated above, I assume that the DA II.3 passage applies the 
NG-claim: There is no (logical) genus for p-series. In this context, Aris-
totle denies that there is a genus as an essential universal nature.397 None-
theless, Aristotle does not deny that “soul”, or “figure” is amenable to 
an account (no strict definition), i.e. a common/general account, i.e. a 
λόγος κοινός (cf. DA II.3, 414b23). This account has an important quali-
fication: The account fails to be ἴδιος of any of the kinds of soul. It is not 
prima facie obvious what is meant by ἴδιος in this context, but the best 
approach to it may be “peculiar to” or “definitory of ”.398 Because of this, 
397 In this regard I follow Lloyd (1962) and Ward (1996). 
398 This also has been suggested by Lloyd (1962: 74) after a discussion of other possibili-
ties which I will omit here. Aristotle states that the definition must be ἴδιος of the defined 
thing in Top. VI.1. 
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one has to investigate each kind separately – ὥστε καθ’ ἕκαστον ζητητέον 
(414b32). If that were the end of the survey, there would be sepa rate 
accounts of each particular soul, which would make “soul” homon-
ymous. The explanation Aristotle searches goes beyond that since he 
tries to show how the different types of soul connect. As they lack a 
common genus one should expect him to apply the PHR or the analogy, 
but he does not. Instead, he explains how the soul-types form an order 
of priority and posteriority. 
In the DA II.4, 415a23-25 Aristotle states that the first faculty – 
δύνᾰμις of the soul is the vegetative faculty and this is contained in / 
belongs to – ὑπάρχει to all souls and is, therefore, most common – 
κοινοτάτη.399 In DA II.4, 416b22, 25 he calls it the first soul πρώτη ψυχή. 
He repeats this thought several times by saying the vegetative soul is 
a principle for all living beings (cf. DA II.1, 412a14-15; II,2 413b1-2; II.4 
415a23-25). He states in the DA II.3, 414b20-25 that the case of souls is 
analogous to the case of figures. Generally speaking, the first member 
of each p-series is the principle of the series. Here, the vegetative soul 
is the principle of the series of souls. More complex living beings like 
animals have a perceptive soul. Since every soul has a vegetative faculty, 
the perceptive soul has one too, as it is the second in the series of souls. 
This, of course, does not mean there are two souls in one living being 
but one soul with two faculties. This kind of containment continues for 
each member of the series, i.e. the first is contained in all, the second 
contained in all but the previous, the third in all but all previous etc.
A little earlier in the text, Aristotle makes a key remark about the way 
the posterior contains the prior: It is contained δυνάμει – in potentiality 
in the posterior. I call this the containment-thesis:
DA II.3, 414b28-32: (παραπλησίως δ’ 
ἔχει τῷ περὶ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ τὰ κατὰ 
ψυχήν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει 
δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον ἐπί τε τῶν σχημά-
των καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, οἷον ἐν τετρα-
γώνῳ μὲν τρίγωνον, ἐν αἰσθητικῷ δὲ τὸ 
θρεπτικόν)
(As it is in the case of the figures, so it is in the 
case of the soul: for always that which is ordered 
in series contains the prior potentially, in case 
of the figures and in the case of souls, as, e.g. in 
the tetragon, the triangle <is contained>, so in 
the perceptive soul the vegetative soul <is 
contained>).
399 Here “most common” does not mean that all souls are vegetative soul of some kind, 
i.e. the vegetative soul is not “most common” because all other souls belong to it as a genus. 
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The ἀεὶ in combination with the analogy as the triangle is in the tetragon, 
so in the perceptive soul, the vegetative soul suggests that the containment 
thesis is a feature of all p-series. The interpretation of the passage proves 
difficult since it is not clear what it means that the prior is contained in 
potentiality in the posterior. Since δύνᾰμις is said in many ways (Met. 
V.12, 1019b35-1020a4; ix.1, 1046a4f., a4-11), one has to determine the 
way it is used here. The following paragraph suggests considering it in 
the following way: 
The connection of “ὑπάρχειν” and “δυνάμει” is explicitly addressed 
neither in Met. V.12 nor in Met. IX, which are the most relevant chapters 
about δύνᾰμις for our purposes. The notion of δύνᾰμις that is possibly 
applied in our passage of the DA is the so-called ontological δύνᾰμις 
from Met. ix.6, 1048a31-32. According to Aristotle’s suggestions in that 
passage, one can determine what is F in potentiality by comparing it 
with what is F in actuality, since these notions are complements of each 
other.400 In our case, that the tetragon contains a triangle in potentiality 
needs to be contrasted with the case of containing a triangle in actuality 
in the way it is stated in Met. ix.6, 1048a32-34: we say that in the wood 
there is a Hermes in potentiality, and in the whole line there is its half 
in potentiality. And this is explained by the addition: because it could 
be taken away [and kept] – ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἄν. One can suppose this is 
meant in a literal sense (in contrast to an abstraction in thought) since 
one can literally take away the half from a line or the Hermes from 
the wood. Although it is not said here, but as a necessary consequence, 
the whole of the line and the (block of) wood is destroyed after having 
taken away the half from the line or the Hermes from the (block of) 
wood.401 Accordingly, we have to consider the tetragon that contains 
400 1048a31-32: Actuality is the being of a thing, not in the way in which we say that a thing 
is potentially – ἔστι δὴ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει. 
Aristotle states that one cannot define what to be potentially F or F in actuality actually means, 
but that one can see what it means by considering analogous cases (Met. ix.6, 1048a37: τὸ 
ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν), i.e. comparing what is potentially F and actually F with what is poten-
tially G and actually G.
401 There is a parallel passage which basically conforms with the former focussing on the 
example of numbers Met. VII.13, 1039a3-7: ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι ἐνυπαρχουσῶν 
ὡς ἐντελεχείᾳ· τὰ γὰρ δύο οὕτως ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέποτε ἓν ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἀλλ‘ ἐὰν δυνάμει δύο 
ᾖ, ἔσται ἕν (οἷον ἡ διπλασία ἐκ δύο ἡμίσεων δυνάμει γε· ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει) For it is 
182 7 The Pros Hen Relation and Ordered Series
the triangle in potentiality in the same way, and similarly the case of 
the different souls. It is impossible that the triangle that is contained in 
potentiality in the tetragon can become a triangle in actuality without 
thereby destroying the tetragon. One could “take away” (and keep) the 
triangle from the tetragon (if one divides the tetragon in the appropriate 
way). But one could not “take away” the triangle that is in the tetragon 
and keep the tetragon.402 The relationship between the tetragon and the 
contained triangle is that of whole and part.403 Met. V.11, 1019a8ff. sup-
ports this. The thing that is contained in something else is posterior in 
actuality, because only after the corruption of the whole, the part can 
be in actuality. This is in line with the passage of Met. ix.6, 1048a32-34. 
According to these considerations, the prior members of p-series are 
components of the posterior members of p-series and the prior mem-
bers can be the remnants of the corruption of posterior members. In 
this light, the containment-thesis is informative primarily with respect 
to the internal structure of posterior elements of the p-series and not 
very revealing regarding the relation between the members.
In the case of the soul, it is a little more difficult, but we can assume 
that the same pertains (cf. DA II.3, 414b20) to a certain degree (i.e. in the 
sublunary sphere and bracketing the difficult case of the intellect). For 
instance, according to the analogy to figures, an animal could become 
deprived of its perceptive organs and hence its perceptive soul by a 
tragic accident. This does not lead to it being soul-less since there is 
still its vegetative soul.404 The opposite is not possible: One cannot take 
away the perceptive soul from the vegetative soul that is contained in 
the perceptive soul and keep the perceptive soul separately (cf. DA II.2, 
413a31-b10). Therefore, the perceptive soul cannot be contained in poten-
tiality in the vegetative soul. At least this is not stated anywhere in the 
impossible that a substance is out of substances that are contained in actuality <in the sub-
stance>: for the two that is in actuality <a two> will never be one in actuality, but only if it 
is potentially two, it will be one (as e.g. the double consists out of two halves in potentiality, 
for the actuality separates).
402 You can’t have your cake and eat it too.
403 Cf. for the many ways in which ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ is said Phys. IV.3,210a14-24.
404 One has to concede that this way of thinking about it does not work for the intellect, 
since there is no corresponding organ which could be lost.
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Corpus. It is evident that the one can be without the other, while the 
other cannot be without the first. The following remarks confirm this:
DA II.3, 415a1-2: ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτι-
κοῦ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν
without the vegetative, there is no perceptive
This passage shows that the existence of higher-order members of 
p-series may depend on prior members. The perceptive is dependent on 
the vegetative for its existence: If the vegetative (faculty) does not exist, 
then the perceptive (faculty) does not exist. (This sounds very similar to 
the prominent claim of Cat. 5, 2b5-9 according to which nothing exists 
without substance).405 From this we can infer: if a perceptive (faculty or 
soul) exists, a vegetative (faculty) exists (in potentiality). What follows 
from this statement? The posterior members of the p-series are depen-
dent on the existence of prior members of the p-series. There is the 
following restriction to this: Posterior members do not depend on the 
existence of prior members which exist in actuality but only in poten-
tiality.406 Nevertheless, the vegetative faculty has a special status because 
it can exist without the other faculties. Either as the soul of a plant or 
according to corruption – κατὰ φθοράν (Met. V.11, 1019a14-15) as other 
types of souls can deteriorate into vegetative souls. Because of this, I 
propose that the vegetative faculty is prior in nature and being – κατά 
φύσιν και ουσίαν (cf. Met. V.11, 1019a3) to all other types of souls. No 
other soul can exist without it, while the vegetative soul can exist with-
out them.407 I will call this type of priority existential priority.
Since substances are also prior in existence to accidents just as the 
vegetative soul is prior to other soul types, one may assume a close rela-
tionship between the two cases. I admit that these cases resemble each 
other in this regard. However, there is also a crucial difference between 
the two. While accidents inhere in substances, higher-order entities of 
405 Cf. also Phys. I.2, 185a31-32.
406 This restriction is necessary to clarify that posterior members do not depend on the 
existence of any vegetative soul but on the existence of that vegetative souls that are com-
ponents of themselves.
407 The series of vegetative, perceptive and intellectual soul pertains in this form only to 
the mortal beings cf. 415a9. Aristotle states that there is a separated account for the con-
templative mind cf. 415a11-12. Cf. also the remark about the destruction of the posterior 
elements of the series by the destruction of the first in EE I.8, 1218a1-8.
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p-series do not inhere into lower-order members — the situation is 
quite the opposite. Lower-order members inhere in higher-order mem-
bers and become parts of them while substances do not become part of 
non-substantial entities.
Since each perceptive soul or faculty contains a vegetative faculty 
in potentiality, the statement of the DA II.3, 415a1-2 reflects the internal 
priority relations within posterior members of p-series (whereas from 
this it does not follow that the perceptive soul is a mere aggregate of the 
vegetative faculty and some further distinct capacity).
Unfortunately, the passage (DA II.3, 415a1-2) fails to satisfactorily 
answer the question in which way the prior members of the p-series are 
prior to the posterior members. It does not add anything to the thesis 
that the vegetative faculty is most common – κοινοτάτη, and the first 
soul – πρώτη ψυχή (DA II.4, 415a23-25) because it is a (fundamental) 
part of all souls. There are other senses of priority one might wish to 
discuss in this context. However, the only one relevant to us regarding 
the relation of p-series and the PHR is logical priority- κατά τον λόγον, 
since this is the most characteristic feature of the PHR.408
There is no evidence that the definitions of members of p-series 
depend on other members – be it the prior on the posterior, or the pos-
terior on the prior. It does not seem necessary to define the perceptive 
faculty (or the tetragon) in relation to the vegetative (or the triangle), or 
vice versa. What it means to be for a perceptive soul is to be a capacity 
to receive certain forms. It does not seem necessary to add that it also 
contains the capacity to nourish and grow. Even though if the vegetative 
faculty is a necessary part of it, it is not necessary that the definition of 
the perceptive soul depends on it.409 Unfortunately, there is no explicit 
textual evidence given in the DA regarding this question. Neither is 
there any clear evidence for the other examples of p-series except one. 
In the Academic example of number/point – line – plane – solid, there 
408 Especially, Owen (1960: 169–170) and Ferejohn (1980: 118–120) determine this as the 
decisive feature of the PHR.
409 Fortenbaugh (1978: 129) does not see any reason to assume definitional priority within 
p-series, since there is no “logical analysis” to be found in those cases. He assumes that the 
vegetative soul is first not because it is logically prior, but because it is “most common”. He 
refers to 415a24 (p. 131). 
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is a dependence in definition. However, I doubt that this occurrence 
enables us to consider dependence in definition an essential feature of 
all other cases of p-series.410 Even if one assumed that the first member 
of a p-series is prior in definition to the posterior members, it cannot 
be identified with the PHR. The main reason for the difference between 
these two concepts is provided by the containment-thesis which does 
not apply to the focally related entities. It is not the case that health is 
contained in potentiality in any of the focally related entities. 
To conclude, there is insufficient evidence to accept p-series as a 
variant of the PHR or to consider the PHR an abbreviated variant of 
a p-series. The similarity of p-series and the PHR primarily consists 
of providing alternative rationales for the unity of things that lack a 
common genus but share the same name. Moreover, I claim that there 
is no elaborate theory of p-series to be found in Aristotle. The alleged 
priority relations of the members of p-series cannot be used to clarify 
the relation to the PHR because the relevant kinds of priorities within 
p-series are not specifically determined. The priority relations vary 
from example to example, and there are not too many of them. The 
only kind of priority that belongs to all p-series cases is the one that 
genuinely belongs to those orders (cf. Cat. 12, 14a30-31). Because of all 
this, the relationship between ordered series and the PHR is more remote 
than often assumed.
410 In the same way I rejected existential priority as a feature of the PHR. While in the 
case of being existential priority is combined with the PHR it does not legitimate the claim 
that existential priority is an essential part of the PHR. 
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8 The Pros Hen Relation in the 
Context of the Metaphysics IV
8.1 “Being” is said in many Ways !?
Ultimately, in Met. IV Aristotle explicitly claims that the PHR also applies 
to being. Hence, according to the classificatory scheme of the DefH-view, 
“being” must also be a polysemous multivocal. In the present study, this 
thesis is essentially undisputed. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning 
that Shields (1999) proposes that Aristotle fails to show that “being” is 
said in many ways (in Shields’s terminology, he fails to demonstrate that 
being is homonymous). Shields argues at great length in his 9th chap-
ter (starting 217ff.) that “there is no workable analysis of being as core 
dependent homonym” (225). Despite admitting that “many central phil-
osophical concepts are in fact core-dependent homonyms”411, he holds 
that “being fails to be homonymous” (268). In addition, he claims “there 
is no distinctively Aristotelian doctrine about the homonymy of being 
to illuminate or defend” (267), and, albeit many central philosophical 
concepts are homonymous when it comes being “[…] Aristotle may be 
guilty of a certain sort of overreaching” (270). I disagree with Shields’s 
assessments for several reasons, not all of which can be incorporated 
into this study. Nevertheless, some issues are addressed.412 
On the one hand, Shields is right to call for a proof that indicates 
that “being” is homonymous (in Shields’s terminology) as in other cases 
something like proof is indeed issued.413 On the other hand, one has 
to be aware of where the thesis of the homonymy of being originates 
from. The following explanation does not present the only origin of the 
hypothesis that being must be said in many ways, yet, it is an influential 
one: That being is said in many ways can be considered a thesis that is 
set up to solve certain problems deriving from the Eleatic assumption 
411 His examples are “‘cause’, ‘principle’, ‘nature’, ‘necessity’, ‘substance’, ‘friendship’, ‘part’, 
‘whole’, ‘priority’, ‘posteriority’, ‘the state’, and ‘justice’.” (268).
412 Ward (2008: 103ff.) provides a defence of Aristotle against Shields’s objections.
413 Aristotle lists various tests (about twelve) that are supposed to show that something 
is said in many ways in Top. I.15.
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of the univocity of being.414 One may call it an assumption of hypothet-
ical necessity, which Aristotle uses to avoid certain Eleatic absurdities, 
such as the claim that all being is one. From this point of view, it is easy 
to see why there is strictly speaking no “proof ” in the case of “being” 
despite there being “proofs” in some other cases. 
A further critique by Shields on Aristotle may prove dubious: Shields 
(1999: 266) admits that it is “account dependence that is relevant for 
establishing core-dependent homonymy”, and further, he contends 
that “those who point to these forms of dependence already assume 
the non-univocity of being.” Hence, if Shields’s denial of the non-uni-
vocity of being also rejects account-dependence between one being and 
another, he criticises how Aristotle defines things. There is no reason 
to think that Aristotle defines one being as logically prior to the other 
because he presupposes that being is said in many ways. Of course, one 
may criticise how Aristotle defines things, and one may suggest other 
definitions, but since he defines as he does, i.e. proposing that the defi-
nition of being x contains the definition of being y, as stated in several 
passages, one should rather claim that the non-univocity of being is 
something Aristotle “reads off ” the definitions of the different beings. 
In this respect, the non-univocity of being is not a presupposition, but 
a consequence of the way Aristotle defines things. 
In addition, Shields’s interpretation of the following thesis in Met. 
IV.2, 1004a4-5 indicates another problem. The passage in question is: 
that which is falls at once into genera – ὑπάρχει γὰρ εὐθὺς γένη ἔχον τὸ 
ὂν. Among Aristotle scholars, this claim is well-known.415 Every being is 
of some kind and each time “being” is said of something, it is possible 
to determine with reference to that kind what it is to be for that thing. 
Thus, the term “being” must be said in many ways. Shields (1999: 229), 
however, interprets Aristotle’s claim in the following way. He assumes 
that this claim states that “Everything of which it is true to say that it 
exists is such that there is some predicate, other than existence, which 
can also be predicated of it.” With this interpretation, Shields disen-
414 Cf. Soph. El. 182b25-27. Also cf. Phys. I.3, 186a22ff. cf. also footnote 118.
415 Owen (1965a: 264); Shields (1999: 229); Geach, P. T. (1954). Form and Existence. 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55: 251–272. Anscombe, G.E.M., and P. T. Geach. (1963). 
Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege. Les Etudes Philosophiques 18 (2): 207–208.
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tangles what he calls “existence” from “some [other] predicate”, and he 
considers them two co-occurring predicates. However, this does not 
seem to be Aristotle’s intention in this passage. One may very well infer 
from Aristotle’s remark that everything that is is determinable because 
it immediately falls into different genera. I assume this means that the 
accounts of beings differ not because some other predicate belongs 
to them as well but because they differ insofar as they are beings.416 
Shields’s interpretation is based on the assumption that, in his words, 
“to exist” and “falling into a genus” are two vastly unrelated predicates. 
Apart from their co-occurrence, there is no connection.
Yet, there must be a connection that goes beyond co-occurrence, 
since the question what it is to be (or “to exist” in Shields’s words)417 for 
x is the same question as what it is to be x. In the context of the passage, 
one can infer this from Aristotle’s statement 1003b26-29 that there is no 
difference between the expression “man” and “being a man” (καὶ οὐχ 
ἕτερόν τι δηλοῖ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν). Generally, this is clear from Aristotle’s 
practice of referring to the essence (the τί ἦν εἶναι) of something. Aris-
totle commonly uses phrases such as τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι or τὸ κρύσταλλῳ 
εἶναι to refer to the essence of something in quite an abstract way. The 
full account of τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι is simply the definition of man. Thus, 
for Aristotle, there is one single answer to the following two questions 
“what it is to be for the man” and “what it is to be a man”.418 Because of 
416 This claim may be guilty of falling into the sense-kind confusion described by Mat-
thews (1972: 157). Matthews claims that if one thinks that 1. “’To exist’ has ten senses”; and 
2. “There are ten kinds of existence” are jointly acceptable one is to fall into the sense-kind 
confusion. Moreover, “And to suppose that the reason there are n senses of ‘exist’ is that 
there are (correspondingly) n kinds of existence is to compound the confusion;” (p. 157). 
417 Unfortunately, Shields does not explain when he uses “to exist” to translate “εἶναι” 
and when “to be”, even though the distinction is highly controversial among Aristotle 
scholars. Cf. Brown, L. (1994). The verb „to be” in Greek philosophy. In Language, ed. 
Stephen Everson, 212–237. Cf. also Kahn, C. H. (1966). The Greek Verb ‚To Be‘ and the Con-
cept of Being. Foundations of Language 2 (3): 245–265. Cf. also Dancy, R. M. (1983). Aris-
totle and Existence. Synthese 54 (3): 409–442. And Matthews (1995); For a controversial 
interpretation cf. Gómez-Lobo, A. (1980). The So-Called Question of Existence in Aristotle, 
an. Post. 2. 1–2. Review of Metaphysics 34 (1): 71–89.
418 Another illustration of this practice is given in the DA II.4, 415b13 living for the living 
things is their being, but cause and principle of this is the soul – τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί 
ἐστιν, αἰτία δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ τούτου ἡ ψυχή. In this passage “to be” for a living thing means “to 
be alive”. Thus, if one calls an animal a “being” then what it is to be a being for this thing 
will simply be what it is to be an animal.
this, I may propose the following reassessment of Shields’s interpreta-
tion of Aristotle’s thesis from above: “To exist” and “falling into a genus” 
behave like definiendum and definiens. What it is to be (or to exist) is 
nothing else that belonging to this or that genus and be defined in terms 
of that genus. Since the genera can differ, the accounts of these beings 
can differ, and hence, the non-univocity of being is warranted. 
There is another of Shields’s arguments that needs reassessment. In 
his section 9.9 (260ff.) much of Shields critique is based on Aristotle’s 
claim that homonymous things are incommensurable. (He refers to 
Phys. 248b6-11; cf. Cat. 11a5-13; Pol. 1259b36-8; Top. 116a1-8).419 Shields 
apparently assumes that this claim has to be taken very seriously, i.e. 
without exceptions. According to Shields’s terminology (which mainly 
covers the InfH-view), being would be homonymous, and thus it should 
also be incommensurable. However, since as Shields claims (261) that 
all beings are commensurable, he concludes that they must be synony-
mously beings.420 On the one hand, one may argue against this that the 
incommensurability-test421 is only to warrant (accidental) homonymy 
and not polysemous multivocity. On the other hand, even if also those 
cases are all incommensurable, it is not evident that being is commen-
surable in the relevant sense. I may even argue that it is not commen-
surable at all. If it is not commensurable, Shields’s argument is based on 
false assumptions. Indeed, one may wonder about the commensurabil-
ity claim concerning beings. Shields explains that this claim only holds 
if Aristotle adheres to something he calls “degrees-of-reality hypothesis” 
(264). Fortunately, Shields admits that this claim is of “dubious coher-
ence” (265). Yet, he does not mention that the thesis one usually asso-
ciates with “degrees of reality” is connected to the interpretation of the 
μᾶλλον-passage in Met. VII.1, 1028a25-26. Morrison (1987)422 suggested 
419 According to the terminology of DefH-view all these claims do not create any problem. 
Within the InfH terminology, one would have to add that the cases with associations between 
the homonyms are problematic since in those cases Aristotle admits commensurability. 
420 He assumes: “Unless two things are F synonymously, it is impossible to compare them 
in terms of F-ness.” (262).
421 Cf. Top. I.15, 107b13-18. 
422 Morrison, D. (1987). The Evidence for Degrees of Being in Aristotle. The Classical Quar-
terly 37 (02): 382.
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three ways one can conceive of μᾶλλον.423 Here, only two will be men-
tioned. The first assumes that μᾶλλον means “more”, i.e. “to a higher 
degree”. Morrison (1987) calls this interpretation the “intensity” inter-
pretation. The second assumes that μᾶλλον means “rather” (Morisson’s 
“metalinguistic” interpretation). Something can be called F rather, i.e. in 
a stricter sense, than something else that also is called F.424 
Shields presumably agrees with the intensity-reading of μᾶλλον. 
Only this reading supports his “degrees-of-reality” thesis while the 
other two do not. Unfortunately, an inconsistency results from this 
assumption as being is also claimed to be said in many ways and, as 
known, nothing that is said in many ways is commensurable. Morrison 
points out that there is a solution to this problem, which avoids incon-
sistency based on the Protrepticus B 81–82 which, he assumes, makes 
a point for those multivocals ordered by priority and posteriority.425
“Normally one is not allowed to compare across ambiguity. But when 
the items to which the ambiguous predicate is applied are related to 
each other as prior and posterior, then comparison is allowed. Aristotle’s 
point is not that ‘more’ can mean ‘in a stricter sense’ rather than ‘to a 
greater degree’. Rather, his point is that when the subjects of predication 
are related as ‘prior and posterior’, then one is allowed to speak of the 
predicate applying ‘to a greater degree’ despite the multiplicity of senses.” 
Morrison (1987: 398)426
423 For a discussion of this topic see Morrison (1987).
424 This thesis is adhered by Owen (1960: 186). 
425 The reference to the Protrepticus B 81–82 is also found in Owen (1960: 186). How-
ever, it is a matter of interpretation what exactly these passages suggest. A full compari-
son of Owen (1960), and Morrison (1987) is not necessary in this context. Shields (1999: 
262 n. 367) is aware of Morrison’s remarks, however, apparently Shields does not share 
Morrison’s assessment of the Protrepticus B 81–82. The passages of the Protrepticus can be 
found in Düring (1969: 71–73). Düring, I. 1969). Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles. Frankfurt 
am Main. For a concise review of Düring cf. Strycker, E. de, and Ingemar Düring. (1969). 
Gnomon 41 (3): 233–255.
426 Cf. also page 400: “For in this passage, Aristotle points out an exception to his usual 
prohibition. If the ambiguous terms are related as prior and posterior, it is acceptable to 
compare them after all”.
According to Shields’s interpretation, the commensurability of being 
not only threatens but makes the non-univocity of being impossible. 
But even though the passages of the Protrepticus allow different inter-
pretations, they provide sufficient reasons to doubt that Shields’s (1999: 
261) argument rests on solid grounds. In addition, one may object to 
Shields because his interpretation approves Aristotle being inconsistent, 
which is nothing a charitable interpretation should desire. I thus refute 
Shields’s interpretation.
8.2 What is the Innovation of the  
Metaphysics IV?
It is common within Aristotelian scholarship that the most innovative 
feature of Met. IV is the application of the PHR to being and connected 
with that the justification of the possibility of a single science of being. 
It is often assumed that development in Aristotle’s thought caused this 
introduction of new ideas.427 Still, there are reasons to assume that the 
application of the PHR to being does not imply a vast doctrinal change 
and that it is not this feature that is most innovative but the expansion 
of Aristotle’s notion of science.
Yu (2001) argues there are reasons to doubt a decided doctrinal 
change between Aristotle’s Categories approach to being and his pros-
hen-approach in Met. IV.428 Whether or not Yu’s arguments to harmo-
nise Aristotle’s awarded two doctrines are entirely convincing or not, I 
admit that he brings the fact into focus that in Met. IV, Aristotle pres-
ents a new kind of unity for sciences. I agree with Yu that this is the most 
427 Cf. Bostock (1994) and Owen (1960).
428 Cf. also the remarks made earlier in this study on Yu (2001), Bostock (1994) and Owen 
(1960) in section 6.1.1.1. Yu calls the Categories’ approach to being the “multiplicity account” 
while he calls the Met. IV approach the “focal meaning account”. Yu (2001: 214) argues that 
in the Categories 4 Aristotle asks several questions about the same subject, e.g. whether 
something is in the Lyceum or whether it is grammatical. The form of predication is “S is P” 
whereas S is of the category of substance and P is a member of any other category. Yu calls 
this “substance-subject predication”. It itself indicates “that different things are all related 
to substance” (215). Finally, Yu concludes (216) with a hint to Met. 1003b6-10 “It should 
not be difficult to see that what substance-subject predication indicates is precisely a pros 
hen relation of other beings to substance”. 
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important theoretical development of Met. IV since it allows Aristotle 
to develop the science of being qua being. 
The application of the PHR to being is most prominent since it is 
combined with a unique innovation regarding his theory of sciences. 
In Met. IV, Aristotle justifies the possibility of a unified science of being, 
however, the way he does that reveals an explanatory pattern that does 
not only justify the unity of the science of being but possibly also the 
unity of other sciences as, e.g. medicine, i.e. the science of all healthy 
things (cf. Met. IV.2, 1003b11). Aristotle determines the subject of the 
science of being as being qua being and what belongs to it per se – ὂν ᾗ 
ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ’ αὑτό (1003a21-22; 1005a3, 13).429 Since 
being is said in many ways, large parts of Met. IV deal with the challenge 
to explain why and how it is possible to suggest that there is a single 
science that considers all beings. This may pose a challenge since it is 
possible (according to several developmental theses about the order of 
Aristotle’s works) that in Met. IV (and VI), Aristotle revises some of his 
earlier views (see below). Still, it is debatable whether Aristotle actually 
revises his view or whether he has merely postponed the application of 
the PHR to being. This question is addressed in many contributions, 
some of which have been mentioned already above.430 
These allegedly “older” views are primarily given in EE I.8, 1217b27-
18a1 and the parallel EN I.6 1096a24-33.431 What is stated there implic-
itly denies the possibility of a single science of being.432 In EE I.8, 
1217b27-18a1 Aristotle states that “good” is said in many ways. In EN 
1096a24, the claim differs a little bit: He states that the good is said in 
429 These per se attributes are unity, sameness, difference and contrariety; cf. Met. IV.2, 
1004a16-20, 25–31; 1005a11-13. Furthermore, this science is not compartmentalised (Met. 
IV.1), but universal in as much as it is primary (Μet. VI.1, 1026a30-31). The task of this 
science is to investigate into the principles and causes of substance (Met. IV.1, 1003a31-32; 
similar also 1003b17-19). However, in Met. IV.2, 1004b6-8 Aristotle also includes the 
accidents (συμβεβηκότα) into the scope of that science. 
430 One has to mention Owen (1960) and his developmental thesis which was mentioned 
above. In addition, as mentioned, Yu (2001) and Bostock (1994). A thorough analysis of 
this topic is also found in Wilson (2000). 
431 These passages have been mentioned already in chapter 7.
432 In addition, in An. Post. II.7, 92b14 and in Top. IV.1, 121a16-19 and 121b7-9 there are 
remarks that make us wonder whether Aristotle ever had a unified science of being at the 
back of his mind, yet, these remarks do not exclude this necessarily. 
as many ways as being is said. Let us call this the being – good – analogy. 
Moreover, he claims that it is hardly possible, that the good-itself will be 
considered in the leisure of one, i.e. in one single science – ὥστε σχολῇ 
αὐτό γε τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς (1218a40-b1; also compare lines 
1217b33-35). Nothing prevents thinking that, mutatis mutandis, accord-
ing to the being – good – analogy, this also pertains to the possibility of a 
science of being. Because of this, it is surprising that in the Metaphysics 
Aristotle claims that there is a science of being possible. The conscien-
tious reader of the Ethics should expect that there is no unified science 
of being, but many sciences of being in analogy to the case of the good 
of which Aristotle claims that there are many sciences (EN 1096a30). 
Aristotle even emphatically adds that there are various sciences of the 
goods that are in one category – νῦν δ’ εἰσὶ πολλαὶ [ἐπιστήμαι] καὶ τῶν 
ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν (EN 1096a31-32). The examples in this context are 
of opportunity and moderation (οἷον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ τὸ μέτριον (1217b36-
37/1096a32-35)). Moderation belongs to the category of quantity and 
opportunity belongs to time (1217b31-32). Yet, the various sorts of oppor-
tunity and moderation are studied in different sciences, e.g. concerning 
food by medicine and gymnastics, concerning military operations by 
strategies, and similarly in respect of another pursuit by another science – 
καὶ οὕτως ἑτέρα περὶ ἑτέραν πρᾶξιν (1217b40).433 Consequently, Aristo-
tle explicitly claims, at least in the EE (1218a40-b1; compare also lines 
1217b33-35), that the complexity of the things that are goods, analo-
gously to the multiplicity of the things that are beings, is hardly attain-
able in the leisure of a single science.434
433 According to Woods’s (1992: 69) reading of that passage it may also be possible that 
one science studies opportunity (something that belongs to the category of time) and 
moderation (something that belongs to the category of quantity) at the same time. Accord-
ing to this idea, there is no such restriction that sciences only study objects that belong to 
a single category. 
434 This view is at variance with what Aristotle presents as a Platonic view on it, namely 
that there is a single idea of the good which is a thesis which demands that the “good” is 
said in one way only. Aristotle claims that for Plato everything that is good is good for 
the same reason: Everything that is good is good because it participates in the good-itself 
(compare for this Meno 71e1-72a5). In addition, as stated earlier, section 4.1.2, there is only 
one account for the good thing and the good-itself. Aristotle is explicitly sceptic about the 
question what the “itself ” supposedly means since he assumes that for the man and the 
man-itself there is just one and the same definition – εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν (EN I.6, 
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There are several ways in which Aristotle determines what a single sci-
ence is. Within Met. IV.1, 1003a21-26 a single science is devoted to a 
separated “part of being” and it considers this part solely under a cer-
tain aspect. In a similar vein, this is repeated in Met. VI.1, 1025b7-9: 
But all these [the special sciences] draw a line around a specific being, 
i.e. a specific genus with which they deal – ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι αὗται περὶ ὄν τι 
καὶ γένος τι περιγραψάμεναι περὶ τούτου πραγματεύοντα. These genera 
establish the traditional branches of sciences such as biology, physics 
or geometry. These sciences investigate specific domains of being, i.e. 
biology investigates beings insofar as they are alive, physics insofar as 
they are being moved, geometry insofar as they are two-dimensionally 
extended.435 Specific of these sciences is that they consider things that 
fall under the same genus. The case of the good falls out of alignment 
for several reasons.436 
Even though Aristotle denies in EE I.8 that there is a single science 
in the case of the good, and analogously in the case of being, he points 
out in EN I.6, 1096b27-28 that the different ways the good is said are 
(perhaps – ἴσως) associated (either by analogy or PHR).437 The tension 
that troubles the scholarship emerges from the following fact: In the 
Ethics nothing is said about the possibility of a science that rests on 
the association of the different senses of the good, or of being. At least 
concerning being there is a claim of this kind in the Metaphysics (in 
IV.1-2, VI.1 and also in K.3438). In the Metaphysics, it is clear that the 
association necessary for the possibility of a single science is the PHR. 
1096b1, also Met. XIII.4, 1079a33-b3 = Met. I.9, 991a2-8). Thus, (for Plato) “good” is said 
synonymously, and because of that there would be only one science of the good (cf. EN 
1096a29). However, among other things, Aristotle claims (EN 1096a30-32) that this con-
tradicts the facts, i.e. the fact that there are many sciences of the good. 
435 Of course, a horse can be considered in biology and at the same time in physics, yet, 
under a different aspect. Aristotle is explicit in this regard. Cf. Met. XIII.3, 1078a9-31. 
436 In fact, there is a multiplicity of sciences of the good (EN 1096a30-32). Furthermore, 
Aristotle claims that the accounts of honour, wisdom and pleasure insofar as they are 
goods are evidently distinct (1096b23f.). The good is evidently predicable in all categories 
(1096a24ff.). Hence, the good is said in many ways and it is hardly possible to consider 
them in the leisure of one science (EE 1218a40-b1; also compare lines 1217b33-35).
437 Cf. section 6.3.
438 If there is a certain association between the things with the same name, there can be 
a common science of them, if not, there will be not one but many. This is how Aristotle 
puts it for the case of being in Met. XI.3, 1060b33.
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The EE I.8 comprises no remark on this solution although the PHR is 
a concept available in EE VII.2. In contrast to EE I.8, the parallel in EN 
I.6, 1096b27-32 contains a clear reference to the PHR, albeit followed 
by the remark that “the discussion of this question [i.e. the association 
of the different ways in which the good is said] must be dismissed […] 
because it belongs more properly to another branch of philosophy.” 
Three possible options may explain this “tension”:
1. Relocation-thesis: The admission of a single science of the good 
(and also of being) is not mentioned in the Ethics since it would 
undermine Aristotle’s argument against the Platonic theses about the 
idea of the good. It is a part of his argument that there are “in fact” 
various sciences of the good (EN 1096a30-32). If he admitted that 
there is a single science (even though only in a certain sense), this 
would undoubtedly weaken his argument. Thus, he remains silent 
in this regard and might just relocate the presentation of his views 
to another occasion which is found in the Metaphysics.
2. Change-of-mind-thesis:439 This thesis considers the argument of the 
Metaphysics to present a new theory. In the Ethics, the application of 
the PHR to being has not yet been on Aristotle´s mind. This explains 
the lack of information on it. Aristotle had the PHR available, but not 
its applicability to being. 
3. Expansion-of-science-thesis: According to this thesis, the significant 
change in Aristotle’s thought does not concern the applicability of 
the PHR to being or other notions, but it concerns the possibility to 
use the PHR to justify the unity of a single science.440 
While the first thesis remains neutral on a possible development in Aris-
totle’s thought, the latter two can be considered developmental theses, 
albeit, regarding distinct aspects. 
The relocation-thesis is appealing because it does not imply (nor 
exclude) any changes in Aristotle’s thought. Furthermore, it complies 
439 Owen (1960: 168) proposes this view which implies a development of Aristotle’s thought.
440 This claim also has been proposed by Yu (2001). Cf. section On Owen (1960),  
Bostock (1994) and Yu (2001) 6.1.1.1.
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with Aristotle’s remark that a proper investigation of these matters does 
not belong to ethical studies (EN I.6, 1096b30-32). Additionally, nothing 
in the Organon or the Ethics contradicts the possibility that the PHR is 
also applicable to being. Hence, the relocation-thesis is not inconsis-
tent with other works, and it does not impose assumptions about any 
possible development in Aristotle’s thought. 
The change-of-mind thesis is the boldest of the theses since it implies 
a change in Aristotle’s thought of which the only evidence is his omis-
sion of the applicability of the PHR to being in the Ethics (and possibly 
other works).441 Although this thesis aims to explain this silence, and 
a change of mind would suffice for this, it is difficult to back this claim 
with direct evidence. Nevertheless, there is a closely related example 
illustrating that a change of mind is possible. It is the case of friendship. 
While in EE the PHR applies to friendship, it does not apply to it in the 
EN. Hence, at least, in that case, Aristotle changed his mind about the 
applicability of the PHR.
The expansion of science thesis also implies a developmental aspect, 
however, in comparison to the former claim, it is not entirely based on 
silence. Aristotle states in EE I.8 that a single science of things that are 
said in many ways is hardly possible. However, as the possibility that 
the PHR is also applicable to being is within reach because of the analo-
gous treatment of the good and being, it is plausible to assume that the 
real “change of mind concerns” the way in which sciences are unified. 
Further support for the expansion of science thesis is given by the 
fact that even without the remarks in the Ethics, the possibility of a sin-
gle science of being as it is presented in the Metaphysics is something 
innovative. Several times, Aristotle claims and argues that being is not a 
genus442 and since sciences are usually unified by genera,443 it is plausi-
ble to doubt that there is a single science of being. Yet, in Metaphysics IV, 
Aristotle explains that not every science is of one genus. The absence of 
441 Owen (1960: 168) claims that in the EE Aristotle had “not yet seen its [i.e. focal mean-
ing] application to such wholly general expressions as ‘being’ or ‘good’.” Against Owen 
one has to concede that at least in EN I.6 is quite clear that Aristotle saw the possibility of 
applying the PHR to the good.
442 Met. III.3, 998b22, X.2, 1053b21-24, Met. XI.1, 1059b31-34, An. Post. II.7, 92b14. 
443 For more information about this cf. the next section.
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a genus is no longer an obstacle for the foundation of a single science. 
This may well have been different in the Organon (cf. An. Post. I.28), 
although it does not mention this. Even if it was explicitly stated that 
there are no alternatives to the generic unity of sciences, the admission 
of sciences, which are one, not by a common genus, but by the PHR is 
a comparatively small concession. This small concession has influen-
tial consequences. In combination with the application of the PHR to 
being, which is not necessarily an entirely new body of thought in the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle can found a unified science of being. Whether 
Aristotle changed his mind or not, and whether there was a reason for 
this change, or whether Aristotle simply remained silent on this ques-
tion is hardly reconstructible. Yet, the view that a science is possible of 
something that is said in many ways is at variance with the Platonic 
view, cf. footnote 434.444 
8.3 The Impact of Met. IV on the Pros Hen  
Relation
Yu (2001) pointed to an important feature, the expansion of the Aris-
totelian notion of science. This is not only the notion of science that is 
further developed in the book; the Metaphysics also has an impact on the 
PHR. Before Met. IV, the PHR does not serve as a principle of unity for 
sciences. This is an entirely new task that Aristotle ascribes to the PHR. 
In the Ethics, particularly in EE VII.2, Aristotle does not mention this 
function of the PHR. Hence, the expansion of science claim does affect 
not only the notion of science but also the notion of the PHR. In fact, this 
modification seems adequate since apart from the usual way sciences 
are unified, i.e. by reference to a genus, there is ostensibly no other way a 
444 Cf. also Met. I.9, 992b18-24: Aristotle argues against the Platonic approach, to explain 
every being is constructed out of the same elements, without distinguishing between the dif-
ferent ways in which “being” is said. This approach would be unsuccessful, since one would 
find “elements” only in substances, while one would not find “elements” in the accidental 
categories. Consequently, these alleged “elements” would not be elements of all beings but 
only of some beings. And hence the Platonic approach (the assumption of a universal sci-
ence for everything) cannot be right. Remotely related is also SE 11, 172a9-15 where Aristo-
tle claims that there is no genus of all things.
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science can be unified, except by the PHR.445 That the PHR is a principle 
of unity of sciences is a feature of the PHR that cannot be equated with 
its feature that it is a principle of unity alternative to generic unity. Not 
every principle of unity is apt to serve as principle of unity of sciences.
The next section reveals that the PHR is a principle of the unity of sci-
ences in general, not only in the case of the science of being qua being. 
Thus, it seems that in all cases in which a PHR features as a principle of 
unity, a scientific investigation is possible. 
8.4 Kath Hen vs Pros Hen  – Two Possible 
Subject Areas of Sciences
8.4.1 A Clarification: Talking about ἐπιστήμη  
in Aristotle 
If one talks about science in Aristotle one talks about what he calls 
“ἐπιστήμη”. Still, “science” is just one of the possible translations of 
“ἐπιστήμη”. The most common translation is not “science” but “knowl-
edge”. In addition, it can also mean “acquaintance with something”, 
in the sense of “skill”; and also “profession”. Quite often the plural 
“ἐπιστῆμαι” is translated as “science”. There is no strict convention. The 
most appropriate translation depends primarily on the context. 
The translations “science” and “knowledge” are related. To provide a 
general account of science, one could say that one calls “science” knowl-
edge that is structured according to some principle. The following dis-
tinction does not aim to delineate a complete theory of the notion of 
ἐπιστήμη in Aristotle but a rough overview. According to Top. 130a20; 
Met. 1017b3, 1087a15, An. Post. I.2) one can distinguish between
 
1. Knowledge as a mental state
2. Knowledge as the content of the mental state, i.e. what is called 
“knowledge of something.”
445 Cf. also section 8.4.2 and the remark about Met. IV.2, 1004a23-25. 
The first of these two options are not relevant in this context. The second 
one can be further distinguished in different ways. There are two main 
approaches to distinguish between “kinds” of knowledge as content.
 
1. The distinction of kinds of knowledge (as content) by way of its 
acquisition:
– One calls knowledge that which is gained from sensory perception,  
memory and experience (cf. An. Post. II.19, also Met. IV.2). This 
leads to (universal) knowledge of facts (An. Pr. I.30). This can be - 
come starting points for demonstrations and then it may be called
– Non-demonstrative knowledge (72a15: Ἀμέσαι ἀρχαι – immediate 
principles (axioms, hypotheses, and definitions, also 72b19-20 and 
88b37)
– Demonstrative Knowledge: Knowledge that is acquired through 
demonstrations
2. The distinction of kinds of knowledge (as content) by the kind of 
content (KOC): 
– One may say: This knowledge (as content) is of one kind because  
it is concerned with one kind of content, e.g. animals.
The following paragraphs primarily focus on the latter way of dis-
tinguishing between kinds of knowledge. The KOC-type distinction is 
found, e.g. in Met. VI.1, 1025a13ff: the principle of Physics is that it con-
siders the moved and inseparable. The principle of Mathematics is that 
it considers the unmoved and inseparable. The principle of theology is 
that it considers the unmoved and separate. Normally, Theology, Math-
ematics and Physics themselves are also called ἐπιστήμη, but in this 
context, ἐπιστήμη translates with “science”. Hence, sciences represent 
those types of knowledge that are ordered according to a particular rule 
determining their content.
Still, as the following paragraphs show, there are two ways in which 
the topics of sciences can be unified. Hence, the following distinction 
concerns the unification of the KOC. 
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It is stated above that the regular way sciences are unified is concerned 
with genera. For example, each of these sciences is one science: geom-
etry, physics and biology. One approach to explaining their unity is to 
refer to the unity of the objects of these sciences. They are unified, in a 
way, as well. In the given examples, they are unified by their genus (cf. 
Met. V.6, 1016a24). The science that corresponds to these things is also 
one according to that genus. In the An. Post. I.28. 87a38 Aristotle states 
that science is one when it is of one genus: Μία δ’ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ ἑνὸς 
γένους – A single science is the one that is of one genus. Presumably, it 
is valid to specify this in the following way “A single science is the one 
whose objects are of one genus”.446 
According to these passages, genera serve as the principles of sci-
ences. For instance, if one considers Zoology and Botany or the like, it 
is easy to see that these sciences examine genera of objects. These two 
enquire into animals and plants. Hence, if something is a subject of this 
science, it must be an animal or a plant. There is no difference in what 
it is to be an animal for an ant and what it is to be an animal for an 
elephant. Thus, Zoology investigates ants and elephants for the same 
reason, i.e. because both are animals. Furthermore, it investigates them 
as animals.447 This is the regular way according to which sciences are 
distinguished.448
In Met. IV.2 Aristotle presents the alleged innovation, i.e. an alter-
native to the regular way sciences are unified. The two alternatives are 
called kath hen and pros hen sciences.449 This distinction adds the PHR 
as an alternative possibility to account for the unity of sciences to the 
regular way. 
446 Cf. also Met. IV.2, 1003b19-21. Similarly, in Top. I.15, 106a30; also, remotely similar 
κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν in EN I.6, 1096a29.
447 Aristotle deals with this aspect in Met. XIII.3, 1078a9-31.
448 The most important recent contribution on this topic is Wilson (2001). 
449 The question whether there are sciences of things of different genera is also formulated 
in Met. XI.3, 1061b16-17: λέγω δ‘ ἐν ᾗ διηπορεῖτο πῶς ἔσται πολλῶν καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων τῷ 
γένει μία τις ἐπιστήμη.
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In the following excerpt, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of things 
according to which it is possible to examine one science. Some things 
that are said – λέγεσθαι
1. καθ’ ἕν 
 and some are said
2. πρός μίαν φύσιν
Met. IV.2, 1003b12-16: οὐ γὰρ 
μόνον τῶν καθ’ ἓν [1] λεγομένων 
ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρός μίαν λεγομέ-
νων φύσιν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τρόπον 
τινὰ λέγονται καθ’ ἕν [2]. δῆλον 
οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ὄντα μιᾶς θεωρῆ-
σαι ᾗ ὄντα.
For not only in the case of those things that are said 
(καθ’ ἓν [1]) according to one, it is possible to examine 
one science, but also in the case of those things said 
in relation to one (πρός μίαν) nature: For these <lat-
ter> things are also said (καθ’ ἓν [2]) according to one, 
in a way. Therefore, it is clear that one considers also 
the beings, as <things> of one <single science>, that 
<considers> beings.
Firstly, let us consider the sciences, which proceed kath hen. The phrase 
“kath hen” simply means “according to one”. It is an elliptical or rather 
“unsaturated” manner of expression, i.e. to understand it properly, one 
has to add of what kind this hen is. In many passages, kath hen is sup-
plemented by something such as species or genus.450 However, it is quite 
conventional that kath hen is synonymous with “synonymously”. This 
interpretation agrees with the suggested supplements species or genus 
since no matter what is said according to one genus or species is said 
so synonymously. Several passages support this assumption.451 Thus, a 
straightforward assumption is that a kath hen science reflects things 
that are synonymous, and one has to qualify this by stating that they 
are synonymously Fs, e.g. animals. It is clear from above that the objects 
belonging to sciences such as Zoology or Botany belong to these sci-
ences because they are synonymously animals or plants. In other words: 
kath hen sciences can be identified as regular generic sciences. 
450 For passages in which εἶδος follows on “kath hen” cf. Top. 148a29-33; 103a17, 23; 
EE 1236a16, b26 (καθ’ ἕν in contrast to πρὸς ἕν) and also EN I.6, 1096b10.
451 On kath hen as synonym for “synonymous” cf. Top. VI.10, 148a29-33 and also Bonitz 
Ind. Arist., 369a443-49.
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In contrast to this are the pros hen sciences. They focus on things that 
are said in relation to one nature – πρός μίαν λεγομένων φύσιν. The dis-
tinction of kath hen and pros hen seems to be made en passant, but one 
has to emphasise the importance of this differentiation as it enables 
Aristotle to establish sciences of classes of things of which there was 
no science before, or at least not in a unified way. In the context of the 
given passage, Aristotle´s primary focus is to explain how the science 
of being qua being is possible. What is so interesting about this justi-
fication is that this explanation is not restricted to the science of being 
(cf. 1003b11 also all healthy things belong to one science, i.e. medicine). 
By telling us that beyond the regular kath hen sciences there is a differ-
ent approach the unity of sciences can be explained, namely involving 
sciences whose objects are said πρός μίαν φύσιν, Aristotle declares a 
principle of unity for a whole new branch of sciences which can be 
called pros hen sciences. 
In pros hen sciences, one can ask the same questions as above. What 
is a single science (in this sense)? The answer is the same: A science 
whose objects are unified in a certain way. Further, what is the way 
in which they are one? They are one, not because they belong to a 
common genus452, but because of their relation to one nature (πρός μίαν 
λεγομένων φύσιν) or principle – ἀρχή (1003b6). One can further ask 
what this nature is or how it unifies. Unfortunately, there is no answer 
given in the passage at hand. It is clear from other passages, e.g., in this 
context, especially from Met. IV.2 (and of course by EE VII.2) that gen-
erally speaking that nature or principle is what in this study is primarily 
called “focal reference”. The focal reference is prior to the focally related 
entities because it is contained in the definitions of the objects of that 
science, while itself does not hold the definitions of these objects. 
Hence, Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of unity concern-
ing sciences. On the one hand, there is a pros-hen-unity of sciences, and 
452 Even though in Met. IV.2, 1003b21-22 Aristotle states that all kinds of being belong 
to a science that is “generically” one. This is not in conflict with his kath hen-pros hen dis-
tinction, since even in the passage where he draws the distinction it is stated that there is a 
sense in which also the pros hen sciences are kath hen. From this, one can infer that there is 
also a sense in which pros hen sciences are generically one, even though it considers things 
of different genera. 
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on the other hand, there is a kath-hen-unity of sciences. From this point 
of view, Aristotle’s significant achievement in Met. IV is the expansion 
of how a science can be unified. This is an innovation as it is the first 
time it is formulated. 
There is a further peculiarity in the passage of Met. IV.2, 1003b12-16, 
which concerns the καθ’ ἕν at [1] and [2]. This peculiarity has influenced 
Owen (1960: 168) to his claim that “‘being’ is used not homonymously 
but even, in a way, synonymously”.453 By saying this, he refers to the 
passage just mentioned. This presupposes that the kath hen at [1] and 
[2] are used in the same way, but there are reasons to assume that this 
is not the case.
There is a difference between the two occurrences of “kath hen” since 
at [2] “kath hen” is qualified by τρόπον τινὰ. One can assume that at [2] 
it has a different, attenuated adverbial function that does not imply syn-
onymy, since the things that are said pros hen are not in a certain way – 
τρόπον τινὰ synonymous.454 Additionally, the certain way – τρόπον τινὰ 
may also indicate that the supplement, “genus”, from [1] is not appro-
priate for kath hen [2]. This would presuppose that there is something 
that is universally applicable to all objects of the respective science in 
the same way, which is precisely not correct for πρός ἓν-sciences since 
they are considering things of different genera. That is why the hen at 
[2] must be supplemented differently.
The best way to interpret the assertion that both approaches (kath 
hen and pros hen) are said kath hen in a way – καθ’ ἕν τρόπον τινὰ is to 
assume that this means that both approaches determine the subject area 
of a single science according to one regularity, i.e. either by belonging 
to a common synonymous genus (kath hen [1]), or by being related to 
a common nature (pros hen). Since it is not necessary to equate “kath 
hen” at [1] with [2], it is not necessary to assume that the things that 
are said pros hen are in a way said synonymously which was assumed by 
Owen. I think this reading needlessly strains Aristotle’s terminological 
distinction of homonymy, synonymy and multivocity. 
453 Because of this claim Owen may be considered adhering the tertium quid view.
454 In Met. XI.3, 1061a10-11 and 1061b10-12 Aristotle uses “kath hen” interchangeably with 
 “pros hen”. 
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In Met. IV.2, there is another informative passage related to the expan-
sion-of-science claim. According to this thesis, the distinction between 
kath hen and pros hen sciences is exhaustive. These are the only two ways 
the unity of a science can be determined. Aristotle states 1004a23-25: 
something, when it is said in many ways <does not belong to one science>, 
if the λόγοι are neither brought up kath hen nor pros hen – οὐ γὰρ εἰ 
πολλαχῶς, ἑτέρας, ἀλλ’ εἰ μήτε καθ’ ἓν μήτε πρός ἓν οἱ λόγοι ἀναφέρονται. 
Hence, there will be many sciences of something only in those cases 
where the accounts of the things are neither related by a PHR nor by 
something one might call a kath hen relation, i.e. a relationship to a 
single genus.
Finally, the introduction of sciences that differ from the kath hen- 
sciences is either a remarkable by-product in the development of the 
science of being or it is actually a long-overdue enhancement of Aristo-
tle´s science-theory, which has been in need of this extension to present 
a theoretical background for sciences that consider things of different 
genera. Both options are compatible. Concerning the different theses 
about the relationship of the allegedly earlier and the allegedly later 
works there is not much hard evidence that renders either of these 
theses impossible. However, most of the present remarks were made 
in favour of the expansion of science thesis. This thesis highlights an 
important clarification made in Met. IV, while remaining compatible 
with the other two theses.455
8.4.3 The “Guide” for Pros Hen Sciences of  
Met. IV.2, 1004a27-31
Another indication that pros hen sciences are actually presented as a 
novelty in this chapter is that Aristotle provides something one may 
call a guide to pros hen sciences. If it is actually a guide, it was clearly 
not designed for only a single application, i.e. to being, but universally 
for many other possible applications.
To develop a pros hen science from scratch, Aristotle proposes that 
one has to fulfil specific tasks:
455 The Relocation-thesis and the change of mind thesis from above.
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Met. IV.2, 1004a27-31: ὥστε διελόμενον 
ποσαχῶς λέγεται ἕκαστον, οὕτως ἀποδο-
τέον πρός τὸ πρῶτον ἐν ἑκάστῃ κατηγο-
ρίᾳ πῶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο λέγεται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ 
τῷ ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ κατ’ 
ἄλλους λεχθήσεται τοιούτους τρόπους.
[1] Just as one has to specify in how many ways 
each thing is said, [2] so one has to specify in 
relation to the first in each category how it is said 
in relation to it, <i.e. the first>: for some things 
will be called accordingly by having it, others by 
producing it, others by other such ways. 
First task [1]: one needs to determine in how many ways something 
 is said.
Second task [2]: one needs to determine appropriately how each 
 thing is related to the first, i.e. the focal reference. 
Only if both requirements are fulfilled, there will be a single science. I 
suggest that Aristotle puts this guide into practice in book V, VII and 
XII of the Metaphysics. All these books can be considered providing 
attempts to fulfil these two tasks, albeit in different ways. Book V cer-
tainly implements the first task. The second task is not completely 
implemented as many cases lack a focal reference, and in those which 
have one, Aristotle does not determine how the other senses are related. 
Nevertheless, many cases comprise something that could serve as a 
focal reference. This study does not provide a full investigation of the 
different examples given in Met. V. Yet, considering Met. V.1 principle, 
V.5, necessity and V.7 being there is something that could act as a focal 
reference. At the same time, many cases do not contain such a hint, e.g. 
V.2 cause; V.4 nature and V.28 genus. Hence, it is plausible to assume that 
the guide for pros hen sciences has a programmatic function.
Given the possibility of a science being concerned with pros hen 
related entities, the oddity of spurious homonyms emerges more strik-
ingly. If spurious homonyms were indeed defined with reference to 
the thing of which they take their name, one could not deny that they 
are part of the respective pros hen science, e.g. one could hardly deny 
that images, statues or dead men are also part of the science of man, i.e. 
anthropology. I may add this odd consequence to the list of arguments 
against definitional overlap in spurious homonyms given in section 4.1.
The fact of spurious cases also clarifies that a pros hen science is not a 
science which has a term as a pivotal point. The pros hen science studies 
only those things that are pros hen related to the focal reference. Hom-
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onymous applications of the same term are not part of that science. 
Through this, it is evident that pros hen sciences cannot be described 
as sciences that consider all the different applications of identical terms 
but only those that fulfil the requirements of the PHR. This is touched 
upon in section 2.2.3. The example concerns those uses of “potency” 
that are based on similarity (cf. Met. IX.1, 1046a8). To determine the 
scope of a pros hen science, it is neither appropriate either to assert 
that, e.g. medicine considers all things that are called “healthy”, nor is it 
appropriate to assert that medicine considers all things that are healthy. 
Both ways are too wide since homonymous uses or homonyms are not 
excluded. The correct way of putting it is to assert that medicine is the 
science only of those healthy things that are pros hen related to health. 
The same may pertain to the case of being. Here, one may justifiedly 
ask, which of the ways of being are pros hen related to substance and 
which are not and thus not part of the science of being qua being. 
8.5 Which Ways of Being are Relevant for 
the Science of Being qua Being?
To answer this question, one may first want to pose another question: 
What does it mean that the science of being qua being is universal – 
καθόλου (Met. IV.1, 1003a24)?456 Does it mean that the science of being 
qua being considers everything that is called “being”? Here the same 
prevails as in the case of medicine touched upon in the last section. 
Aristotle’s proposal of the science of being qua being does not attempt 
to analyse every linguistic occurrence of “εἶναι” or its cognates. If that 
were the case, Aristotle’s science would be the science of the term “being”, 
but Aristotle’s interest is not merely linguistic. It is difficult to decipher 
what exactly his interest is since the expression “being qua being” is 
obscure.457
456 Aristotle’s answer to this question is given in the Μet. VI.1, 1026a30-31. It is universal 
in as much it is primary. It is primary, if there are substances that are prior to sensible sub-
stances such as the unmoved mover which would be the cause of all beings. In this sense 
the science that considers these things is more universal. 
457 One could refer to Met. VI.1
One may find a solution in the alleged guide for pros hen sciences. The 
first task to establish this science is to identify in how many ways “being” 
is said. Then, the second task is showing how they are related.458 Yet, 
which ways of being are the relevant ones?
Unfortunately, there are many passages where Aristotle provides 
lists of the ways “being” is said, which are not identical. Even worse, it 
is also not straightforwardly obvious how these lists are related. Accord-
ing to the Categories, the number of ways may be either four or roughly 
ten depending on passage one focuses on. In Met. V.7, there is a dis-
tinction Aristotle repeats several times in the Metaphysics459 which dis-
tinguishes again between four ways, which are not identical to the four 
ways of the Categories (The approach of Met. V.7 has particular impor-
tance for the structure of the discussion of the Metaphysics, especially 
concerning the books VI–IX). These four ways are:
1. Accidental being 460
2. Per se being / being according to the Categories 461
3. Veridical being  462
4. The potential and actual being 463
This distinction is broader than the Categories distinction since it con-
tains the distinction of the Categories within its “per se being”. Further-
more, it is frustrating that in this chapter, Aristotle does not explain the 
terminology of this list to his other distinctions. In Met. V.7, Aristotle’s 
terminology seems to deviate from his usual terminology. For instance, 
the case of per se being demonstrated in the An. Post. I.4, 73b5-10 and 
Met. VII.1 states that substances are called “per se beings” while acci-
dents are not. In Met. V.7 also what is usually called “accidents” is listed 
under “per se being”. This shows that the terminology in this chapter 
458 As indicated before, not all ways of being that can be distinguished must be part of 
that science, but only those in which there is a focal connection.
459 Met. VI.2 1026a33-b2; IX.10, 1051a34-b2; XII.2, 1069b27; XIV.2, 1089a26-28.
460 Accidental being is excluded from scientific investigation in Met. VI.2-3.
461 Per se being discussed in Met. VII-VIII.
462 Postponed in Met. VI.4, 1027b29. Reconsidered in Met. IX.10.
463 Discussed in Met. IX.1-9.
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deviates, i.e. “per se being” or “accidental being” outside of V.7 is not 
coextensive with “per se being” or “accidental being” within V.7. It is 
difficult to explain the reasons for this difference in detail. A complete 
analysis of this problem is not part of this study, but at least for per se 
being, I make the following suggestion: Outside Met. V.7 list of being, 
“per se” beings are those that are ontologically independent, i.e. sub-
stances. This is apparently not the criterion which is applied within the 
V.7 to qualify as “per se being”. To define a rationale, one could draw a 
connection to the way the categories occur in Top. I.9 and one could 
assert that in Met. V.7 categorial being is called “per se” since, at least 
according to Top. I.9, 103b36-38, all categories can serve as genuine or 
“per se” answers to what-it-is questions. Hence, in this regard, all cate-
gories represent genuine (or per se) kinds of beings, regardless of any 
association between them. The other sense of “per se being” is related 
to the (ontological) order of the categories in the Categories. 
Concerning the accidental being of Met. V.7, there is a similar risk 
of confusion. Accidental being in this context does not refer to the cat-
egories 2–10 but to things that are accidental, or, to use another word, 
random, or randomly occurring, e.g. finding a treasure while digging 
a hole for a plant.464 The treasure discovery is an accident for the dig-
ger. This happens neither necessary nor mostly – ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. In the 
same sense of “accident” the musical can be white (1025a19-20).465 It 
is important that for those accidents, there is only an indeterminate – 
ἀόριστον cause. Aristotle explicitly excludes this kind of “accidental 
being” from the survey of the first philosophy because one cannot 
investigate things with indeterminate causes. I assume that the second 
way, accidents are described in Met. V.30, 1025a30-34 represents the 
“regular” in which “accidental being” is used, i.e. the use that addresses 
the categories 2–10. 
In addition, another remark of Aristotle renders the many ways 
being is said even less restricted since it does not attempt to list “all” 
ways in which “being” is said. It is presented in Met. VIII.2, 1042b25. 
Matthews (1995: 233) examined these different approaches of which 
464 Cf. Met. V.30, 1025a14-17. 
465 This example is also given in Met. V.7 for accidental being. 
the last one strikes him: “Aristotle completely outdoes himself in telling 
us in how many ways ‘to be’ is said. ‘To be’ is said, he tells us there, in 
an indefinitely large number of ways. This claim is both startling and 
unsettling. I shall call it ‘the unsettling claim’.” 
In addition, there is yet another approach listing many ways of being 
given in Met. IV.2, 1003b6-10 which I call the pros hen list of being. 
Met. IV.2, 1003b6-10: τὰ μὲν γὰρ 
ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ’ ὅτι 
πάθη οὐσίας, τὰ δ’ ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς 
οὐσίαν ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις ἢ 
ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ 
οὐσίας ἢ τῶν πρός τὴν οὐσίαν 
λεγομένων, ἢ τούτων τινὸς 
ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας.
Some things are called “beings” because they are sub-
stances, others because they are affections of sub-
stances, others because they are the way towards a 
substance or <they are> destructions or privations or 
qualities or productive or generative of a substance 
or they are of those things which are said to be in 
relation to a substance or because it is the negation 
of something of these things or of a substance <itself>.
As this list is a part of Met. IV.2, and as such, it is presumably the best 
candidate to give an answer to the two tasks of the guide for pros hen 
sciences of the same chapter. It provides a list of ways and further indi-
cates their relation.
Unfortunately, this approach does not attempt to describe a “full” 
list of the ways in which being is said either. It seems to be exemplary 
for the possible relations things can have with substances as some cate-
gories – yet not all – are mentioned. Apparently, it is open-ended.466 
Thus, the examples given in that list only illustrate the multiplicity of 
ways things can be related to a substance, but a definite answer is not 
given and presumably not intended. In general, it is unlikely to be able 
to quantify “in how many ways is being said”. This would unnecessar-
ily restrict Aristotle’s proposal. The disadvantage of this openness is 
that it is difficult to deal with borderline and spurious cases.467 Yet, it 
is clear that this list contains more ways of being than the categorical 
approach as there are cases in this list mentioned that do not fit into 
the categorial scheme. There is, e.g. “the way towards a substance” and 
“the negation of a substance”, which do not refer to any of the catego-
466 For “open-endedness” as a desirable feature of the account of the PHR cf. Shields (1999: 
104ff.). 
467 This is a problem Shields tries to tackle with his CDH4 approach as mentioned earlier 
in section 6.1.1.5.
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ries. Thus, although the pros hen list covers categorical being, its scope 
is not restricted to it. 
I conclude that there is no answer to the question “which senses of 
being are relevant for the science of being?” in the form of a complete 
list. Aristotle’s guide gives the general answer to this question to pros 
hen sciences. Primarily relevant for any pros hen science are only those 
ways of being F that are pros hen related to their focal reference. Thus, 
there is no specific, but only a general answer. 
Regarding Met. V.7 list of ways of being, it is clear that not all of these 
ways are part of the pros hen science of being. Presumably, it is only per 
se being. In Met. IX.1 Aristotle clearly states that it is this sense of being, 
which is related to substance since all accidental categories include the 
account of substance within them. Then he begins examining actual 
and potential being without any remark on the relation of these ways of 
being to substance. There is no explicit indication about these two ways 
of being that enables us to assess whether they are also pros hen related 
to substance or not. I guess that potential and actual being require cat-
egorial being as they are modes in which categorial being occurs and 
thus may be related to substance via their reference to categorial beings.
A more detailed analysis of this case could be object of a future study. 
8.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I address a variety of topics connected to the role of the 
PHR in the context of Met. IV. At the beginning of this chapter, I tried 
to invalidate several of Shields’s arguments he proposed to show that 
there is no Aristotelian doctrine of the multivocity of being. For exam-
ple, he claims that things that are said non-synonymously are all incom-
mensurable. I was able to demonstrate that Aristotle actually excludes 
those things from this rule that are related through priority relations. 
As this is the case for all things that are focally related, I was able to 
reject Shields’s claim. 
In the second section of this chapter, I claimed that the real inno-
vation of Met. IV is not merely the application of the PHR to being, but 
that Aristotle expands the ways in which sciences can be unified. Before 
Met. IV, Aristotle did not mention that the PHR can serve as a principle 
unity for sciences. Because of this, I claimed in the third section that 
the main contribution of Met. IV to the notion of PHR is the introduc-
tion of this feature. This feature is relevant also to the topic of spurious 
homonyms as it is in line with my previous arguments from section 4.1. 
If spurious homonyms allowed a PHR, one should be able to examine 
them scientifically. I deemed this an absurdity. 
In the fourth section, I entered a more detailed discussion on the 
so-called kath hen and pros hen unification of sciences. I argued that a 
pros hen science is not a science of the term that is said in many ways but 
a science that considers those things that are unified by the PHR. Thus, 
it is not necessary to assume that all ways in which “being” is said are 
part of the pros hen science of being. In the last section of this study, I 
examined this question in more detail. There are many passages where 
Aristotle lists different ways in which “to be” is said. I conclude that 
Aristotle’s pros hen science of being only cover those ways of being that 
are focally related to substance. 
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This thesis investigated Aristotle’s notion of pros hen and its relation 
to the Aristotelian notions of homonymy, synonymy and multivocity. 
It examined what exactly these notions mean, explored how they are 
related, and discussed how these notions are displayed and assessed in 
contemporary literature. I stated that the notion of pros hen is primar-
ily determined by logical priority and definitional dependence among 
polysemous multivocals. Moreover, I presented that Aristotle’s notion 
of homonymy is narrower than usually assumed. 
The first chapter showed that Aristotle’s notion of multivocity itself 
requires a thorough analysis and interpretation. I concluded that a 
semantic account of multivocity is central to Aristotle’s works. While a 
univocal term can be replaced by a single logos that determines its sig-
nification, there is a plurality of logoi that corresponds to a multivocal 
term. The second chapter was devoted to the notions of homonymy, 
synonymy and multivocity with a special focus on possible views on 
their relation. This study aimed at challenging the currently dominant 
view on the relation of these notions, which I labelled the InfH-view. 
It assumes that Aristotle’s notion of homonymy is comprehensive and, 
for the most part, identical to the notion of multivocity. I argued that 
this view disregards several crucial aspects that are central to Aristotle’s 
doctrine of these notions. While Aristotle never violates the dogma that 
all homonyms are multivocal, he often claims that some multivocals 
are not homonymous. This warrants that homonymy and multivocity 
are not co-extensive. 
Nevertheless, they are closely related. I argue that the narrower 
notion of homonymy is a subcategory of multivocity and that this rela-
tionship more appropriately represents Aristotle’s doctrine of homon-
ymy, synonymy and multivocity. I called this thesis the DefH-view. It 
is a view that deflates the notion of homonymy from the perspective of 
its usual treatment. However, it inflates the notion of multivocity, which 
reflects Aristotle’s use of these notions. I admitted that there are several 
limitations that come with the proposal of a narrower notion of hom-
onymy. Yet, I argue that these limitations can be bypassed by adhering 
to a developmental thesis. In some earlier works, so it seems, Aristotle 
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did not distinguish between homonymy and multivocity while in later 
works it is beyond doubt that these notions do not coincide. The third 
chapter focused on the allegedly strict definitions of homonymy and 
synonymy found in the Categories 1. I analysed the difficulties of the two 
definitions that are common to both, and additionally, those that are 
related only to the definition of homonymy. In the case of homonymy, 
the account – λόγος of one thing called F is supposed to be different 
from the account of another thing called F. Central to this definition are 
the attributes τῆς οὐσίας and κατὰ τοὔνομα which both belong to λόγος. 
As there have been doubts about the authenticity of the τῆς οὐσίας part, 
I examined the possibility whether one of these attributes is dispens-
able with the result that both are necessary. Moreover, I discussed the 
conceptual scope of the definition of homonymy, i.e. whether it defines 
a narrow notion of homonymy or a comprehensive. The result of this 
analysis was that certain ambiguities within this definition prevent an 
answer free of doubt. However, I argue that the reasons to consider it a 
definition of a narrow notion of homonymy prevail. 
In chapter four, I discussed the controversial topic of spurious hom-
onyms, i.e. the class of examples of homonymy, which are concerned 
with living and dead things and with originals and copies. In each case, 
things have the same names; however, while it is clear that these things 
do not share their name by mere accident, it not clear how they are 
defined. Since Aristotle does not express a distinct answer to this, the 
scholarly opinions diverge. I argued that Aristotle presumably defined 
them without overlap. Accordingly, I claimed that in such cases, a nar-
row notion of homonymy is applied. These examples also show that 
“accidental homonymy” might not be the best label for this case as there 
are reasons indicating that the copy bearing the same name as the orig-
inal may not be by accident. Shields asserted that the only reason for 
these things bearing the same name is “custom and courtesy”. I agreed 
with him that this is an insufficient reason to assume definitional over-
lap between these cases. 
Chapter five introduced the notion of polysemy attempting to fill 
the terminological gap between homonymous multivocals and those 
multivocals that are connected either by a PHR or by an analogy. 
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In chapter six, I explored polysemous multivocals in more detail. The 
core of this chapter dealt with polysemous multivocals that are con-
nected by the PHR. I provided a discussion and critique of a selection 
of contributions relevant to this context. In that section, I argued that in 
contrast to some scholarly proposals, the PHR requires logical priority 
only. Often it is assumed that the focal reference is also prior in exis-
tence to the focally related entities, but I demonstrated with reference 
to several passages that there is no need to assume that. I reviewed the 
difficulties of Shields’s attempt to define what he calls core-dependent 
homonymy. As Aristotle does not state a strict definition of the PHR, I 
proposed to consider the remarks on this notion that are scattered in 
the corpus synoptically. In most cases, the notion is applied but not 
explained in detail. Because of that, an effective way to approach this 
notion is considering its applications, i.e. considering in which situa-
tions the notion is relevant. I concluded that the PHR has more than 
one function. The primary function of this notion is to offer an expla-
nation for the connection of certain multivocals as the PHR primarily 
occurs in those contexts. The PHR can satisfy this explanatory func-
tion since it may also be considered a principle of unity, an alternative 
to generic unity. Furthermore, the PHR is a principle of unity for sci-
ences. This function is an innovation presented in Met. IV.2. Since not 
every principle of unity can feature as a principle of unity of sciences, 
this feature of the PHR is honourable and influential as it is the only 
alternative principle of unity of sciences beside genera. As the linguis-
tic level is held to represent the factual level appropriately, I claim that 
although the PHR in Aristotle is tied to linguistic circumstances, it is 
not grounded by them.468 I then stated that the key features of the PHR 
are logical priority and definitional dependence. In addition, through 
discussion of spurious homonyms, it was found that it is very diffi-
cult to determine which cases exhibit logical priority and which lack 
it. Shields saw that Aristotle’s remarks do not enable us to distinguish 
proper from improper cases of association and tried to determine the 
missing criterion. He assumes that the focally related entities must be 
causally related to the focal reference. I argued that there are severe 
468 This alludes to SE 165a6-10. 
problems in Shields’s approach. I claimed that Aristotle does not declare 
what Shields tries to attribute to him and that Aristotle does not offer 
strict criteria that would enable us to reconstruct a proper definition. 
Nevertheless, I sought to define the PHR with a two-fold attempt. 
One definition corresponded to each of the two kinds of examples of the 
PHR. I distinguished between examples containing paronymy between 
the focal reference and the focally related entities such as “health” and 
“healthy” and those examples lacking paronymy as it is the case with 
“friendship”. So far, this distinction is broadly neglected in the literature. 
In addition, in that section, I analysed how paronymy differs from the 
PHR and how the analogy is related to the PHR. In contrast to Shields, I 
proposed that the analogy is a real alternative to the PHR when it comes 
to the question of the explanation of certain multivocals. 
In the seventh section of this study, I examined the relationship 
between p-series and the PHR as it has often been claimed to exhibit 
a tight relationship. I concluded that there is a far more remote con-
nection between these cases than it is usually assumed. There are no 
reasons to assume that the priority and posteriority relations of things 
ordered in series – τὰ ἐφεξῆς rest upon logical priority. Additionally, I 
showed that in the case of focally related entities, the focal reference 
is not contained within the focally related entities, whereas this is the 
case in things ordered in series. 
The eighth section discussed the PHR in the context of Met. IV. It 
revealed a discussion of the question about the most innovative fea-
ture of that book. The result indicated that Aristotle’s modification of 
his notion of science plays a crucial role. However, this modification 
is only possible since Aristotle also ascribes a new feature to the PHR, 
namely, to function as a principle of unity for sciences. The section 
also scrutinises the alleged tension between “earlier” and “later” works 
of Aristotle concerning the question about the absence of the PHR as 
a tool to explain the unity of sciences, especially in the EE and EN. In 
addition, I claim that not all ways in which being is said are relevant for 
the science of being qua being but only some. This insight helps under-
stand the relations between the various lists of the ways in which being 
is said, which are spread throughout the corpus. 
216 General Conclusions
Finally, in the prospect of further investigations, I would like to mention 
that there is an application of the notion of pros hen in Met. XII.10 that 
has not been addressed by this study. I omitted it because that applica-
tion of the term “πρὸς ἕν” is certainly different from the one discussed 
within this study. It is concerned with the causal unification of being, 
which is addressed in Met. XII.4–5. In Met. XII.5 1071a4ff. Aristotle 
claims that the ultimate unmoved mover is numerically the same for all 
beings. In Met. XII.10, 1075a18-19 Aristotle calls the dependence of the 
whole cosmos on the (first) unmoved mover a pros hen unification. This 
application of the notion of pros hen does not imply a logical depen-
dency of lower-level entities on the first unmoved mover. However, it 
implies a causal dependency on the first unmoved mover. 
General Conclusions 217
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This doctoral thesis addresses a group of conceptual instruments 
that are central to Aristotle‘s philosophy, namely, the concepts 
of pros hen, homonymy, synonymy and multivocity (a neologism 
for the phrase “to be said in many ways”). These instruments 
are crucial to many of Aristotle‘s works as he devotes himself 
to analysing the key notions in each of his investigations using 
these instruments.
Despite the undisputable importance of these instruments, they 
display severe interpretative problems, which this thesis criti-
cally evaluates. The currently established view on the relation-
ship between homonymy and multivocity is discussed and then 
reassessed in order to approach the definition of the so-called 
pros hen structure. This approach takes into account a so-far 
undescribed distinction of types of examples Aristotle uses and 
sheds new light on the assessments of the role of the pros hen 
structure in Aristotle’s philosophy and the theories on develop-
ment in Aristotle’s thought.
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